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1. We are Climate Change: 
Climate Debates Between Transnational 
and Local Discourses
Michael Brüggemann and Simone Rödder
Local discourses around the world draw on multiple resources to 
make sense of a “travelling idea” such as climate change, including 
direct experiences of extreme weather, mediated reports, educational 
NGO activities, and pre-existing values and belief systems. There is no 
simple link between scientific literacy, climate-change awareness, and a 
sustainable lifestyle, but complex entanglements of transnational and 
local discourses and of scientific and other (religious, moral etc.) ways of 
making sense of climate change. As the case studies in this volume show, 
this entanglement of ways of sense-making results in both localizations 
of transnational discourses and the climatization of local discourses: 
aspects of the travelling idea of climate change are well-received, 
integrated, transformed, or rejected. Our comparison reveals a major 
factor that shapes the local appropriation of the concept of anthropogenic 
climate change: the fit of prior local interpretations, norms and practices 
with travelling ideas influences whether they are likely to be embraced 
or rejected.
© Michael Brüggemann and Simone Rödder, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0212.01
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Silla […] means the weather. Silla means also the human intelligence. 
So the weather and human intelligence are connected in our mythology, 
[…] the bigger intelligence that means the universe. So the universe, the 
weather of the globe, our weather […] but also the human intelligence 
are connected.
Interview with Inuit representative on a United Nations climate summit, as 
quoted in Roosvall and Tegelberg (2018: 69). 
The work of literary scholars, anthropologists, cultural historians, and 
critical theorists over the past several decades has yielded abundant 
evidence that “nature” is not nearly so natural as it seems. Instead, it is 
a profoundly human construction. This is not to say that the nonhuman 
world is somehow unreal or a mere figment of our imaginations—
far from it. But the way we describe and understand that world is so 
entangled with our own values and assumptions that the two can never 
be fully separated. What we mean when we use the word “nature” says 
as much about ourselves as about the things we label with that word.
Cronon (1995: 25), as quoted in Jasanoff (2010: 245).
Echoing the first quote, it is a key proposition of the social sciences 
that representing nature entails representing humans (e.g. Jasanoff 
2010; Jasanoff 2004; Luckmann 1970; Berger and Luckmann 1966). 
Anthropogenic global warming is a case in point: our physical 
environment, including the climate and the landscape, shapes our social 
realities; our social realities, in turn, influence our perceptions of our 
physical surroundings. These perceptions shape our practices and ways 
of living—which again affect the climate system.
 “We are the climate”, states ethnographer de Wit in Chapter 5, 
Tanzania. The phrase is echoed in different studies assembled in this 
book, including Maasailand in northern Tanzania, the capital city of 
Greenland, Nuuk, and the Philippine Island of Palawan.
There is, thus, a threefold connection between society and climate 
change. We are climate change, as our interpretations of climate change 
reflect who we are. We are climate change, as our lifestyle is based on 
the massive emission of greenhouse gases. Thirdly, and this is a major 
finding from the empirical studies presented in this book: the notion of a 
complex entanglement between society and nature, climate, and climate 
change is shared among many communities around the globe.
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Given that climate change exists and will proceed regardless of what 
we think about it, why is it important to study how local communities 
make sense of climate change? As has long been argued in sociology 
(Luhmann 1989), the physical and biogeochemical processes described 
by terms such as climate and climate change have to be distinguished 
from the patterns of interpretation related to these processes that find 
resonance in society. In this sense, the concept of climate change is a social 
construction (Stehr and von Storch 1995). Interpretations of climate 
change, such as those that stress individual and collective efficacy (the 
belief that “we can make a difference”), may motivate people to change 
their lifestyles and, more importantly, mobilize political action, while 
feelings of fear and shock may overwhelm, paralyze actions or lead 
to risk denial (Feldman and Hart 2015; O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole 
2009). Responsibility for action may be attributed to individuals or to 
political and economic decision-makers. Different causes of action may 
be advocated. All of these factors will ultimately influence how societies 
react to climate change. This is why it is not only of academic interest, 
but also of practical importance to study local discourses about climate 
change.
This book investigates sense-making as a process of social 
construction. Sociologists Berger and Luckmann (1966) have famously 
argued that society is composed of social constructions of reality in 
the myriad of day-to-day interactions in which we define, perform, 
and negotiate individual and collective selves. Social representations 
theory from social psychology likewise posits that there are patterns of 
meaning embedded in media content as well as in direct communication 
processes that shape social interactions (Höijer 2011, see also Chapter 
2, Greenland). Combining this meaning-based approach with the idea 
of social differentiation, human geographer Hulme has described the 
scientific concept of climate change as “an idea that now travels well 
beyond its origins in the natural sciences. And as this idea meets new 
cultures on its travels and encounters the worlds of politics, economics, 
popular culture, commerce and religion—often through the interposing 
role of the media—climate change takes on new meanings and serves 
new purposes” (Hulme 2009: xxvi; see also Chapter 3, Philippines).
Important factors that influence both the individual and collective 
sense-making of climate change include the encounter of (1) transnational 
4 Global Warming in Local Discourses
and local discourses and (2) scientific and other ways of sense-making. 
The two dimensions are empirically not distinct, yet it makes sense to 
distinguish them analytically and discuss them one by one.
(1) Transnational and local discourses: The climate debate is shaped 
by strong transnational (cutting across national borders) actors and 
institutions. The transnational character of climate research has been 
institutionalized in the set-up of and reports by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and is communicated based on 
a consensus policy (Hoppe and Rödder 2019). Another driver of 
transnational elements of climate debates is the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and its annual climate 
summits (Conferences of the Parties, COPs). COPs have been found to 
be the most salient events in media coverage of climate change (Schäfer, 
Ivanova, and Schmidt 2013); they have become political media events 
reaching broad audiences (Brüggemann et al. 2017; Wessler et al. 2016).
Two observatories of media coverage of climate change at the 
Universities of Colorado (Media and Climate Change Observatory, 
MeCCO) and Hamburg (Online Media Monitor on Climate Change, 
OMM) confirm the relevance of COPs and transnational science events 
in drawing attention to climate change. They also show that climate 
change was heavily debated in the years 2007 to 2009, when the Nobel 
Peace Prize was awarded to the IPCC and Al Gore, and when the climate 
summit in Copenhagen attracted high hopes for transnational climate 
governance. The failure of Copenhagen led to a decade of public neglect 
of the issue, reflected in waning media attention to the topic (Boykoff et al. 
2018; Brüggemann et al. 2018). The media debate on climate change has 
re-emerged in 2018 and 2019 after summers of heat and drought and the 
transnational climate strikes inspired by teenage activist Greta Thunberg 
(Mahl et al. 2020). The media debate is thus driven by transnational events 
and actors, including transnational NGO networks, as well as strategies 
of denial and downplaying the issue, fueled by the interests of carbon-
dioxide-emitting industries (Oreskes 2017; Dunlap and McCright 2015). 
While strong transnational discourses may lead us to expect 
similarities in local discourses about climate change, there are also good 
reasons to expect diversity. Local discourses are embedded in national 
political contexts that clearly also matter for the debate on climate 
change, as different content analyses have shown. National government 
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positions tend to set the frames in national media outlets (Wessler et 
al. 2016; Grundmann and Scott 2014; Grundmann 2007). Ethnographic 
research has shown that local communities do not just mirror global 
climate discourses but develop their own interpretations of nature and/
or climate change (Stensrud and Eriksen 2019; Baer and Singer 2014; 
Crate and Nuttall 2009).
(2) Scientific and other ways of sense-making: The global governance 
approach of the climate regime resonates well with the prevailing scientific 
framing of the climate problem as global temperature rise (Aykut, Foyer, 
and Morena 2017; Aykut and Dahan 2015). Yet, scientific debates clash 
with the logics of other social worlds (Grundmann and Rödder 2019). 
The emergence of the concept of anthropogenic climate change has 
sparked entangled discourses in science, politics and journalistic media 
(Weingart, Engels, and Pansegrau 2000). National politics, as mentioned 
above, shapes national climate debates, as do the logics of journalism 
and political leanings of news outlets (Brüggemann and Engesser 2017; 
Boykoff 2011). Political ideologies overshadow scientific sense-making 
of climate change. Denying and downplaying the risks of anthropogenic 
climate change has become a defining feature of being Republican in the 
United States (Hoffman 2015; Dunlap and McCright 2008).
The impersonal and universal abstractions of science do not resonate 
well with local discourses. Jasanoff argues that the scientific-political 
representation of the climate problem as a global phenomenon is at odds 
with the sensations and memories through which local communities 
make sense of climatic change (2010: 237). The scientific meaning of 
climate change, as a decades-long increase in average global temperature, 
is not something that individuals can experience: “Global warming is 
not founded on everyday experience, has no immediate effects, and is 
not readily observable” (Ungar 1992: 489). Exposure to extreme weather 
or changes in vegetation or seasons can, of course, be experienced, yet 
it is an act of interpretation to link them to climate change (see also 
Rudiak-Gould 2013 on the controversy of whether climate change is 
visible). It has been shown that political concern about climate change 
has benefited from weather anomalies since the 1970s: “With a little help 
from Mother Nature […] climate change research reached the agenda of 
top US policy-makers” in 1971-75 (Hart and Victor 1993: 665, as quoted 
in Grundmann and Stehr 2012: 120). Yet, extended phases of extreme 
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summer heat (e.g., in 1988, 2012, and 2018/19) have only partly found 
resonance as “social scares” (Ungar 2014, 1992). 
Communities do not necessarily draw a link between experiences of 
extreme weather and global warming, and indeed, connecting everyday 
experiences of weather phenomena to climate change has long been 
regarded as a misunderstanding of the scientific concept. Yet, as Jasanoff 
(2010) points out, this is an obvious way to help individuals make sense 
of the concept. Moving on from the misunderstanding-paradigm, a 
research field has recently emerged in climate sciences that explicitly 
aims to assess the connection between extreme weather phenomena 
and climate change, the science of event attribution (see Chapter 
7, Attribution Science). To turn the link between extreme weather 
events and climate change into a new focus of climate research may be 
interpreted as a scientific response to the mismatch of scales between 
climate science and every-day experiences in both time and space. 
Following Jasanoff, we assume that “the impersonal, apolitical and 
universal imaginary of climate change projected by science comes into 
conflict with the subjective, situated and normative imaginations of 
human actors engaging with nature” (2010: 233). This book addresses 
these tensions based on in-depth studies of how communities around 
the world make sense of climate change: How do local discourses relate 
to global discourses of science and politics? The volume’s case studies 
extend beyond the well-researched Anglo-Saxon sphere and include 
both industrialized nations as well as perspectives from the Global 
South. Each case explores three dimensions of climate-change discourse. 
The first dimension is patterns of communication related to climate 
change. Information about climate change often comes to us in mediated 
form, and the type of media influences the message that is conveyed 
(see, e.g., traditional media theories going back as far as McLuhan 
1964). Therefore, each chapter analyzes who is communicating climate 
change messages—and using which media, including mass and social 
media, as well as interpersonal communications.
Second, we are interested in patterns of interpretation about climate 
change that emerge from the different flows of communication. Local 
recipients may engage in oppositional readings of media coverage (Hall 
et al. 1978): their sense-making might depart from the frames provided by 
elite sources that populate media coverage. Therefore, each chapter probes 
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whether climate change is viewed in the study location as anthropogenic 
or not, and as a severe problem or not. Additional questions include: Who 
is held responsible for mitigating and/or adapting to climate change? Do 
people self-identify as victims of, or as contributors to, anthropogenic 
climate change? What solutions do they advocate?
The third dimension is the entanglement of meanings originating at 
the local or transnational level including how the scientific and other 
framings of climate change speak to each other. 
We suggest grasping entanglements of meanings with the concepts 
of localization of transnational climate discourses and climatization of local 
discourses, respectively. The first term invokes the precedence of local 
patterns of interpreting concepts from afar. It has been used to describe 
processes or strategies that counter trends of homogenization through 
globalization and emphasizes the relevance of local factors of influence 
(see, e.g., Escobar 2001). The second term, climatization, stresses changes 
in local discourses induced by transnational climate-change discourses. 
It was developed in the context of studies on transnational climate 
policy making (Aykut, Foyer, and Morena 2017). Foyer and colleagues 
diagnose a “climatization” of the policy world whereby participants in 
various discourses present issues that were formerly unrelated to the 
climate problem through a “climatic lens”, leading to the treatment of a 
variety of issues according to the dominant logics of the global climate 
regime (Foyer, Aykut, and Morena 2017).
Beyond this framework, the individual chapters draw on a variety 
of analytical perspectives. Each presents findings from an in-depth 
study (mostly PhD theses) conducted within different disciplinary 
traditions, including anthropology with its focus on detailed description 
(Geertz 1973, see Chapter 3, Philippines, and Chapter 5, Tanzania) and 
media and journalism studies, from both interpretive (see Chapter 
2, Greenland, and Chapter 6, Bangladesh) and more standardized 
approaches (see Chapter 4, Germany). All share a solid grounding in 
fieldwork, and all prioritize local discourse, asking how communities 
around the world re-contextualize and reframe transnational discourses 
on climate change. As expected, all case studies demonstrate that local 
communities relate their everyday experiences of changing seasons and 
extreme weather events to climate change. Notably, the attribution of 
weather events to climate change has come full circle and refocused 
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attention in climate science on event attribution. We therefore asked a 
climate scientist to introduce the field of event attribution science by 
presenting the current state of knowledge on how climate change affects 
extreme weather events and seasonal phenomena in the world regions 
discussed in this volume (see Chapter 7, Attribution Science). This final 
chapter can itself be read as a piece of scientific discourse—written 
with a broad audience in mind—that speaks to the other chapters’ 
explorations of local communities’ sense-making. 
In the following, we summarize each study, explain its approach and 
case-specific findings and eventually discuss some common patterns 
that emerge from the case studies.
Climate Change as a Vehicle for Hopes  
and Fears in Greenland
While the Arctic regularly serves as a poster child for dangerous 
anthropogenic climate-change impacts in media reports, its citizen’s 
perspectives on both the impacts and their media representation have 
so far received much less attention (but see Nilsson and Christensen 
2019; Nuttall 2009). Chapter 2, written by communication scholar Freja 
Eriksen, helps fill this gap by studying how Greenlanders make sense 
of climate-change impacts through both media exposure and personal 
experiences. Her analysis is based on social representations theory and 
on five focus group interviews involving fifteen inhabitants of Nuuk, 
the capital of Greenland. 
Eriksen finds that while iconic images of melting icebergs portray 
Arctic citizens as climate change victims, her interviewees do not self-
identify as victims. The local discourses she describes diversify the global 
imaginary of Greenland “melting away”, even including the positive 
image of a future capital “Costa del Nuuk”. The notion of “Costa del 
Nuuk” is an example of naming and anchoring the unclear future of a 
warming Greenland with well-known concepts such as summer holidays 
on the Spanish Mediterranean coast. These humorous replies confirm 
previous findings by Nuttall (2009), whereby political aspirations for 
self-governance and independence are linked to a warming climate that 
opens up chances for future development (while Denmark, the former 
colonizer, might become flooded).
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Eriksen’s findings also echo Nuttall’s (2009) argument that in 
Greenland, the climate is widely understood to be permanently changing 
and intrinsically unstable. Similar to perceptions among the Maasai (see 
Chapter 5, Tanzania), unreliable seasons and a changing climate are 
thus not believed to be extraordinary, new, or necessarily manmade. 
Notably, for the inhabitants of Greenland, who we might expect to 
have direct experiences with climate change, the topic appears heavily 
mediated by news coverage. As one high school student puts it: “We live 
in Greenland but we don’t see icebergs break off every day”. While the 
interviewees criticize too stereotypical media descriptions of climate-
change impacts, media coverage remains a major reference point. 
And while some interviewees oppose the dominant journalistic story 
of harmful climate change with Greenland as one of the most heavily 
affected countries, Eriksen points out that the alternative narrative put 
forward—politically and economically beneficial climate change—may 
also be taken from the media. 
The chapter highlights that both media and local discourses cannot 
be treated as homogeneous entities. Eriksen found that an individual’s 
professional background influenced whether they stressed the potential 
economic benefits or environmental risks of climate change. Also, groups 
of older people were more likely to doubt that humans have triggered 
current climate change and to believe that the media exaggerate climate 
change. Younger interviewees asserted that the media underestimate the 
true dangers of man-made global warming. Yet both age groups shared 
a distrust and criticism of media coverage, albeit for different reasons. 
Some inhabitants called for more local Greenlandic perspectives on 
climate change in the media.
The chapter clearly illustrates both the clash between transnational 
and local discourses and the conflict between the scientific view and 
self-assessments of climate-change impacts. While science warns that 
the Arctic is more heavily affected by climate change and is warming 
faster than most other world regions, and transnational media 
stereotypes propagate iconic images of polar bears and melting ice, 
local discourses emphasize that the climate has always been changing, 
that warmer temperatures might actually be better for Greenland and 
that Greenlanders have been able to adapt to these changes throughout 
history.
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Recontextualizing a Travelling Idea: Climate Change 
on the Philippine Island of Palawan
Chapter 3, written by social and cultural anthropologist Thomas Friedrich, 
studies the case of the Philippine island of Palawan to shed light on how 
climate change is perceived on an island where environmental protection 
is popular. Employing multi-method ethnography, the chapter explores 
how the idea of climate change is locally reframed based on personal 
experiences, and embedded in pre-existing ways of knowing nature and 
cultural practices including an already strong environmentalism. 
Conceptually, the chapter draws on Hulme’s interpretation of 
climate change as a “travelling idea” (2009), and argues that the notion 
of climate change has evolved predominantly in a top-down direction, 
from global IPCC knowledge via networks of media and politics to local 
people with diverse cultural backgrounds and epistemologies who 
try to make sense of it. Friedrich combines this notion with a Science 
and Technology Studies-informed distinction between knowledge and 
meaning, reiterating Jasanoff’s point that scientific climate knowledge 
arises from impersonal observation whereas cultural meanings emerge 
from embedded experience in specific environmental, social and cultural 
contexts (Jasanoff 2010).
Because the island of Palawan has been exposed to severe 
environmental destruction, the government has pursued a vigorous 
environmental discourse and a determined environmental policy 
since the 1990s, which has also contributed to a consensual view of the 
perception of climate change.
The chapter examines educational theatre performances to 
demonstrate how the production and dissemination of a local notion 
of climate change takes place. The communicator of knowledge about 
climate change that the ethnographer examined in this case is a local 
NGO. In all their plays, natural disasters were linked to morally 
wrong environmental behavior such as cutting mangroves for charcoal 
production, an illegal but widespread practice on the island. The author 
thus argues that activities like the theatre “contribute to maintaining 
the popularity of tree planting as a means of environmental and climate 
protection”. Recommending already widespread activities helps 
to secure the popularity of environmental protection measures, as 
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opposed to discourses that brand popular practices, such as eating meat 
or driving cars, as environmentally harmful.
As for the question of entanglements between local and global 
discourses, the chapter shows that there is no linear relationship between 
climate knowledge and environmentally friendly behavior. On Palawan, 
climate change is perceived as one natural hazard among many, and 
“the discourse on climate change may have served more as post-hoc 
justification than original motivation for past and present behavior”. 
It is thus neither knowledge of, nor belief in, anthropogenic climate 
change that makes a behavioral difference. Rather, the global discourse 
reinforces pre-existing beliefs, values, and practices. On Palawan, 
“it strengthens people’s traditionally strong environmentalism and 
validates their strong rejection of, for example, cutting trees or burning 
garbage”. In such a situation, the climate may be protected ‘accidentally’ 
while communities pursue other goals.
Climate Change Comes Closer for Locals in Northern 
Germany 
In Chapter 4, a media and communication studies author team (Imke 
Hoppe, Fenja De Silva-Schmidt, Michael Brüggemann, and Dorothee 
Arlt) reports findings from a broader research project at Hamburg 
University that explored audience reception of the COP 21 climate 
summit in Paris. The chapter compares how the Paris summit has been 
perceived and interpreted in an urban (Hamburg) and a rural setting 
(Otterndorf), both located in Northern Germany. The small town of 
Otterndorf is situated at the end of the Elbe estuary on the North coast, 
and the metropolis of Hamburg is located upstream along the Elbe River. 
The authors explore how space, both as a physical and a social concept, 
influences interpretations of climate change, with a focus on the role 
media reception plays in the process. The chapter draws on data from 
focus group discussions and media diaries, and uses an online panel 
survey from the wider project to contextualize the qualitative analysis 
presented in the chapter.
The results show that both media use and interpretations of 
climate change are fairly similar in both settings. Respondents in both 
settings criticized local media coverage of the summit. Apparently, 
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local newspapers failed to explain the complex matter of transnational 
climate governance and make it locally relevant. Locals were aware 
of the summit but claimed that the media did not explain what the 
international negotiations were about.
Spatial differences mattered as residents of Hamburg and Otterndorf 
differed in the extent to which they were personally concerned about 
potential climate-change impacts. Even though sea level rise is a tangible 
consequence of climate change for residents of Hamburg as well, they 
hold strong beliefs that it will not affect them personally. Historical 
floods (devastating parts of Hamburg in 1962) are no longer viewed 
as a threat. People in Otterndorf, with the rising tides of the North Sea 
behind the dikes, felt more personally concerned about climate change 
and worried that coastal protection was insufficient. Local discourses 
found in Hamburg thus provide evidence of the belief that Hamburg 
(e.g., through the harbor) contributes to climate change, but is not really 
affected. The local discourse in Otterndorf, taking place among the 
inhabitants and apparently being neglected by local media, was more 
about climate change as a threat to some of their villages.
An unexpected finding was the role of local roots and connection: 
long-term inhabitants drew stronger links between climate change, 
climate policy making, and their local community. The study thus 
concludes that the longer an individual lives in a place and the 
more connected he or she feels to it, the more relevant spatial factors 
become for her or his experience of climate change. While the science 
of anthropogenic climate change is widely accepted, the global policy 
discourse remains remote to local communities in Germany.
Resistance to the Idea of Anthropogenic Climate 
Change among the Maasai
Chapter 5 travels south into Maasailand. It draws on fourteen months of 
ethnographic work conducted by anthropologist Sara de Wit for a PhD 
dissertation at the University of Cologne. She studies the ways in which 
climate-change discourse is translated, communicated and received in 
a rural village in Northern Tanzania, exploring how villagers who have 
no experience with Western life and whose culture is shaped by religion 
translate the story of climate change. 
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Conceptually, the chapter draws on cultural theories of risk perception 
(e.g., Douglas 1992) that emphasize that our models of nature and risk 
are not value-neutral scientific descriptions but are influenced by moral 
and political considerations. The chapter reconstructs the translations 
of the transnational discourse about climate change driven by the mass 
media (represented by the local radio station), the (Christian) church 
and NGOs. It finds that the ways in which climate science is translated 
do not sit well with the Maasai’s religion and culture. The absence of 
awareness of and talk about climate change is not primarily rooted in a 
lack of knowledge, argues de Wit, but constitutes an “attempt to remain 
faithful to one’s own set of norms, values, beliefs”.
The first reason for the Maasai to oppose the scientific narrative about 
climate change is that it is perceived as an attack on their religion. In the 
local language, the same word (Eng’ai) denotes God, sky (or heaven), 
and rain. Drought and rain are the domain of God. Now NGOs—in 
an educational movie described in the chapter—are telling the Maasai 
that it is climate change that brings about drought and that humans 
cause climate change. Hence, it is of no use to pray for rain. Scientists 
are viewed as secular prophets propagating their apocalyptic tale. Also, 
discussing the future meets resistance among the Maasai, who “refuted 
any attempt to probe future climate scenarios or ideas of the future in 
any sense. Questions related to futurology were always cast away with 
laughter, followed by ‘we cannot know’, or ‘only God knows’”.
The second reason why the message of anthropogenic climate 
change meets opposition is that the local community views changing 
weather and unreliable seasons as normal conditions of life. The idea 
of stability as the “natural” state of nature seems strange (see also 
Chapter 2, Greenland). A third reason is that the Maasai currently have 
to deal with a deep cultural change following a switch from a nomadic 
to a semi-nomadic lifestyle: “Perhaps the weather has changed, but 
we have changed, too”. The deterioration of climatic conditions is 
furthermore interpreted as a consequence of the decline of culture and 
morals.
De Wit points out that in this context it is “not fruitful to disentangle 
climatic and societal changes”—a marked contrast to the scientific 
attribution approach as outlined in Chapter 7, which focuses on isolating 
the contribution of climate change to extreme weather events. She 
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concludes that the story of climate change is not doomed to be rejected 
locally, if it respects the “inclusive ontology in which society, morals and 
nature are interwoven—a way of living that ceases to make sense when 
purged of Eng’ai”.
Climate Change and Other Troubles along Bangladesh’s 
Coastline
In Chapter 6, Bangladesh-born communication scholar Shameem 
Mahmud focuses on the country’s coastal region to explore how 
communities at the forefront of climate-change risks make sense of the 
concept. Thus, the chapter deals with yet another group that is often 
dubbed “climate victims” in Western discourses. 
The chapter studies the community’s major information sources on 
climate change and how it understands climate change in the context 
of constant exposure to regional geo-hazards such as tropical cyclones, 
floods, salinity in the water and soil, storms, and coastal erosion. 
The conceptual part of the chapter is based on the climate change 
communication and risk perception literature. Methodologically, the 
study draws mainly on interviews with thirty-eight citizens of a coastal 
district in Bangladesh, located close to the world’s largest mangrove 
forest. Almost half of the participants were illiterate. 
The study finds that interviewees obtained climate change 
information from a number of sources, including mass media (radio 
and television), NGO advocacy programmes, and local opinion leaders. 
This acquired knowledge focuses on topics such as salinization and sea 
level rise as local impacts of climate change. It is interesting to note that, 
just as in Greenland (see Chapter 2, Greenland), the local communities 
in this climate-change-affected country still learn about the concept 
through the media. An interesting aspect of this chapter is the role of 
NGOs in framing the climate issue for the coastal community. There are 
250 active NGOs in the region, and attributions to climate change are 
often induced by NGO officials who conduct awareness programmes 
for farmers and fishermen. “I have heard this might be because of 
climate change” was a standard narrative among community members 
in response to the interview questions.
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Mahmud identifies two major patterns of sense-making of climate 
change within the community. First, a “regional geo-hazard pattern”, 
which contextualizes risks from climate change with well-known local 
geo-hazards, namely “climate change as increased and unprecedented 
storms”, “climate change as drowning in the sea”, and “climate 
change means increased salinity”. The second pattern is “weather 
and seasonal variance”. It describes how the interviewees attribute 
their personal experiences of changes in local weather and seasons to 
climate change. The communities’ direct exposure to extreme weather 
events and experiences of seasonal change and other vagaries of the 
weather clearly influence how they make sense of mediated climate 
change information. 
In their explanation of phenomena, such as increased salinity and 
rising tidal surges, the interviewees stated that the phenomena were “not 
new”, but attributed the increase of the problem to the hitherto abstract 
concept of climate change—a phenomenon that social representations 
theory (see Chapter 2, Greenland, and Chapter 3, Philippines) describes 
as “anchoring” a new concept in familiar ones. The interviewees were 
also aware of local causes other than climate change: e.g. shrimp 
aquaculture as a source of increased salinization. Rather than attributing 
any ecological problem to the global issue of climate change, and in 
contrast to some of what they have heard from NGOs, the community 
members claimed agency, and responsibility: “We should not always 
blame others for the problem”.
The study reveals complex entanglements between local and global 
discourses, including the question of responsibility for a problem 
like salinization. The chapter highlights the importance of analyzing 
NGOs’ communication strategies, tools and content, as well as their 
role in creating awareness and motivating behavioral changes among 
rural communities. In conclusion, local “place identity” formed 
through experiences of regional geo-hazards, in combination with 
media information and NGO communication, make climate change a 
salient risk in this coastal community of Bangladesh.
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Attributing Extreme Weather Events to Climate 
Change: The Perspective of Science
In Chapter 7, physicist and climate modeler Friederike Otto describes 
the kinds of changes that are already being experienced locally and 
those that we are likely to see in the future. As one of the pioneering 
researchers in the emerging field of event attribution, she shows how 
research has recently advanced in exploring the link between extreme 
weather events and climate change. The chapter also exemplifies 
how science produces knowledge that is subsequently considered as 
authoritative in society. The process starts with a “landmark paper” that 
proposes a new methodology, which is followed by peer scrutiny and 
results in published claims of relevant knowledge.
The chapter translates the question of links between climate 
change and extreme weather into the scientific language of changing 
probabilities: climate change has increased the likelihood of particular 
types of events by a certain percentage. It also emphasizes that 
attributable changes in these probabilities are associated with a 
number of uncertainties, and that the robustness of various studies 
varies strongly depending on the types of events and geographic 
region investigated.
Nonetheless, there are some basic facts that climate scientists now 
treat as known for certain, including the fact that the current global 
warming trend is anthropogenic. This warming causes rising sea levels 
and increases the risk of some extreme weather events. This link is 
more evident for heat waves and large-scale rainfall, while at this time 
droughts and other events can only be linked to climate change in 
specific regions and seasons. 
While Otto clearly stresses advances in this field, she also highlights 
limitations such as the complexity of weather phenomena like droughts 
and a lack of data, especially in the Global South. There are also natural 
variabilities in the climate system that influence how often extreme 
events occur. Furthermore, anthropogenic climate change interferes 
with other human impacts such as changing land use patterns and 
how communities manage rivers and water systems (see Chapter 6, 
Bangladesh). Otto explains that the damage caused by extreme events 
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is understood as an outcome not only of the event itself, but local 
vulnerability and exposure are major risk factors in addition to the 
meteorological hazards. The methodological rationale of the scientific 
approach is to disentangle these factors in order to accurately attribute 
given effects to particular causes. This approach to disentangling 
different causes stands in marked contrast to how different factors 
(anthropogenic, natural) and considerations (scientific, religious, 
moral, and economic) are entangled in local debates about climate 
change.
This chapter draws on data gathered from around the world and 
provides a perspective that is shaped by the logic of scientific research. 
Although it holds insights on specific regions, its perspective is 
not that of a local community but of a distinct professional way of 
sense-making. Still, it illustrates how the media and public debates 
influence climate science, and thus provides evidence of what has 
been conceptualized as the medialization of science (Rödder et al. 
2012; Weingart 1998). Individual perceptions and journalistic claims 
about links between extreme weather events and climate change 
have long preceded climate scientists’ ability to draw this link. Public 
claims about possible links may have provided the impetus for the 
emergence of the science of event attribution—which has only very 
recently matured to make claims about the role of anthropogenic 
climate change in specific weather events.
Comparing Local Discourses
Local discourses on climate change are, in many ways, unique. 
Describing and understanding the specifics and details of each case is 
an endeavor that goes beyond the scope of book chapters and deserves 
full-length dissertations (De Wit 2017; Friedrich 2017; Mahmud 
2016). Having summarized the cases with at least some of their 
specific results, we now briefly discuss them comparatively, looking 
at similarities and differences. We follow our framework of patterns of 
communication, patterns of interpretation, and patterns of entanglement of 
transnational and local discourses. 
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Patterns of Communication: How Local Communities 
Use and Evaluate Sources of Information on Climate 
Change
Local communities typically distinguish between “us” (voices from my 
village, family, friends) and “them/others” (voices from afar, such as 
journalistic media, NGOs, and scientists) in the use and assessment of 
sources on climate change. Some sources, like local media outlets or local 
NGOs, may be situated in between these two categories, depending on 
how strongly they are rooted locally. “Other” sources are used to learn 
about the world beyond the local community (“I have seen it on TV”, 
“It was on the news”), yet these sources are not trusted in the same way 
as those socially close to home. When asked whom they would rather 
believe about climate change, students from Greenland responded 
their local “elders” or “my grandmother” (see Chapter 2, Greenland). 
In more traditional societies, being socially close seems to overlap with 
spatial proximity, since families and communities tend to be located 
in the same village or in a limited area. In highly mediatized Western 
societies, particularly in urban contexts, being spatially and socially 
close (in the sense of belonging to the same community) may or may 
not overlap. Yet, the distinction between familiar sources that are part of 
the community and voices from afar remains relevant in both settings.
Media coverage, in particular, is criticized, mainly for not being 
able to understand local concerns related to climate change. Being a 
detached observer (and therefore keeping distance) is, in fact, a core self-
understanding of journalism (Hanitzsch 2011; Deuze 2005). Climate 
change as a travelling idea that comes from afar is typically mediated 
by journalistic media, as well as by the NGOs’ educational and activist 
programmes. The localization of the transnational discourse may 
sometimes fail, and remain remote and irrelevant to local publics. 
Explicit criticism of news reporting was salient in our Western case 
studies where interviewees claimed that the media (including local 
media) provided a stereotypical image of them as helpless victims 
of climate change (Greenland), or failed to make the issue of global 
warming locally relevant (Northern Germany). In line with the well-
researched phenomenon of a “hostile media” perception (Gunther and 
Schmitt 2004), some respondents assume that the journalistic media 
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serve some kind of hidden agenda (such as protecting the profits of 
ocean liners in Hamburg, see Chapter 4, Germany). We also see plural 
(negative) evaluations of the coverage: while some inhabitants of Nuuk 
criticized the media for being too alarmist, others opposed them for 
neglecting the risks associated with climate change (see Chapter 2, 
Greenland).
Several chapters highlight the role of NGOs in bringing ideas of 
climate change to local communities. As the chapters describe, it is 
mainly through educational programmes and events that local or 
western NGOs try to create climate-change awareness and motivate 
behavioral change among local communities. The chapters about cases 
from the Global South do not relate any instances of explicit criticism of 
either media content or NGO activities.
Differences between northern and southern societies occur, possibly, 
due to the higher degree of mediatization in the northern societies, 
where all areas of life are shaped by digital media use (see, e.g., Couldry 
and Hepp 2016). Thus, the students from Greenland emphasize that 
they do not see melting icebergs in everyday life, but know about them 
from media coverage.
The direct information activities of NGOs were not mentioned in our 
western case studies. It may be—and this needs to be further studied—
that the NGO’s local information activities in the Global South serve as a 
functional equivalent to mediated communication in western societies. 
Patterns of Interpretation: How Local Communities 
Make Sense of Climate Change 
Many informants in the communities under study share the feeling of 
being affected by climate change. This is expressed as a change from a 
more stable and better past to an unpredictable present and a potentially 
threatening future. Most explicitly articulated among the Maasai, but 
also elsewhere, these changes are attributed to a moral decline in 
society. A complex nature-culture connection via morality and religion 
is a commonplace finding in the anthropological literature, typically 
idealizing the past in order to criticize the present (Schnegg 2019). 
While the local communities analyzed in the case studies feel affected 
by climate change, they do not see themselves as victims. Rather, they 
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claim agency and feel competent to fight climate change, for example 
by praying or planting trees. And they feel able to adapt. This finding 
is in line with other studies which have found that local communities 
self-identify as “designers of the environment”, and is in stark contrast 
with the transnational discourse that casts them as “helpless victims of 
climate change processes” (Jurt et al. 2015). Yet, there is little denial of 
the anthropogenic nature of climate change (some Maasai and some 
respondents in Greenland are exceptions that we will return to below), 
and there is an overall willingness to address the problem.
Another cross-cutting finding is that local discourses are not 
homogeneous: they are divided by age group, social position of the 
interviewee, and degree of rootedness in the local community. Older 
people seem to be more inclined to resist new narratives such as climate 
change, and we find evidence of this in Greenland as well as among 
the Maasai. Studies have shown this for other countries, even though 
there are national differences in the relative importance of each of the 
factors influencing perceptions of climate change (Poortinga et al. 2019; 
Capstick et al. 2014).
Entanglement of Local and Transnational Discourses 
The chapters report instances of both the localization of transnational 
discourses and the climatization of local discourses. Transnational 
climate discourses travel to communities some of which do not read or 
write and its meanings are transformed along the way, resulting in vastly 
diverging localizations around the world. The chapters on Greenland 
and Germany emphasize that local subgroups differ in how they make 
sense of climate change. The Greenland case study shows how younger 
audiences are more connected to transnational discourses through 
journalistic and social media. The German case study emphasizes 
differences between a village and a city, as well as between inhabitants 
with deeper or shallower roots in the local community. The localization 
of discourses in this case affects inhabitants with deeper roots in the 
community to a greater extent.
At the same time, we see instances of “climatized” local practices. 
Chapter 3 finds that the global climate discourse fosters the already 
popular practice of collective tree planting and thus “recycles” this 
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practice “in climatic terms” (Foyer and Kervran 2017). The Maasai, 
however, mostly reject the idea of anthropogenic climate change, which 
conflicts with God’s responsibility for rain, the weather, and the climate. 
This is notably similar to the views of some fundamentalist Christian 
communities in the United States (Shao 2017; Smith and Leiserowitz 
2013). In Bangladesh and the Philippines, by contrast, the idea of climate 
change falls on culturally responsive grounds. Whether a scientific 
idea like climate change is embraced is thus linked to the respective 
community’s prior beliefs about nature, humankind and the universe. 
Comparing the Maasai, the cases in Bangladesh and the Philippines hint 
at an important driver of the climatization of discourses: the fit of prior 
local interpretations, norms and practices with travelling ideas influences 
whether they are likely to be embraced or rejected. 
We find an overall primacy of local concerns, which may be explained 
by drawing an analogy of local communities’ sense-making with 
individual psychological mechanisms. Confirmation bias and avoidance 
of cognitive dissonance explain how individuals preserve their world 
views; similar processes may also apply to how local communities 
preserve their own discourses. New information is selectively used 
to confirm pre-existing cultural ideas, such as tree planting in the 
Philippines or urging people not to cut down the mangrove forest in 
Bangladesh. 
All chapters confirm noticeable differences between the epistemologies 
employed by science and those of local communities, drawing, e.g., on 
religion and morality. The major feature of how people draw on different 
resources to make sense of climate change is indeed relating the idea of 
climate change from global scientific and policy discourses to personal 
or collective experiences of weather events or seasonal changes. It is 
interesting to note that climate science, with the field of event attribution, 
has adapted to this common-sense logic of relating the abstract (climate 
change) to the concrete experience (extreme weather event). Departing 
from emphasizing the difference between weather and climate, scientists 
now also focus on trying to explain how weather events and climate 
change relate (see Chapter 7, Attribution Science). 
When discussing the changes they witness, local communities often 
express a sense of “shared responsibility” between carbon dioxide 
emissions from afar and ecologically deleterious local practices, such 
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as shrimp farming (in Bangladesh), cutting trees (in the Philippines), 
or personal consumption patterns (in Germany). People on the coast of 
Bangladesh do not forget the local sources of some of their ecological 
problems (salinization), and do not attribute these problems solely to 
climate change. For this reason, the tendency of some NGOs to attribute 
a given local problem to global climate change at times clashes with the 
local communities’ attributions of local problem causes. The attribution 
of a local problem to climate change and, often, the promotion of 
technical fixes as prime solutions, calls into question the communities’ 
own ways of knowing, as well as claiming agency and attributing 
responsibilities. Thus, while climate protest movements may have the 
best of intentions, attributing concrete local problems solely to climate 
change depoliticizes practices on the local level and may help local 
authorities deviate attention and deflect responsibility away from their 
own failures and mismanagement. 
Many ideas and practices in local discourses, like planting trees to 
avoid climate change, are not fundamentally at odds with scientific 
scenarios of mitigating climate change, but an important aspect is often 
lost in translation: the scale of the issue. Politicians and scientists talk 
about global challenges, while individuals integrate their conclusions 
from this global discourse into their local day-to-day activities. While 
some interviewees in the Philippines and Bangladesh assume that the 
problem can be tackled if they plant some trees, some current climate 
scenarios would require transforming areas the size of entire countries 
into industrial tree-growing plantations. There is again a mismatch 
between the scale of scientific forecasts on the infrastructure changes 
necessary to combat climate change and the actions people can take 
within the constraints of their everyday lives.
Finally, we find that individuals’ reception of the idea of climate 
change does not depend on their education. The majority of respondents 
from Bangladesh and the Philippines may be less educated and may 
have more pressing concerns than climate change, but they do not doubt 
its existence. Partly, they engage in climate protection ‘accidentally’, by 
continuing the cultural practice of tree planting that preceded their 
awareness of climate change (see Chapter 3, Philippines). These cases 
once more confirm the finding that there is no simple link between 
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scientific literacy, climate-change awareness, and a sustainable lifestyle 
(Grémillet 2008). 
Outlook
Local discourses around the world draw on different resources to make 
sense of climate change, including mediated reports, experiences of 
extreme weather, and pre-existing values and belief systems. This results 
in both localizations of transnational debates and the climatization of 
local discourses and practices. 
One may think about this research not only for the purpose of 
understanding local discourses and their entanglement with scientific 
and political climate debates, but it may inspire communication practice, 
as well. When communicating climate change, one should be ready 
to accept that people have more urgent concerns to deal with in their 
everyday lives—but sometimes climate change may be related to these 
more obtrusive concerns. Identifying links between the global problem 
and local concerns is useful for developing strategies for engaging 
people with climate change. Planting trees has been practiced for good 
ecological reasons before worrying about climate change, yet it also 
benefits climate protection. When trying to solve ecological problems on 
the coast of Bangladesh, an academic discussion of whether salinization 
is due to climate change or due to shrimp farming is beside the point, 
as both of these (and probably other) factors contribute to the problem. 
In local discourses, as De Wit’s chapter shows, seemingly contradicting 
approaches to interpreting the world co-exist. Schnegg (2019), in a study 
on how pastoralists in Namibia explain rain patterns as opposed to how 
meteorologists explain the same phenomenon, finds that individuals do 
not have to rigorously decide between the two competing knowledge 
systems; they can relate to both, depending on their respective social 
context. They can “switch between ways of knowing, and thus between 
worlds”. Whether people effectively do so is also likely to depend on 
whether one knowledge system (whether it is science or religion, for 
instance) claims precedence in all domains of life. This insight has 
consequences for how climate change should not be communicated: 
as a modern substitute for religious beliefs. This might be more easily 
achieved by a local communicator who can complement, and possibly, 
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integrate, a scientific perspective with the belief systems (religious or 
not) of a local community.
We encourage our readers to draw their own conclusions on how 
to communicate climate change at home, wherever that may be. The 
following case studies show that knowledge about the locally salient 
discourses around nature and climate change is a precondition for 
understanding how to communicate climate change. They also, hopefully, 
inspire a more interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary dialogue on how 
local communities make sense of climate change.
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2. The Case of “Costa del Nuuk”: 
Greenlanders Make Sense of Global 
Climate Change1
Freja C. Eriksen
This chapter investigates how fifteen inhabitants of the Greenlandic 
capital, Nuuk, make sense of climate change and its impacts through 
media exposure and personal experiences. While Greenland’s melting 
ice sheet has long served as a backdrop to the global climate debate, local 
public views of climate change have largely been overlooked. This study 
finds that, although the media is an important source of information 
about climate change for the inhabitants of Nuuk, their sense-making of 
the phenomenon is saturated by personal experiences. Alarmist media 
representations, for instance, are continuously challenged by references 
to personal experiences of positive local impacts of climate change. The 
chapter identifies six distinctions underlying the inhabitants’ sense-
making of climate change—natural/unnatural, certainty/uncertainty, self/
other, local/global, positive/negative, and environment/economy. 
1  This chapter is based on the author’s Master’s thesis, submitted in 2016 at Universität 
Hamburg. 
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A “Poster Child” for Climate Change 
“In a couple of years, you can come up here to visit ‘Costa del 
Nuuk’“[laughs]. 
Johannes
This chapter presents a case study of how fifteen inhabitants of 
Greenland’s capital, Nuuk, make sense of climate change and its 
impacts through media exposure as well as personal experiences. It 
opens with a quote from one of the study’s participants, Johannes. He 
is fifty-nine years old, works at an airline in Nuuk, and cannot help but 
laugh at the thought of climate change transforming his hometown into 
a sunny holiday destination. This study contributes his and fourteen 
other interviewees’ sense-making of climate change to the literature on 
public views of climate change. According to the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “human influence on the climate 
system is clear” (IPCC 2014: 2). However, there are several gaps in 
our understanding of how climate change is experienced, understood, 
and made sense of in its many contexts around the world. The case of 
Nuuk illuminates only one in a daunting range of cases yet to be studied 
(Schäfer and Schlichting 2014). It is, however, particularly pertinent due 
to the observable and rapid melting of Greenland’s ice sheet and the 
country’s status as a “poster child for Arctic climate change” (Holm 
2010: 145). 
Greenland (Kalaallit Nunaat) and its melting ice sheet have for 
several years served as a backdrop to the international climate debate 
for politicians, environmental campaigners, journalists and researchers 
(Bjørst 2011). The annual shrinkage of the ice sheet, which covers 80% 
of the country’s geography, has “increased four-fold from 1995–2000” 
(Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 2012: 3). In the foreign 
media, Greenland regularly headlines stories, such as “Greenland is 
melting away” (Davenport et al. 2015) and “Climate change: Greenland 
loses a trillion tons of ice in four years as melting rate triples” (Harvey 
2016). Studies of British tabloid and broadsheet newspapers have 
documented how images associated with Greenland, of “melting ice” 
and “polar bears”, have come to dominate the coverage of climate-
change impacts (Smith and Joffe 2009). The status of these iconic images 
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is underlined by studies that show how laypeople’s first associations 
of climate change in the USA, England, and Sweden were references 
to “melting glaciers and polar ice”, “polar regions melting”, “melting 
icebergs” and “rising temperatures” (Wibeck 2014b; Smith and Joffe 
2013; Leiserowitz 2006). Through climate change science, international 
news coverage, and global institutions such as the IPCC, a “climate 
change crisis discourse” has developed, in which the Arctic nature, and, 
to a lesser extent, its citizens, play a leading role (Farbotko and Lazrus 
2012; Bravo 2009; Martello 2004). While in this discourse “climate 
vulnerable populations are being positioned as victims, but also as 
evidence of the climate crisis”, their own voices and perspectives are at 
risk of drowning (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012: 382). But although such 
narratives are prominent in global climate-change discourses, they may 
not necessarily represent Arctic citizens’ views (Bravo 2009). Studying 
how the people of Greenland make sense of climate change and its 
impacts is therefore both relevant and compelling.
Greenland has arguably been on a path to “greater economic and 
political independence” (Government of Greenland) since the end 
of Danish colonization in 1953. Yet, its economy still greatly depends 
on an annual block grant from Denmark of about 470 million euro 
(Government of Greenland). The desire for economic and political 
independence is a powerful undercurrent in the country’s public 
debate on climate change (Bjørst 2011; Nuttall 2009). In April 2016, 
Greenland opted for a territorial reservation to the Paris Agreement, 
as negotiated in December 2015, because the agreement did not take 
the country’s economic development considerations fully into account 
(Government of Greenland). The disappearance of ice in Greenland 
has made valuable resources, such as oil, gas, mining and hydrocarbon 
development, both at sea and on land, more accessible (Ackrén and 
Jakobsen 2015; Nuttall 2009). Due to these possibilities for economic 
development, Nuttall (2009: 295) concludes that “Greenland is literally 
warming to the idea of less snow and ice”. Greenland represents a 
particularly interesting case to study: in the global climate governance 
regime, it must balance its role as the voice of an Indigenous people, 
while campaigning for its right to produce emissions and thus 
contribute to climate change (Bjørst 2008). 
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I share Farbotko and Lazrus’ (2012: 382) view of climate change 
as both a “discursive and material phenomenon”, and find that 
Nuuk’s inhabitants are affected by climate change in both a physical 
and a social sense. Nuuk’s residents represent a “climate-exposed 
population” (Farbotko and Lazrus 2012: 382) whose voices and views 
are an important addition to the current literature; global climate-
change narratives must take local discourses and individual experiences 
of climate-change impacts into account. According to Farbotko and 
Lazrus, the “[c]limate is changing, but its meanings are contingent on 
place and history and cannot be imposed from above without risk of 
disjunctures and injustice” (2012: 383). This paper hence proceeds on 
the assumption that Greenland’s political discourses on climate change 
and its citizens’ sense-making of the issue should be added to current 
research on local, contextual understandings of climate change around 
the world. The study’s main research question thus is how do inhabitants 
of Nuuk make sense of climate change and its impacts through media exposure 
and personal experiences? 
I investigate this question using (1) data gathered in five focus group 
interviews involving a total of fifteen participants and (2) a survey of 
their media use, both in general and related to climate change. The 
chapter proceeds by introducing the study’s relevant concepts and 
theoretical framework of social representations. I then review previous 
studies of audience reception of climate change coverage and outline 
the study’s research design and methodology. The bulk of the chapter 
is dedicated to presenting and discussing the study’s findings. The 
main conclusion is that, although the media is an important source 
of information about climate change for Nuuk’s inhabitants, their 
sense-making of the phenomenon is heavily influenced by personal 
experiences. For instance, they continuously challenge alarmist media 
representations by referring to personal experiences of positive local 
impacts of climate change. Finally, the chapter identifies six distinctions 
underlying residents’ sense-making of climate change—natural/
unnatural, certainty/uncertainty, self/other, local/global, positive/negative, 
and environment/economy. 
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Conceptual Considerations and Literature Review
“Climate-Exposed Populations” 
While research on public views of climate change has generally focused 
on North America and Europe, there have been some recent studies on 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Schäfer and Schlichting 2014; Wibeck 
2014a). Schlichting and Schäfer’s 2014 review of 133 publications 
does not mention any studies of Greenland, although they stress the 
relevance of analyzing the countries “most affected by” climate change 
(2014: 146). Most climate change-related studies of Greenland thus far 
have been conducted by “physical scientists, often with a focus on the 
ice sheet” (Holm 2010: 145; Hall et al. 2006; Lüthcke et al. 2006; Zwally 
et al. 2002). Studies involving Greenlanders’ attitudes towards climate 
change are fewer, although growing in number (Holm 2010). 
As climate-change impacts—and efforts to mitigate those impacts—
have entered the global agenda, an interest in Indigenous peoples and 
their role in anthropogenic climate change has emerged (Martello 
2008). Studies have gradually investigated Indigenous peoples’ 
perceptions of climate change and how their “traditional ecological 
knowledge” can inform our understanding of physical climatic changes 
(Roosvall and Tegelberg 2012). A group of anthropological researchers 
has touched on local climate-change discourses in Greenland (Tejsner 
2013; Bjorst 2011; Holm 2010; Nuttall 2009, 2008; Leduc 2007). Using 
multi-sited ethnography, Bjørst (2011) identifies several recurring 
discourse elements framing climate change in relation to Greenland 
and the Arctic. Studying the perceptions of her informants in the 
Disco Bay area, she finds a common “mistrust in science” and a related 
questioning of the phenomenon of climate change in general, which has 
left room for more local theories of climate change (Bjørst 2011). She 
and Nuttall (2009: 297–98) maintain that climate is often understood 
to be continuously changing and intrinsically unstable, related to the 
Greenlandic word for climate (sila). As such, climate change is not 
necessarily perceived as extraordinary or manmade (see Chapter 5, 
Tanzania). This outlook leads to a situated form of “normalization of 
the threat” (Bjørst 2011: 242). 
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Another key observation made by both Nuttall (2009) and Bjørst 
(2011: 243, author’s translation) is a preoccupation in Greenland with 
“possibilities as well as problems”. Nuttall (2008: 47) argues that this 
apprehension is perhaps more prevalent in Greenland than anywhere 
else in the circumpolar North, due to its aspirations for self-governance 
and independence, which are made more likely by the prospect of a 
warmer climate opening up new industries. Bjørst (2011: 246, author’s 
translation) similarly identifies a tendency to put “development, 
national political and economic independence before anything else”. 
These are important findings, because it can be assumed that these 
tendencies resonate in the local sense-making of climate change. To my 
knowledge, this study is the first to examine Greenlandic discourses of 
climate change from a communication and media studies perspective. 
Following the finalization of the present study, a nationally 
representative survey of Greenlandic perspectives on climate change 
has, however, been published (Minor et al. 2019). It provides evidence 
that more than nine out of ten Greenlanders think climate change is 
happening, although only about half think it is mostly caused by human 
activities and about a third believes it is caused by “natural changes in the 
environment”. Residents in the area of the survey covering Nuuk (West 
Sermersooq) were slightly more certain that climate change is happening 
and is caused mostly by human activities. Two thirds of the residents of 
West Sermersooq said they had experienced the effects of climate change 
(compared to 76% in the general Greenlandic population), and about 60% 
said they heard about climate change in the media at least once a week 
or at least once a month. 45% heard people they know talk about climate 
change at least once a week or at least once a month. The survey also 
reveals a clear tendency of respondents to see climate change as mainly 
a bad thing. In West Sermersooq, about half saw climate change as either 
“bad” or “very bad”, while most others saw it as “neutral”. A greater part 
of the respondents also saw climate change as more likely to harm than 
benefit the people of Greenland. A majority of respondents both in West 
Sermersooq and Greenland in general saw “protecting the environment 
even if it costs jobs” as more important than “economic growth, even if 
it leads to environmental problems”, favoring policies of re-entering the 
Paris Agreement, regulating greenhouse gas emissions from industry and 
investing in alternative energy sources. These findings are pertinent as 
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they form a more recent and representative insight into perspectives on 
climate change in Greenland and Nuuk where environmental concerns 
apparently outweigh economic interests. 
Social Representations Theory
The present study contributes to the constructionist literature that has 
used social representations theory to research “public views” of climate 
change (Wibeck 2014b; Smith and Joffe 2013; Olausson 2011; Whitmarsh, 
Lorenzoni, and O’Neill 2011; Cabecinhas, Lázaro, and Carvalho 2008; 
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006; Moscovici 1984a). As these studies have 
demonstrated, social representations theory is particularly suitable to 
researching how laypeople or specific groups within society make sense 
of climate change. At its core, the theory, originated by Moscovici (1984b), 
endeavors to explain how people familiarize themselves with hitherto 
unknown objects or change. Moscovici’s (1984a) theory presupposes 
that “concepts and images” of scientific origin permeate society, where 
they evolve into collective and “mundane understandings” (Olausson 
2011: 953). The social representations approach views the popular sense-
making of, for example, scientific knowledge, as “a valid knowledge 
system in its own right”, as opposed to a distortion or inaccurate 
representation of scientific knowledge (Moloney et al. 2014: 1; Wibeck 
2014b: 206). Following this approach, the present study does not seek 
to verify whether citizens’ knowledge of climate change is scientifically 
accurate, but to understand how the scientific concept of climate change 
is publicly made sense of (Smith and Joffe 2013). I use the phrase “make 
sense” to operationalize the process of creating meaning, as employed 
in Wibeck’s (2014b), Olausson’s (2011), Moloney et al.’s (2014), and 
Marková’s (2003) adaptations of Moscovici’s theory.
According to Moscovici (1984a: 953), social representations “fill 
our minds and our conversations, our mass media, popular books, and 
political discourses”. Therefore, mass media have only increased the 
importance of social representations by multiplying the changes ideas 
undergo as they are subject to media simplifications and sensationalizing 
(Moloney at al. 2014; Moscovici 1984b). The media is an important 
“discursive site” where social representations are “(re)produced” 
(Olausson 2011). Analyzing interviewees’ social representations reveals 
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a glimpse of “iconic images” that circulate in the “socio-cultural context” 
(Smith and Joffe 2013).
This study relies on four central notions to operationalize the 
theory of social representations. According to Moscovici (1984b), the 
process of making the unfamiliar familiar happens through two central 
mechanisms—“objectifying” and “anchoring”. Objectifying refers to 
a mechanism of turning “something abstract into something almost 
concrete” (Moscovici 1984b: 29); it involves attributing a real-life form to 
the abstract (Moscovici 2000). For example, climate change is typically 
objectified in media representations as a storm, heatwave, or flood 
(Höijer 2010). Anchoring is a process in which people place new ideas 
in relation to categories or paradigms of their existing representations 
(Moscovici 2000). In other words, new ideas are placed in a “familiar 
context” in order to make sense of them (Moscovici 1984b). The process 
of anchoring takes place through “naming” and “classifying”, also 
known as “drawing distinctions” (Moscovici 2000: 42; Olausson 2011: 
285). Through the mechanism of naming, abstract phenomena are 
given a “label” or “familiar name” (Moscovici 2000: 42). According 
to Moscovici (2000: 42), a phenomenon that does not have a familiar 
name or category is perceived as “alien” and “threatening”. Thus, for 
example, laypeople refer to climate change as “weather” in some studies. 
In this way, the “abstract and intangible risk” it poses “acquires familiar 
and comprehensible characteristics” (Olausson 2011: 289). Drawing 
distinctions involves placing intangible phenomena in the context of “well-
known opposites”, in a form of hierarchy or classification (Olausson 
2011: 285; Moscovici 2000: 43). Smith and Joffe (2013: 19) label these 
distinctions “themata”, and define them as “mutually interdependent 
oppositions or dialogical antinomies”. Common distinctions, such as 
natural/unnatural, certainty/uncertainty and self/other, reveal the “latent 
content, or latent drivers of public thinking” around climate change 
among interviewees (Smith and Joffe 2013: 16). 
Making Sense of Climate Change
The present study employs social representations theory to investigate 
how the inhabitants of Nuuk make sense of climate change. Most similar 
to this study’s conceptual and methodological approach are Olausson’s 
(2011) and Wibeck’s (2014b) case studies in Sweden. Both studies 
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explore laypeople’s social representations of climate change through 
focus group interviews. 
Olausson (2011: 289) finds that respondents discuss climate change’s 
“existing consequences” with great conviction and use “everyday 
experiences of the weather” as a way to anchor their conceptualizations 
of the phenomenon, often familiarizing it through the label “weather”. 
She concludes that “the respondents’ own experiences are of utmost 
importance”, which is especially relevant for the climate-exposed 
sample of Nuuk’s inhabitants (Olausson 2011). Wibeck (2014b: 209, 
211) similarly reports participants referencing their “own experiences 
of changes in weather”, but stresses the finding that they saw climate 
change mostly as a “global issue” with severe, yet distant consequences. 
She finds that focus groups continuously negotiate the certainty and 
severity of climate change and our ability to mitigate it (2014b: 212–
14). Somewhat in contrast, Olausson finds that a general “belief” in 
anthropogenic climate change seems to be commonplace among her 
interviewees (2011: 286).
Smith and Joffe (2013: 21–22) find “melting ice” to be their London 
participants’ most common first association with climate change, 
followed by references to “weather” and “pollution”. These associations, 
they conclude, echo “how newspapers visually represent the threat” in 
British media. They identify three “themata” that interviewees use to 
structure their sense-making in a “non- or unconscious” way (2013: 
19, 22). First, they categorize their British interviewees into those who 
are certain and those who are uncertain about anthropogenic climate 
change. While respondents generally express certainty that global 
warming is real, many are still uncertain about its causes, and blame this 
on “contradictory media coverage” (Smith and Joffe 2013: 27). Second, 
they identify a thema they call “natural/unnatural”, which highlights 
the way respondents observe “strange and bizarre weather” in relation 
to their expectations of how nature should behave, thus also drawing 
on personal experience of changes in weather patterns (Smith and Joffe 
2013: 25-26). Third, they identify a thema labelled “self/other” (Smith 
and Joffe 2013: 23-25), and find respondents place responsibility for 
climate change mostly on the “other”, portraying the USA, China, and 
India, for example, as the main perpetrators of global warming. The 
impacts of climate change are also largely distanced from the “self”, 
and serious consequences are thought to affect others more (Smith and 
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Joffe 2013: 25). Meanwhile, notions of the “self” are related to solutions 
to climate change, often associated with recycling, which ambiguously 
provide either a sense of “satisfaction” or “helplessness and frustration” 
(Smith and Joffe 2013: 25).
Audience Reception of Climate Change Coverage
The scientific construct of global climate change is not directly visible, 
and therefore requires “media transmission”, even to Greenlanders 
(Taddicken 2013). There is limited understanding of the media’s role 
in shaping the public’s “knowledge [of] and attitudes” towards climate 
change (Taddicken 2013: 39; Cabecinhas, Lázaro, and Carvalho 2008: 
172). Taddicken argues that until now, “communication scholars have 
paid much greater attention to media content than to audiences and 
media users” (2013: 40). In many current studies within the field, the 
media is assumed to play a key part in framing people’s understanding 
of climate change, but these assumptions are “rarely verified with 
reference to empirical studies on the relationship between media output 
and audience reception” (Olausson 2011: 282). Hence, there is a need 
for more research on the “complex reception process” that takes place as 
people make sense of a phenomenon such as climate change—a process 
in which the media “constitutes only one of several meaning-making 
resources” (Olausson 2011: 282). The current study therefore adopts a 
similar approach to that of Olausson (2011: 282–83), viewing the media 
as a central element in the analysis, while preventing a focus on the 
content of media reporting on climate change from overshadowing the 
audience’s complex reception process.
Olausson concludes that the media serves as her Swedish focus 
group participants’ primary source of information about climate 
change, although this information is “negotiated and remolded in 
conversations and discussions with other people” (2011: 294). She refers 
to the media as the “agenda-setter”, but argues it is important not to 
underestimate how people negotiate and embed their own experiences 
into media discourses and vice versa when making sense of climate 
change (Olausson 2011). Olausson further identifies three criticisms 
of general media representations noted by her Swedish interviewees: 
a fatigue with “emotionally charged media messages”, an awareness 
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of their “commercial conditions”, and the media coverage’s “lack of 
continuity and integration of various sorts of news” (2011: 292–93). 
Ryghaug, Sorensen, and Naess (2011: 784) similarly conduct focus 
group interviews with members of the Norwegian public, and find 
that all groups referred to the media (specifically newspapers (print or 
digital) and “television and radio”) as their primary source of climate 
change information. Yet their interviewees, like those in the Olausson 
(2011) study, believe that the media exaggerates stories “to sell more 
newspapers” (Ryghaug, Sorensen, and Naess 2011: 790). 
Previous studies have portrayed the mass media—first, TV; second, 
newspapers; and, to a growing extent, the internet—as the main 
sources of information on climate change, which are more influential 
than “people’s interpersonal communication” (Schäfer 2015: 853). 
These conclusions, however, are based on a review of surveys from 
the USA, the UK, Germany, and Australia (Schäfer 2015). In Southern 
England, Whitmarsh (2008) found mass media to be the main source 
of information on climate change among respondents, with TV as the 
primary source, followed by newspapers and radio, while Stamm, 
Clark, and Eblacas (2000) found newspaper and TV to be the most 
used information sources in a segment of US citizens. In Portugal, 
Cabecinhas, Lázaro, and Carvalho (2008: 174) found that the media 
(television news, followed by newspapers and “televised films and 
documentaries”) was their survey participants’ main source of 
information on climate change. Respondents viewed the news media 
and “people they know” as somewhat credible on this issue, while 
they mistrusted “government, local authorities and corporations”. 
Taddicken (2013: 39) investigated the “impact of mass media and 
internet use” on German internet users’ knowledge and attitudes 
towards climate change and found that only regular use of television, 
but not of print media, positively affected knowledge and attitudes. 
She concluded that visual cues are powerful tools for communicating 
information about climate change. Arlt, Hoppe, and Wolling (2011: 
52, 57) found that watching public news programmes in Germany 
predicted greater awareness, while reading weekly print media “had a 
slightly negative effect on problem awareness”, indicating that media 
use does “not always have a motivating, awareness-heightening effect”. 
A survey of the German public by Brüggemann et al. (2017) showed 
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limited effects of media coverage of annual UN climate summits on 
knowledge and attitudes, and no effect on the respondents’ intention 
to act. 
Research Design and Methodology
Research Design
Based on the conceptual considerations and findings from previous 
studies, this study explores how inhabitants make sense of climate 
change and its impacts. It is an open inquiry into how interviewees 
represent climate change and its impacts at both the local and global 
levels. It explores interviewees’ associations with both the scientific 
phenomenon of climate change and its impacts (e.g., socio-economic), 
including how these associations are negotiated among focus group 
members, how important interviewees believe future climate change is, 
how they demarcate it, etc. 
The study furthermore explores the origins of interviewees’ 
representations of climate change by investigating the relevance of 
personal experiences versus media exposure in shaping their sense-
making of climate change and its impacts. “Personal experiences” is 
defined as interpersonal communication, as well as personal climatic 
and societal observations; in sum, anything that inhabitants refer to 
in making sense of climate change and its impacts that is not directly 
related to mediated communication. “Media” refers to any type of 
mass media content consumed by focus group participants, including 
printed newspapers, internet sources, radio, TV, social media, Netflix 
documentaries, etc.
Finally, the study explores how the interviewees relate media 
representations to their personal experiences, and how they negotiate 
any contradictions between information gained from the two sources. 
The aim is to determine how inhabitants interpret media representations, 
such as how they relate to memories of specific examples of media 
coverage or general evaluations of discourses on climate change and 
Greenland’s role in these. 
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The research questions were investigated in August 2016 through (1) 
five focus group interviews with fifteen participants and (2) a survey 
of eleven of these participants’ media use, both general and related 
to climate change. Unfortunately, the survey responses of FG 5 could 
not be retrieved. The case study method is useful for investigating a 
phenomenon that cannot be separated from “important contextual 
conditions”—in this instance, local discourses of climate change in 
Greenland’s capital city. This object of study is intrinsically linked to its 
“real-world context”, as we are interested in how discourses of a global, 
scientific phenomenon are shaped in a local environment (Yin 2014). 
The case study approach allows the use of different sources of evidence 
(Yin 2014). The present study employs a mixed-methods approach that 
draws on data from qualitative focus group interviews and a survey 
of the same participants’ media use (David and Sutton 2011). The 
focus group interviews give insights into the interviewees’ “everyday 
experiences, meanings and language”, while the self-administered 
survey explores the participants’ individual media use more directly 
and in depth than would be possible during a focus group (David and 
Sutton 2011). 
The Case Study: The City of Nuuk
Located in southwest Greenland, Nuuk is the world’s northernmost 
capital (Gill 2015). The city is home to one-quarter of Greenland’s 
55,847 inhabitants (Rasmussen 2016: Schultz-Lorentzen and Rasmussen 
2012; Statistikbanken). Nuuk has a variety of inhabitants employed in 
“government administrative work, education, health care […] hunting, 
fishing, fish and shrimp processing” (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2017). 
The city encompasses a cross-section of professions, ages and geographic 
backgrounds. This study thus complements previous findings from 
Greenland that have mostly studied Disco Bay, located close to the 
receding glaciers of Ilulissat Icefjord. Greenlandic is the population’s 
first language, while 12% of Greenlanders are bilingual Danish speakers 
(Rischel 2016). Half of Greenland’s Danish inhabitants live in Nuuk 
(Statistikbanken). 
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Focus Group Interviews
The study’s primary method was five semi-structured focus group 
interviews with two to four participants in each group (Table 2.1) 
(David and Sutton 2011). According to Moscovici, it is precisely 
“material from samples of conversations [which] gives access to the 
social representations” (2000: 62). Previous studies of sense-making of 
climate change have employed this technique (Wibeck 2014b; Olausson 
2011; Ryghaug, Sorensen, and Naess 2011). A total of seven men and 
eight women were interviewed. Workplaces and institutions were 
contacted by email and phone asking for three to four people willing 
to take part in the study. The targeted workplaces and institutions were 
chosen according to the methodological principle of maximum variance, 
taking into consideration that people with different professions, which 
are presumably affected by climate change to varying degrees, might 
express different perspectives.
Two administrative employees at a fish factory in Nuuk (FG 1) were 
sampled as fishery is Greenland’s largest industry and about half of 
the country’s fishing fleet is based in Nuuk (Schultz-Lorentzen and 
Rasmussen, 2012). Three airline employees were included in the sample 
(FG 4) as tourism comprises a growing industry in Greenland, while 
air traffic by its nature contributes to the country’s CO2 emissions. Both 
industries were assumed to be somewhat affected by climate change, and 
thus the views of their employees were deemed of interest. A bank clerk 
and two women working in kindergartens, albeit in different schools, 
were targeted (FG 2) in order to include insights of inhabitants whose 
work would not be directly affected by climate change. As more than 
60% of Nuuk’s inhabitants work in public and private service, these also 
constitute important segments of the population (Schultz-Lorentzen 
and Rasmussen, 2012). Two Danish government officials were chosen 
in order to add insights from inhabitants who had obtained higher 
education and to provide a perspective of someone dealing, perhaps 
indirectly, with climate change as a political matter. A Greenlandic 
tourist guide was included to get a perspective from someone in 
contact with the tourists in Greenland, some of them specifically to 
experience climate change (FG 3). Four high school students were 
included in the sample (FG 5) in order to get the perspectives of a 
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group of younger inhabitants of the city. While climate change has been 
a known phenomenon in Greenland for much of their lives, the younger 
generation are also an interesting group as their media use could vary 
from that of the generation before them. Since employees and students 
signed up to participate in the interview, a small self-selection bias (e.g., 
interest in climate change) must be expected and accounted for in the 
analysis. 






Name and age Nationalities Interview 
date
FG 1 Administrative 
employees in fishing 
industry





FG 2 Employees in public 
and private service 
(banking/education)
3 (3 women) Jonna (55),  






FG 3 Public officials and 
tourist guide
3 (3 men) Malthe (23), 






FG 4 Employees at 
different levels of 
airline 
















Table adapted from Wibeck (2014b: 208).  
*no information.
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As the study’s research question refers to “inhabitants of Nuuk”, 
Danes are included in this sample. Nuuk is home to half of all of 
the country’s inhabitants born outside of Greenland and has a high 
population of Danes. Many of the Danish inhabitants in the study 
have, however, resided in Greenland for several decades. Interviews 
were conducted in Danish, which is the second language for most 
Greenlanders (Rischel 2016) and the first language of the author. A 
translator was not necessary. Most interviewees were fluent in Danish, 
while a few were helped by other interview participants to remember 
forgotten words. Participants’ names, workplaces with few employees 
and place names mentioned during the interviews were anonymized 
during transcription. 
All interviews were conducted according to a semi-structured 
interview guide. They took between 45 and 80 minutes, well within the 
recommended time frame of 45 to 90 minutes (David and Sutton 2011). 
All five group interviews were slightly different, as the interviewer 
attempted to follow the flow of the participants’ conversation as well as 
follow up on interesting themes raised. The interviews were audio taped, 
transcribed and subsequently analyzed by qualitative content analysis 
in order to map the “patterns within [the] qualitative data” (David and 
Sutton 2011). Deductive codes were based on the analytical elements 
of social representations theory (objectification, anchoring, naming, and 
distinctions), and key themes of interest according to the research 
questions. Subsequently, a “descriptive” coding, an “interpretative” 
and a final coding—including inductive sub-codes—were undertaken 
(David and Sutton 2011; King and Horrocks 2010). 
Survey on Media Use 
Little research exists on media use in Greenland. One of the few 
previous studies has shown that TV and radio are the population’s most 
important media sources, in particular the Greenlandic Broadcasting 
Corporation’s (KNR) programmes (Ravn-Højgaard et al. 2018). People 
living in Nuuk are, however, found to watch less TV and listen half as 
much to the radio than the general population. Meanwhile, the capital’s 
inhabitants use the internet more (68%) than the rest of the Greenlandic 
population (43%), and social media are used more in Nuuk (56% on a 
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daily basis as compared to 43 % in the rest of the country). Also, younger 
Greenlanders are found to use the internet more, and TV and KNR’s 
services less. 35% of the population primarily receive news through 
online media, a trend which is growing. 
To gain a deeper understanding of the current study’s interviewees’ 
differentiated media use in relation to general news and climate change 
specific news, all participants were asked to fill out a quantitative survey 
(David and Sutton 2011). The survey sought information on participants’ 
stated media use, sources of information on climate change, and their 
evaluation of the sources’ trustworthiness—information that would not 
have been fully uncovered in a focus group interview. By combining 
and comparing qualitative interview and quantitative survey data, the 
study carefully develops its understanding of how participants make 
sense of climate change through media and personal experience (David 
and Sutton 2011; Greene, Caracelli and Graham 1989).
The first half of the survey consisted of three parts, asking the 
interviewees about: (1) their media use related to news about 
Greenlandic and international affairs, (2) their media use related to 
information about climate change, and (3) which sources they would 
trust most to answer questions about climate change. The second half of 
the survey consisted of demographic questions about the interviewees’ 
gender, age, nationality, years lived in Nuuk, geographic heritage, civil 
status, education, employment situation, and type of employment. The 
survey was developed using elements of Jensen and Helles’ (2015) and 
Metag, Füchslin, and Schäfer’s (2015) surveys. The survey was given to 
the study’s participants upon finishing the focus group interview for 
practical reasons, and to avoid priming the focus groups in any direction.
Findings
The following analysis is structured around the study’s major research 
questions. Within each section, relevant themes are analyzed by exploring 
participants’ ways of objectifying and anchoring climate change through 
naming and distinctions. Since social representations are said to become 
accessible through “material from samples of conversations”, we seek 
to discover them in the interactions between focus group participants 
(Moscovici 2000: 62). The analysis pays close attention to both the 
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groups’ collective and separate individuals’ patterns of sense-making. 
According to Moscovici (2000: 63), social representations are “revealed 
especially in times of crisis and upheaval, when a group or its images 
are undergoing a change”. Hence, special attention is paid to situations 
in which interviewees disagree, discuss, or contest with each other 
(Wibeck 2014b). At the same time, it is relevant if absolute agreement or 
a complete absence of tension is observed. This would suggest that social 
representations within an area are widely agreed upon to the extent that 
they are no longer consciously reflected on (Moscovici 2000). 
Making Sense of Climate Change and its Impacts 
The first part of the study’s findings explores the inhabitants of Nuuk’s 
immediate associations with and definitions of climate change. How do 
they relate the concept to the context of Greenland and Nuuk? In short, 
how do they make sense of the phenomenon?
Natural and Unnatural Local Weather Phenomena: 
Objectifications of Climate Change 
The first interview started with the question, “What is the first thing 
that comes to your mind when someone mentions climate change?” The 
first images evoked in interviewees’ minds by such an open question can 
reveal which prior social representations of climate change interviewees 
draw on while they are still relatively uninfluenced by the researcher’s 
agenda (Wibeck 2014b). While the participants’ responses varied, many 
immediately related climate change to the local context of Greenland 
and changes therein that participants had seen or heard about. An 
illustration of this pattern is found in four high school students’ answer 
to the initial question: 
Tanja: Global warming 
David: That’s, that’s the same thing actually. [laughs] 
Ivalu: Uhm, I think hunters, don’t know why, always hunters. Poor 
hunters. 
David: Mmm, I think about shorter winter. 
Tanja: Warmer summer. 
Ivalu: Also, stormy weather. We have that often now, compared to before, 
like real storms. 
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Hansine: Really bad, bad weather in the winter. 
Tanja: And the ice sheet, when it melts. 
Ivalu: It’s alright if it melts. [all laugh] 
Tanja: No... [continue laughing]. (FG 5: 3–13) 
Associations with Greenlandic weather and changing seasons were 
present and prominent in all focus group discussions. In these immediate 
associations, climate change was equated with “weather” and objectified 
to become visible as a “warmer summer” and “the ice sheet, when it 
melts”. Also, among the three middle-aged women of FG 2, who work 
in a school, a kindergarten and in banking, respectively, the close, 
personal observations of climate change were prevalent and absorbed 
the group’s attention for much of the interview. Individual observations 
on changing seasons, drying areas of land, milder temperatures, less 
snow, stronger winds etc. were used to objectify climate change. Smith 
and Joffe’s (2013: 26) distinction between natural and unnatural is 
omnipresent here, as interviewees juxtaposed ideas about “how nature 
is expected to behave” with observations of it behaving in unfamiliar 
and unpredictable ways. Participants in all five focus groups continued 
circling around the impacts of climate change in Nuuk and the rest of 
Greenland—how they experienced climate change in their local context. 
This process of objectifying through local images and examples was a 
main theme of all the interviews.
The continuous references to weather phenomena and their 
perceived changes aligns with previous findings from Wibeck (2014b: 
209) and Smith and Joffe (2013: 212–22), who identified “melting 
polar ice caps, endangered polar bears, warmer weather, floods, and 
droughts”, “melting ice”, and “weather” as the dominant associations of 
their Norwegian and British interviewees. However, the present study’s 
finding of strong contextual links to Greenland sets it apart from these 
earlier studies. While melting ice was mentioned, local experiences of 
weather change observed by the interviewees, themselves, or people 
they know took precedence in the interviews. Thus, personal experience 
appears to influence Nuuk’s inhabitants’ sense-making of climate 
change to a greater extent than what is concluded in studies of British 
and Norwegian laypeople’s sense-making (Wibeck 2014b; Smith and 
Joffe 2013). 
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Another interesting aspect of the excerpt above is how humor was 
used to downplay the urgency and severity of climate change. Melting 
ice was laughed off as “alright”. Along similar lines, Johannes elsewhere 
commented that in a couple of years, we will be able to come and visit 
“Costa del Nuuk” (FG 4: 183). I argue that this can be classified as a type 
of anchoring—inserting climate change in comical over-exaggerated 
representations, which makes it more tangible, less unsettling, and 
easier to talk about and make sense of. Bore and Reid (2014: 454) have 
previously explored how laughing at climate change can “promote 
active and positive engagement”. 
Certainty and Uncertainty with Regard to Climate 
Change’s Anthropogenic Causes
Another significant finding was that all the interview participants 
reported having experienced climate change in Greenland, although 
they did not necessarily define this change as anthropogenic in origin. 
In interviews, the moderator consistently referred to the phenomenon 
as “climate change” but not as “anthropogenic” to avoid influencing 
participants’ sense-making. This uncertainty regarding the question of 
attribution (see Chapter 7, Attribution Science) is illustrated by how 
climate change is discussed among the three women Jonna, Nivi, and 
Karen. When asked whether they believe in climate change, Jonna 
replied: 
Jonna: I do, really, I think there is change in so many things, also because 
you can also feel it on what you catch of whales and fish and other 
things. It is felt that, uhm, just now the cod has arrived much earlier than 
normal... (FG 2: 18) 
These personal experiences, however, do not necessarily translate into 
a certainty that climate change has anthropogenic causes. To many 
interviewees, climate change is not necessarily ‘human induced’. 
To some, it simply means a change in the climate. Thus, later in the 
interview, Jonna commented on how climate change is framed in the 
media as anthropogenic. 
Jonna: And then they used to say that it is the people themselves that 
are responsible for it. That we are—people. But I don’t believe in that. 
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Several hundred years ago Europe was frozen. I certainly do not think 
that is the population’s fault. 
Karen: No. 
… Moderator: What do the rest of you think of that? 
Karen: I have also had that thought: that the atmosphere takes care of 
itself, the earth, right. (FG 2: 106–10) 
Although Jonna has no doubt about the existence of a phenomenon 
she calls climate change, she does not define it as anthropogenic. 
Participants in other focus groups similarly expressed a wavering 
between anthropogenic climate change as certain/uncertain. Thus, 
Johannes declared his opinion: 
Johannes: ...And the media, they describe it as manmade, right. But... 
(laughs), it bloody isn’t all manmade. (FG 4: 4) 
Diverging from Olausson’s (2011: 287) finding that “human-induced” 
climate change was taken to be “common sense” among Swedish 
laypeople, this study does not identify a solidified social representation 
of climate change as manmade. This conclusion, however, ties into 
Bjørst’s (2011: 239, author’s translation) previous findings from 
Greenland, in which she identifies a “mistrust in science” and stronger 
belief in “locally formulated climate theories”. It is, however, important 
to mention that the younger focus group participants clearly defined 
climate change as anthropogenic. Here, a common social representation 
of climate change as human induced seemed solidified to the extent that 
it was not necessary to discuss this further. In this study, it thus appears 
to be an age-dependent phenomenon: younger participants believe more 
strongly in anthropogenic climate change than do older participants. 
Positive and Negative Impacts of Climate Change for 
the Self and the Other 
Another major theme of the five focus group interviews was the 
evaluation of climate-change impacts as positive/negative. This was a 
divisive theme, dividing interviewees between worrying about the 
condition of nature and a pragmatic view focused on Greenland’s 
economic development. A couple of interviewees drew this distinction 
in response to the interview’s first question of what comes to mind when 
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climate change is mentioned. Frederik, who works in an administrative 
position at a fish factory in Nuuk, began the interview as follows: 
Frederik: Uhm, I think possibilities (chuckles). Because it might be that 
if you live somewhere else than here, then it isn’t possibilities, but what 
we see here is that things are changing a lot, I think, and that creates lots 
of possibilities for this country. (FG 1: 12) 
When asked what he would write if asked to write an article about 
climate change later in the interview, Frederik answered: 
Frederik: The more the better, I guess. Then we can sit outside and my 
strawberries will feel better and we could grow some more potatoes. (FG 
1: 110) 
Other answers show that Frederik’s evaluation of climate change as 
positive mainly relates to his profession and new possibilities for the 
fishery of e.g., cod, while an improved quality of life is typically added 
with a hint of humor. Other positive impacts of climate change mentioned 
in the focus groups are more climate tourists, agriculture, mining, longer 
summers, saving energy, and being able to sail wherever one wants. 
The positive evaluation of climate change as bringing “possibilities”, 
as they were labelled independently by two interviewees, contradicts 
the dominant view in the media that climate change is purely negative. 
When asked which issues related to climate change he saw as most 
prominent in the media, Frederik interrupted: 
Frederik: Well, like I said, that is also why I said possibilities. Because 
everyone, almost everyone, focuses precisely on it being disasters this 
will bring, right? ... It is clear, if you live on some sort of island one and a 
half meters above the sea down in the Pacific Ocean, then reality might 
look a bit different. (FG 1: 67)
Thus, positive aspects of climate change were perceived as being in 
opposition to the dominant media representation of climate change as 
purely negative for local reasons. At the same time, Frederik’s quote 
exemplifies how interviewees were reluctant to embrace a “victim” 
role. Here, Smith and Joffe’s (2013: 23) distinction between self and 
other comes into play. Though some participants contemplated and 
worried about the negative impacts of climate change, the “self” was 
never regarded as a victim and an “other” very rarely as any form of 
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“perpetrator” of climate change (Smith and Joffe 2013; Bjørst 2012). On 
the contrary, and as illustrated above, there was an inclination to cast 
others, such as the inhabitants of small islands threatened by sea level 
rise, as victims of climate change. This is also obvious in the following 
discussion between Frederik and his colleague Bjarne. 
Moderator: ...Maybe it also has something to do with media coverage, 
that there is somehow a counter reaction? 
Frederik: Yes, yes, exactly. That it becomes too much, that you think now 
it’s all doomsday around that again. 
Bjarne: We can’t just think about ourselves here in Greenland though. 
Frederik: No, that’s also true.
Bjarne: If it melts that much and it affects the oceans, right? You have to 
be very watchful about that. (FG 1: 111–16) 
This focus group interview had only two participants, both working 
administratively at a fish factory in Nuuk. The contrasting view to 
media representations of climate change as inherently negative was 
highlighted again by Frederik’s annoyance with “doomsday” reports. 
When the discussion had centered on the potential positive impacts 
of climate change in Greenland, Bjarne interrupted to remind his 
colleague that Greenland is not alone in the world. This highlights 
an additional distinction beyond those identified by Smith and Joffe: 
the distinction between the local and global impacts of climate change. 
This theme recurs in interviewees’ discussions of their memories of 
media content outlined later in the analysis. In several interviews, the 
local level was accentuated through examples of the positive impacts 
of climate change in Greenland, showing how some interviewees did 
not adhere to the view that climate change is disastrous. The younger 
high school students also distinguished between local and global, albeit 
in a different form, as a demand for information about the de facto 
consequences of climate change for Greenland locally. This theme is 
also outlined below. 
In other focus groups, climate change’s negative impacts were 
more prevalent. In the following exchange, four high school students 
discussed whether climate change affects anyone they know. 
Ivalu: Hunters. 
Moderator: Hunters. How so? 
Ivalu: It’s harder, I’ve heard. 
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Hansine: They can’t go out sailing if it’s that kind of weather, then they 
just have to stay at home. 
Ivalu: And the weather is bad often. 
David: Mmm. (FG 5: 66–71) 
Hunters and fishermen were mentioned here and in other focus groups 
as a segment of the population that is especially vulnerable to climate 
change. Interviewees who mostly view climate change as positive 
recognized that it may pose more dire obstacles for inhabitants of other 
parts of the country. There was, however, a strong recognition that 
Greenlanders have adapted to changes in climate throughout history. 
Thus, respondents may view climate change as “worrying”, but they 
do not use it to victimize themselves or other inhabitants of Greenland 
(FG 5: 112). 
Environmental and Economic Sustainability: A Basic 
Distinction
The distinction between the positive and negative impacts of climate 
change underlines another distinction—between environmental and 
economic sustainability. Other researchers have touched on this theme, 
commenting on how Greenland is “warming to the idea of less snow and 
ice” due to its economic advantages (Nuttall 2009: 295). Ulrik outlined 
this view clearly in an evolving discussion with two other interviewees 
about how the country should behave in relation to new possibilities for 
mining. 
Ulrik: Well, sustainable. The economy is simply also an important part of 
the sustainability, in my view. (FG 3: 140) 
When asked if she sees any positive or negative impacts of climate 
change, Jonna, in another focus group, replied: 
Jonna: Well, the positive is earnings. But who says that’s the most 
important thing anyway? Yes, we do have a lot of these luxury things. 
Well, is that really what you need? I mean, should we be thinking luxury 
or should we be thinking about our nature? (FG 2: 147) 
Although arguments on both ends of the environment/economy spectrum 
were contemplated in all focus groups, there was a noticeable tendency 
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to highlight the positive impacts and possibilities of climate change in 
Greenland in the three focus groups comprised of people employed by 
an airline, a fish factory, and within governance and tourism. By contrast, 
the female interviewees studying or employed in the education and 
banking sectors interpreted climate change as predominantly negative. 
On the basis of this study, it is not possible to say whether gender, age, 
profession or even media use as variables correlate with sense-making of 
climate change as either positive or negative. Nonetheless, it is a finding 
worth contemplating that the interviewed men, working in industries 
that presumably are somewhat positively affected by climate change, 
viewed the phenomenon as predominantly positive. 
Media and Personal Experience as Sources of 
Information
This section analyzes how the media and personal experiences might 
influence the interviewees’ sense-making processes. It first looks at 
which information sources participants report using in the interviews 
and surveys. Second, it examines how they express and negotiate the 
trustworthiness of these sources.
The Media as a Source of Information on Climate 
Change
The media sources from which participants receive information about 
climate change varied within and across focus groups. In their survey 
responses, all participants except one reported hearing about climate 
change from national Greenlandic newspapers” “every week” or “every 
month”. In all focus groups except FG 3, participants similarly reported 
hearing about climate change from “local Greenlandic newspapers” 
“every week” or “every month”. The same is true for hearing about 
climate change from “TV”. According to survey responses, traditional 
media such as national and local papers and TV comprise many of the 
participants’ media use. Specific sources mentioned in interviews were 
the Greenlandic outlets Sermitsiaq, AG and KNR, the Danish newspaper 
Politiken, and television station TV 2, as well as the international news 
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outlets CNN, The New York Times, The Guardian, Siberian Times, CBC, and 
the entertainment company Netflix. 
In focus group interviews “anything from the local papers to the news 
on TV and, well, TV and written papers” to “Googling”, “local” and 
“foreign media”, and “radio” were mentioned as sources of information 
(FG 4: 48–50; FG 1: 52; FG 2: 104). Only the group of four high school 
students and the younger tourist guide Malthe stated that they mainly 
rely on articles from the internet, especially Facebook, coming from 
e.g., the Greenlandic news outlet Sermitsiaq. In their survey responses, 
however, Karen, Nivi, and Johannes also indicated that they hear about 
climate change through social media “every week”, while Pavia does so 
“every day”. 
Memories of Media Content 
Analyzing interviewees’ memories of media coverage provides 
insight into media-related images through which they make sense 
of climate change. When the moderator scrutinized the examples 
brought up during the interviews, it once again became evident that 
interviewees frequently use images of Greenland to make sense of the 
phenomenon. Thus, even when speaking of mediated images, local 
Greenlandic objectifications of climate change were common. These 
are not necessarily connected specifically to Nuuk, but often illustrate 
the melting of Greenland’s ice sheet. Thus, the interviewees often 
mentioned images from the news media including the “melting ice” 
and “melting polar ice caps” identified in Smith and Joffe’s (2013) as 
well as Wibeck’s (2014b) studies. The high school students David and 
Tanja recounted a time lapse video of the ice sheet’s melting, while 
Ivalu recalled a video of two people watching an iceberg break off; 
“that was pretty crazy to see that it is so big. We live in Greenland but 
we don’t see icebergs break off every day, you know (laughs)” (FG 5: 
179).
In a second theme of memorized media images, interviewees recalled 
coverage of other populations affected by climate change through floods, 
which they recall as having made an impression on them. Both themes 
are illustrated well in an exchange between Nivi and Jonna. 
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Nivi: I also think of a programme I watched, I think this year or last 
year. It was a recording from the ice sheet where it has become rivers. 
Water just streamed down. Just think how much water comes out every 
day. I have a hard time imagining it. You almost can’t. 
Jonna: There is so much water coming out.
Nivi: I wonder what’s below the ice! And then I am thinking of this scene 
where I saw a flood, I don’t quite remember where it was, but there were 
cars and everything is floating around, and men, people that had to be 
rescued. It is incomprehensible. (FG 2: 181–87) 
Nivi and Jonna both remember media coverage showing the melting 
of the Greenlandic ice sheet. The images appeared to be vivid in their 
memory and seemed to affect them both. In the middle of this exchange, 
however, Nivi added an example of coverage of a flood in an unnamed 
place. A similar example is found in the exchange between Bjørn and 
Frederik. The latter remembered a news piece about an island state in 
the Pacific having bought new land to live on for when they become 
flooded. “That actually does make you think, okay, this really has a 
pretty big consequence for these people, right”, says Frederik (FG 1: 
140). His and Nivi’s comments highlight how the participants, while 
mostly occupied with climate changes in their proximity, also objectify 
it through other people who experience its (negative) consequences. 
The remembered examples of media coverage related to Greenland 
usually objectify climate change through natural phenomena such 
as melting ice, while the examples related to other places that have 
made an impression mostly include direct negative consequences for 
people. Here, the distinction between local and global is drawn again, 
as interviewees supply examples of how other places are more affected 
by climate change. The distinction was present yet again as the focus 
group of high school students discussed how they do not know what 
will happen to Greenland when the ice melts. 
Ivalu: We just know that Denmark will sink. 
Hansine: We just know that Denmark will become flooded (laughs) 
Ivalu: Then they will all have to move here. 
David: Yeah. 
Ivalu: Then we’ll get the queen (all laugh). (FG 5: 204–10) 
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Here, a distinction between Greenland and Denmark is drawn, 
describing how, even though climate change is vivid to interviewees, its 
most severe consequences are cast as affecting someone else.
Negotiating the Trustworthiness of Media and 
Personal Experiences 
Exploring the information sources listed by participants in their survey 
responses and through focus group interviews, the main finding is that 
media and personal experience both appear to be important information 
sources. This is exemplified in the following exchange among four high 
school students, when asked where they get information on climate 
change: 
Ivalu: The media. 
Moderator: The media? 
Ivalu: Yes. 
David: Yeah, the media. 
Tanja: Yes. 
Moderator: Is it mostly media it comes from, do you think? 
Ivalu: Yes, but also—for me also from people on the street, like local 
fishermen and hunters that talk about it, and old people. 
Hansine: Mmm. 
Ivalu: And for example my grandmother, everything like that. 
Moderator: Yeah. What do they say? 
Ivalu: How cold it was in the old times, before we were born. Back when 
the snow really squeaked in the winter and it was really cold so your ears 
turned red, and all that kind of stuff that my mum used to talk about. 
David: Mmm. 
Hansine: Yes. (FG 5: 80–92) 
The above exchange shows how media and first-hand sources interact 
and are negotiated. Several exchanges across the different focus groups 
reveal how the interviewees alternate between using the media and 
personal experiences to make sense of climate changes. This was 
also exemplified in how some interviewees counter negative media 
representations using personal and locally contextualized evaluations 
of climate change as positive. 
In the previous section, the four high school students started by 
mentioning the media as their primary source of information, and, after 
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an intervention by the moderator, added elders, hunters and fishermen 
as sources. The following exchange indicates that this switch also implies 
that they trust first-hand sources more. When asked whether they trust 
the media or first-hand sources more, they replied: 
Ivalu: I trust old people more (laughs). Because they know what they 
are talking about. 
David: Yeah, that’s right. 
Hansine: Yes. 
Tanja: Mmm. 
Ivalu: They really know what they’re talking about. 
Moderator: Yeah. So in comparison with an article, then you would trust 
most..? 
Hansine: The elders. (FG 5: 151–59) 
The question about which sources are more trustworthy was negotiated 
through the interview, and thus is not a set or fossilized representation. 
When the moderator suggested that elders might just have a different 
perspective than the media, Ivalu replied, “I trust my grandmother 
more than I trust the media” (FG 5: 161). In general, although the 
media was mentioned as a source of information in all focus groups, its 
trustworthiness was scrutinized more than that of personal experiences 
and sources. 
In their survey responses, all female participants except Jonna 
ranked “conversations with friends, family, colleagues etc.” as the 
source they rely on most for climate change information. But all three 
women in FG 2 also included either “local” or “national Greenlandic 
newspapers” in their list of trustworthy sources. These survey 
responses align closely with the three women’s collective sense-
making of climate change through objectifications of local changes in 
weather in their focus group interview. Interestingly, in another part of 
the survey respondents (including the three airline employees and the 
Danish government officials Gorm and Ulrik) ranked “international 
newspapers” among the most reliable sources. This matches the focus 
in their discussions, which were more preoccupied with the positive 
and economically beneficial sides of climate change than its negative 
environmental consequences.
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Media Representations Related to Personal Experience
This section assesses how interviewees negotiated and made sense of 
contradictions between mediated and personal experiences of climate 
change. 
Criticism of “Doomsday” Coverage
First, the study explored what the interviewees believe the media focus 
on in their climate change coverage. A main theme in interviewees’ 
responses to this question was that the media focused too much on 
the negative aspects of climate change or incited fear and alarmism 
through their coverage. A clear example is Frederik’s persistent 
highlighting of the positive possibilities that climate change poses 
in Greenland, which he finds missing from the media’s “doomsday” 
coverage, as outlined above (FG 1: 112, 67). The theme is also clear 
in Malthe’s response to how he views media reporting on climate 
change. 
Malthe: Fear mongering, I think. Honestly, I think so. It’s very, like, now 
you should only shower once a week and cycle to work or take the bus at 
least. Maybe the rest of you have a different view? 
Malthe expressed the view that the media are overly focused on the 
catastrophic elements of climate change. The same view was expressed 
in several focus group interviews. For instance, Karen reported that the 
media sometimes “blows it out of proportion a little too much” (FG 2: 
145). This type of “emotional fatigue” has been detected in other studies 
by, e.g., Olausson (2011: 292), whose focus group participants were 
“highly critical of the commercial conditions of the news media that 
generate this type of journalism”. The finding that emotional appeals, 
especially to fear, may have the opposite effect to increasing concern 
about climate change is supported in several other studies (Ryghaug, 
Sorensen, and Naess 2011; Wolf and Moser 2011; O’Neill and Nicholson 
Cole 2009). 
A criticism of the media’s lack of alarmism set the high school 
students apart from the other interviewees. Their emphasis on how the 
media does not take climate change seriously enough is exemplified in 
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the following exchange, when asked what they generally think about 
how the media covers the issue. 
Ivalu: It’s very mild. 
David: Yes, it’s mega mild. Really mild. 
Tanja: Kindergarten. 
Ivalu: It is not so much, we need to do something now and it is serious 
and it affects a lot of people, it affects the whole earth. 
David: Mhm. 
Moderator: So by “very mild”, you mean—what do you mean by “mild”? 
Tanja: Kindergarten mild. 
David: I mean it won’t affect anyone at all. That mild. (FG 5: 264–71) 
Similar expressions of dissatisfaction with how seriously climate change 
is taken in the media were not found in any other focus group. As seen 
in the passage above, the students even collectively showed disdain for 
how “mildly” the media treats the topic of climate change, calling it 
“kindergarten mild”.
Lack of Local Voices 
The high school students also criticized the lack of a local focus on climate 
change in the media. 
David: The media, they cover Denmark’s consequences but there is not 
really anything about covering our consequences, if something should 
happen. (FG 5: 183)
This social representation of how the consequences of climate change for 
Greenland are missing from the media coverage seemed to develop over 
the course of the conversation, as Ivalu’s reply indicates, “yeah, that’s 
true actually... Yeah, wow” (FG 5: 184–86). Once the idea was conceived, 
however, it reoccurred several times throughout the interview. Thus, 
when asked what they would write about if they were to write an article 
about climate change, the students reply: 
Ivalu: Listen to us. And to the elders. I mean listen to the locals. Listen 
to us who live here. 
David: Yes. 
Ivalu: Not necessarily Vittus but.. (all laugh)
Moderator: ...Who would you interview then? 
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Ivalu: Someone who is reasonable. 
David: It’s the hunters, I think. The hunters and the locals. 
Ivalu: Also the ones in smaller towns, settlements. 
Tanja: Yeah. (FG 5: 329–40)
This idea seems linked to how the students claim to trust elders, 
fishermen, and hunters from Greenland more than the media on 
questions related to climate change. It is an example of precisely 
how focus group participants relate personal experiences to media 
representations and at times identify dissonances between the two. 
Here, the students employed the accounts they have collected through 
personal interactions to critique how media representations exclude 
important voices. This theme was only peripherally touched on in other 
focus groups, for example when Pavia declared that he thinks climate 
conferences are a waste of time, and should instead take into account the 
experiences of “real nature people.” (FG 4: 75) 
This finding touches on the extent to which the media are seen to 
represent the local, contextual actualizations of climate change around 
the world. It aligns with the critique from other focus groups that 
find positive Greenlandic perspectives missing in, particularly non-
Greenlandic, media accounts of the issue. It is interesting to note how 
the students highlighted personal, first-hand accounts and requested 
a stronger focus on local, Greenlandic accounts of climate change in 
the media, while at the same time highlighting the severity of climate 
change. In other focus groups, local perspectives were mainly used to 
exemplify the positive effects of climate change in Greenland and to 
criticize media representations for focusing only on its negative effects. 
This could be a generational difference, as the high school students are 
the group that most separated themselves from the four other focus 
groups in terms of their greater certainty regarding anthropogenic 
climate change and sense-making of the phenomenon as predominantly 
negative. This could, however, also be related to many other variables 
such as media use. Unfortunately, no survey responses were obtained 
from the high school students to investigate these issues. 
Another negotiation of how local Greenlandic experiences of 
climate change are mirrored in media representations was present in 
the tourist guide Malthe’s proclamation that Greenland is sometimes 
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represented as a victim “in others’ argumentation”. When asked to 
elaborate on this point, he replied: 
Malthe: I think you often experience Greenland as this big ice cube 
that’s just melting and melting, melting and the water levels are rising 
and rising and rising. That’s mostly what I meant with that—in a way 
becoming a victim. Or positioned in this kind of victim role. Whereas 
if you ask the Greenlanders themselves, like me for example, then it’s a 
completely different picture one has. (FG 3: 182)
Malthe’s comments outline a dissonance between a common media 
representation of climate change and the local, contextual experiences 
of himself and other Greenlanders. In a sense, he distances himself from 
the common objectifying images of climate change, namely “melting 
ice” and rising “sea levels”—which studies have found are the most 
common images of climate change for many, at least Western, people 
(Wibeck 2014b; Smith and Joffe 2013; Leiserowitz 2006). Malthe’s 
comments illuminate another way through which interviewees related 
media representations to their personal experiences, thus negotiating 
established social representations and creating new ones in the 
process. It very explicitly underlines the need to include varied, local, 
contextualized experiences of even a phenomenon as global as climate 
change. 
Climate Conferences and Politicians’ Visits 
Another media focus, according to the interviewees, is stories about 
climate conferences and “high-profile climate tourists” visiting 
Greenland, as the participant Gorm calls them. This was also exemplified 
in Ulrik’s observation on media stories below. 
Ulrik: Well, specifically, I would say, that when some big shot or other 
from somewhere comes up here to see it. And then it’s only to hear or 
read what they all say. (FG 3: 62)
These two types of stories, high-profile politicians at climate 
conferences or passing through Greenland, were brought up in 
several interviews. Interviewees also mentioned climate conferences 
as the most cited sources in climate change news coverage when 
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asked directly. They discussed how climate conferences are held and 
widely covered, but expressed no particular trust in their effect. On 
the contrary, Malthe evoked a pejorative image of “grown up people 
with a long education honestly sitting and just talking about the 
weather” (FG 3: 26). The political negotiations on climate change 
were thus another representation by which interviewees made sense 
of the issue.
Discussion
This study explores how fifteen inhabitants of the world’s northernmost 
capital, Nuuk, make sense of climate change through media exposure 
and personal experience. The three distinctions outlined in Smith 
and Joffe’s (2013) study (natural/unnatural, certainty/uncertainty and 
self/other) were identified in the focus group discussions, and were 
complemented by three additional distinctions based on the empirical 
data (local/global, positive/negative, and environment/economy). Together, 
they represent the main points of contention or organizing “opposites” 
that the fifteen interviewees used to make sense of climate change 
(Olausson 2011).
Natural/Unnatural 
As is clear in their myriad objectifications of climate change, the 
distinction between natural and unnatural permeated interviewees’ 
sense-making of climate change. Smith and Joffe (2013: 26) describe 
this distinction as the juxtaposition of “how nature is expected to 
behave” with observations of it behaving in unfamiliar or unpredictable 
ways. Climate change was continuously represented as “weather”, 
which was perceived as stormier, more unreliable, warmer, etc. in 
comparison to before. This naming mechanism was also identified 
among participants in Olausson’s (2011: 289) study, allowing her to 
conclude that “the abstract and intangible risk acquire[d] familiar and 
comprehensible characteristics”.
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Certainty/Uncertainty 
Notably, none of the interviewees doubted the existence of climate 
change. The findings of the study, however, illuminate how perceptions 
of changes in the Greenlandic climate did not necessarily translate into 
a certainty with regard to anthropogenic climate change. Interviewees 
repeatedly discussed whether climate change is manmade by references 
to how “you can’t do anything against nature” and the notion that 
climate change should not be blamed on anyone. A social representation 
of climate change as manmade was not solidified among most 
participants. The distinction between certainty and uncertainty was thus 
an important sense-making device. In contrast, Olausson’s (2011: 287) 
study of Norwegian laypeople’s sense-making showed a high degree of 
certainty that climate change is manmade.
From Self/Other to Local/Global 
The study’s findings showed how the study participants did not use the 
self/other distinction to portray an “other” as the perpetrator of climate 
change. Contrary to Smith and Joffe’s (2013) findings, the participants 
in Nuuk advocated against blaming anyone for climate change. Instead, 
they used the self/other distinction to explain how the impacts of climate 
change were felt more strongly by others—such as islanders in the 
Pacific Ocean and hunters in the more northern regions of Greenland. 
This finding confirms Ryghaug, Sorensen, and Naess’ (2011: 785) 
description of interviewees’ interpretation of climate change as “distant 
in time and space”, thereby giving it a “less stressful” meaning. This 
distinction parallels the more specific difference between local and global 
identified in the present study. To some interviewees, the realities of 
climate change on a global scale should of course not be ignored, but 
on a local level, the impacts were seen as mostly positive. Interviewees 
also observed differences between the focus in local vs. global media 
coverage. The distinction between local and global adds an important 
extra layer to the distinction of self versus other. In essence, it highlights 
how interviewees are able to make sense of climate change, as both a 
global phenomenon with mainly negative impacts, and on the local 
level, as the “possibility” of pleasantly warmer temperatures and new 
economic potential.
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Positive/Negative 
Throughout the focus groups, a new positive/negative distinction was 
identified. While there were “romanticized recollections” of snow up to 
one’s head in the past, romanticized imaginations of a future, warmer 
“Costa del Nuuk” were just as prevalent in the interviews (Smith and 
Joffe 2013). Positive impacts of climate change in Nuuk were often 
advanced in opposition to fear, inciting media representations of 
climate change as purely negative. Other studies, such as Ryghaug, 
Sorensen, and Naess’ (2011: 785), have illuminated how Norwegian 
citizens reason against the severity in media representations in order 
to “diminish the risks” of global warming and give it a “less agonizing 
meaning”. In this study, I would argue that the emphasis on the positive 
impacts of climate change also serves to underline one’s own, localized 
experiences of climate change when these are not recognized in media 
representations. Participants who experienced positive effects of climate 
change, such as through their profession, criticized the media for not 
sufficiently portraying these positive effects. Thus, the distinction 
between evaluating climate-change impacts as positive or negative was 
a central theme of the interviews, and a unique finding of this study. 
It illuminates a dissonance between personal experiences and media 
representations of climate change within a particularly climate-exposed 
population. It is interesting to note how this finding differs from the 
results of the nationally representative survey conducted by Minor et 
al. (2019), in which respondents saw climate change and its impacts 
in Greenland as mainly negative. A possible explanation could be their 
different methodologies, but also the time period that separates them 
is interesting to observe as climate change has received rising global 
political attention. The deviating findings clearly underline the need for 
further research in this area. 
Environment/Economy 
A classic distinction in ecological debates is the tension between the 
environment and the economy. Previous studies connect this distinction to 
that between positive/negative. Bjørst’s (2011: 243, author’s translation) 
finding that her informants in Greenland stressed “possibilities as 
well as problems” is thus confirmed with the findings among the 
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laypeople of Nuuk. It is interesting to note that the participants closest 
to the economy end of the environment/economy continuum were first 
government officials and second employed in the tourism and fisheries 
industries, which can be seen to be positively affected by climate change. 
Those aligned with the environment end of the continuum were high 
school students and women working in “unaffected” positions in 
the education and banking sectors. This finding can be connected to 
Olausson’s (2011: 294) assumption that when social representations 
do not match our own “experiences, values, and opinions”, they are 
“likely to be transformed to resemble already established and familiar 
social representations, or even to be rejected to avoid any cognitive 
or emotional dissonance”. Future, larger-scale quantitative studies 
could focus, for example, on how inhabitants’ ages, professions, and 
educational backgrounds influence the sense-making of climate change 
in Greenland. Participants did not state that their preoccupation with 
the positive impacts of climate change emanated from or was inspired 
by media coverage—quite the contrary, these points were brought up 
in sharp contrast to mainstream media coverage. Nuttall, however, has 
argued that Greenlanders increasingly look more positively at climate 
change as politicians encourage the public to “think positively about 
the opportunities that climate change is bringing” (2009:47; 2008: 295). 
Personal Experience and the Media as Information Sources
A crucial finding of this study is the participants’ reliance on personal 
experience in their sense-making of climate change. In objectifying 
climate change, interviewees drew to a great extent on unmediated, 
personal images. For example, when asked whether she believes in 
climate change, a young high school student replied, “I mean, I have 
experienced it my whole life” (FG 5: 35). The importance that participants 
placed on anecdotes and stories heard from elders and fishermen reveal 
how interpersonal communication permeates participants’ sense-
making. In line with this, several previous studies have shown how 
“respondents make use of everyday experiences of the weather” to 
make sense of climate change in Sweden, Norway, and Britain (Olausson 
2011; Ryghaug, Sorensen, and Naess 2011; Lorenzoni and Hulme 2009; 
Whitmarsh 2008). Interviewees also drew on mediated objectifications 
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in their sense-making of climate change. These were often strongly 
connected to Greenland. These objectifications included vivid images 
of the melting ice sheet and rivers formed by thawing and large break 
offs of icebergs, as seen in videos on the internet. Climate change was 
also objectified through images from other parts of the world, such 
as island states in the Pacific. The mediated objectifications of climate 
change among Nuuk’s inhabitants therefore align somewhat with those 
identified among British and Swedish respondents in other studies 
(Wibeck 2014b; Smith and Joffe 2013). In those studies, “melting ice”, 
“weather”, “melting polar ice caps, endangered polar bears, warmer 
weather, floods, and droughts” dominated interviewees’ objectifications 
of climate change (Wibeck 2014b: 209; Smith and Joffe 2013: 21). This is 
an interesting finding, which suggests that a global set of images related 
to climate change has diffused through the media to Norwegians as well 
as Brits, Swedes, and Greenlanders.
Opposing Media Representations 
As the analysis and discussion have so far revealed, media exposure 
and personal experiences of climate change form parts of a complex 
reception and sense-making process. Stamm, Clark, and Eblacas (2000: 
220) conclude that studies in this field show that media coverage is “at 
least partly responsible for focusing people’s attention on environmental 
problems”. The current study demonstrates that residents of Nuuk 
also rely heavily on the media for information on climate change. This 
does not, however, mean that Nuuk’s inhabitants uncritically absorb 
media representations. Just as Olausson (2011: 294) concludes, media 
information was “negotiated and remolded in conversations and 
discussions with other people” throughout the course of the focus 
group interviews.
This study’s analysis has illuminated how participants were able to 
critically reflect on the information they received from the media. The 
most frequent criticisms of the media were related to the prevalence 
of emotional appeals and incitement of fear. By contrast, a minority 
of younger interviewees criticized the media for being too mild in its 
climate change reporting, and failing to communicate the urgency of 
the matter. Other participants missed local, Greenlandic accounts of 
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climate change and its consequences. Overall, the participants from 
Nuuk cannot be seen as “passive recipients of powerful messages”, as 
they actively negotiated media representations (Jensen and Rosengren 
1990). 
Olausson (2011: 295) describes the role of the media in shaping sense-
making of climate change as that of an “agenda-setter”, in the sense 
that it establishes an “overall framework” that is then “gradually filled 
with various elements, including personal and collectively deliberated 
experiences”. This account aligns well with the findings from Nuuk, 
showing how interviewees draw on personal observations to make sense 
of mediated concepts of climate change such as the threat of climate 
change. According to Olausson ‘s (2011: 295) use of the concept, agenda-
setting cannot be reduced to focusing people’s attention or “making 
people talk about climate change”, but also encompasses “setting the 
limits for viable ways of talking about this global risk in terms of causes, 
consequences, and responsibility for solutions”. In this sense, although 
they may not be directly visible, established social representations of 
climate change, perpetuated by the media, set limits on sense-making 
of the phenomenon. Although this study has convincingly shown 
that the social representations of Nuuk’s inhabitants oppose media 
representations of climate change as purely negative, their reasoning 
about the positive aspects of climate change may also be grounded 
in media representations. Indeed, a couple of interviewees noted that 
the positive aspects of climate change are more prevalent in national 
Greenlandic media. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored how inhabitants of Greenland’s capital city 
make sense of climate change and its impacts through media and 
personal experiences. Social representations theory was used to analyze 
the processes through which the scientific phenomenon was made 
tangible and comprehensible by fifteen inhabitants of various ages, 
genders, professions and backgrounds. 
In order to ensure a meaningful adaptation to the climatic changes 
experienced in Nuuk, we should learn from its inhabitants’ sense-
making. This entails including their locally particular, geographically 
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and culturally specific representations of climate change—for example, 
bringing Greenlanders’ positive experiences of climate change, 
although contradictory to dominant narratives—in broader media 
representations of climate change. These local representations challenge 
both international research and media to “create space for multiple 
and under-represented voices on the experience of climate change” 
(Farbotko and Lazrus 2012: 383). Otherwise, the voices and interests 
of populations at the heart of climate (crisis) discourses are in danger 
of being misrepresented or excluded. Thus, paying attention to local 
discourses on climate change is a crucial part of understanding the 
issue, its impacts, and ways to mitigate and adapt to it. 
Future studies should incorporate larger national and cross-national 
perspectives of public views on climate change in Greenland and other 
parts of the Arctic region. The survey incorporated in this study can 
only illuminate the particular media use of the interviewees. A larger-
scale study of climate change-related media use could further explore 
some of the perspectives analyzed in this study regarding how media 
use influences sense-making of climate change in Greenland. A study 
of national Greenlandic media coverage of climate change should also 
be undertaken to investigate whether the positive evaluations found 
in this study are grounded in the images and evaluations of national 
media coverage. Finally, future case studies should continue to explore 
how climate change is made sense of in local contexts around the world. 
While the Greenland that is “melting away” comprises an internationally 
recognized representation, its anticipated future capital “Costa del 
Nuuk” is—so far—less well known.
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3. Communication and 
Knowledge Transfer on Climate 
Change in the Philippines:  
The Case of Palawan
Thomas Friedrich
Separately from its physical reality, climate change is a travelling idea 
(Hulme 2009). Through numerous policies, laws and regulations, the 
global discourse on climate change affects many people, irrespective of 
how strongly they experience the consequences of a changing climate. 
The idea travels from global to local via a long chain of communication 
and translation. Along the way, knowledge becomes detached from 
meaning (Jasanoff 2010). This chapter considers the Philippine island 
of Palawan to show how an idea can be re-integrated into a meaningful 
context during multiple translations from source to destination in local 
ontologies. It demonstrates that the local reception of climate-change 
discourse is influenced by pre-existing systems of knowledge and 
meaning that are reproduced by circular rather than unidirectional, 
top-down communication. Irrespective of scientific accuracy, climate 
change thus becomes a coherent, plausible, and tangible concept 
regarding what people already know, believe and experience. Using 
empirical data collected in multi-method fieldwork, this chapter shows 
that sense-making is a multi-layered process, in which various sources of 
information play a decisive role in how climate change is comprehended 
and communicated. Using the example of a lay theatre performance, the 
chapter demonstrates how the reproduction and dissemination of the 
local notion of climate change unfolds, and offers recommendations for 
climate communicators.
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Introduction: Translating a Travelling Idea
There is an overwhelming scientific consensus that global warming is 
occurring as a result of human activity (Cook et al. 2013). Although 
the diffusion of public climate-change skepticism remains an issue 
especially in English-speaking countries, publics around the world 
largely accept that climate change is a cause of concern (Engels et al. 
2013). National surveys (e.g. TNS Opinion & Social 2017) indicate that 
climate science, and how it is conveyed, strongly influence both what is 
generally known about climate change and public attitudes towards it. 
Thus, it may be assumed that scientific knowledge content, insights and 
main conclusions have been successfully communicated throughout 
the world. In that sense, it has been stated that climate change is not 
only a measurable physical phenomenon but has also developed into 
a travelling idea (Hulme 2009).1 The discourse on climate change has 
become a prevalent part of information and education campaigns, 
environmental laws and policy measures. Climate change as an idea 
is affecting many people, regardless of whether they have personally 
experienced its effects. This idea has travelled in a top-down direction; 
it was initially developed by (predominantly natural) scientists from 
different disciplines and countries, represented by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The global climate-change discourse 
has informed billions of lay people that our planet’s climate is changing 
due to anthropogenic causes, which will have severe consequences. 
In regularly published IPCC reports that contain up-to-date scientific 
knowledge about climate change, the idea has been reproduced and 
disseminated widely. Subsequently, through a network of media, politics, 
and other modes of communication, it then engages in a complex process 
of knowledge transfer and transformation from the global to the local 
level before it eventually reaches its final recipients—local people with 
1  Although Hulme never used the term travelling idea, he has described climate 
change as “an idea that now travels well beyond its origins in the natural sciences. 
And as this idea meets new cultures on its travels and encounters the worlds of 
politics, economics, popular culture, commerce and religion—often through the 
interposing role of the media—climate change takes on new meanings and serves 
new purposes” (Hulme 2009: xxvi). For a more comprehensive description of the 
concept of travelling ideas at the global and organizational levels, see Czarniawska-
Joerges and Sevón (1996; 2005).
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diverse cultural backgrounds and epistemologies who try to make sense 
of (the idea of) climate change. The research questions underlying this 
chapter are how this knowledge transfer takes place in a local context, 
i.e. which are the key players involved, and how the local reception 
and reproduction of the scientific discourse on climate change can be 
captured empirically. This chapter outlines this chain of communication 
and translation of scientific knowledge about climate change from the 
global to the local level, using the example of the island of Palawan in 
the southwest of the Philippines.
Of course, this linear model of communication is very simplified. To 
analyze and fully understand the process of knowledge dissemination, 
loops and feedbacks must also be taken into consideration (Weingart, 
Engels, and Pansegrau 2000), especially at the local level. Those who 
initiated the global discourse (namely climate scientists) are less diverse 
than the multipliers and recipients of this discourse around the world. 
The more it trickles down into the manifold realms of politics, society, 
and culture, the more it interacts with other national discourses, local 
narratives, and traditional ontologies. Thus, not only knowledge is of 
utter importance when it comes to climate change communication, but 
also meaning (Jasanoff 2010). Therefore, the way in which people make 
sense of climate change relates not only to what they know or do not 
know about it, but also to how they understand the idea, and what it 
actually means to them when they are told that the climate is changing, 
that the sea level is rising, or that extreme weather events are more likely 
to occur in the future. Do they understand the fundamental causalities 
of the global discourse in the same way as scientists do, or are there 
alternative models of explanation? And why do some of these models 
eventually prevail within a society, while others do not? For Jasanoff, 
the fact that climate science “cuts against the grain of ordinary human 
experience” (Jasanoff 2010: 237), and thus produces local discordances, 
relates to how it separates scientific knowledge from meaning on a global 
level during the process of scientific assessment: “Scientific assessments 
such as those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change helped 
establish climate change as a global phenomenon, but in the process 
they detached knowledge from meaning. Climate facts arise from 
impersonal observation whereas meanings emerge from embedded 
experience” (Jasanoff 2010: 233). In the process of communicating and 
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translating scientific facts about climate change, the climate discourse 
has encountered various, in part, conflicting local epistemologies and 
cultures of knowledge, e.g. cultural models of nature that contradict 
each other (Beck 2007; Bostrom and Lashof 2007; Jasanoff 2010). This 
raises the question of how exactly (global) scientific knowledge and 
(local) cultural knowledge intertwine or, in other words, how the 
“counterintuitive nature of global warming causation” (Rudiak-Gould 
2014a: 370) fits into more traditional ethno-ecological beliefs. Indeed, 
scientific findings are themselves the result of the co-production of 
knowledge and are thus affected by cultural constraints:
Scientific knowledge, in particular, is not a transcendent mirror of reality. 
It both embeds and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms, 
conventions, discourses, instruments and institutions—in short, in all the 
building blocks of what we term the social. (Jasanoff 2004b: 3, original 
emphasis)
[S]cientific facts bearing on the global environment never take root in 
a neutral interpretive field; they are dropped into contexts that have 
already been conditioned to produce distinctive cultural responses to 
scientific claims. (Jasanoff 2010: 240)
So, what does this mean for climate change communication? I use the 
case of Palawan to illustrate that what local people know about climate 
change cannot be separated from the meaning they attach to the concept. 
As Jasanoff has pointed out, meaning derives from experiences that 
are embedded in specific environmental, social, and cultural contexts. 
It is therefore reasonable to assume that the way people make sense 
of climate change is inextricably linked to these contexts. As outlined 
below, what climate change means to the inhabitants of Palawan strongly 
depends on their cultural model of nature, i.e., on basic assumptions 
about their natural environment and the weather, as well as past and 
everyday experiences, national and local discourses, and narratives that 
frame the idea and constantly reproduce it in its localized meaning. 
Hence, the complex interconnections of climate change knowledge with 
associated knowledge domains must be taken into consideration in 
order to fully understand how the travelling idea is integrated into pre-
existing systems of knowledge and meaning. In this regard, the term 
making sense refers to the process of making foreign knowledge familiar 
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within the context(s) of present beliefs by establishing the best possible 
coherence and plausibility.
In social representations theory (cf. Smith and Joffe 2013), the process 
lay people use to make (common) sense of unfamiliar information is 
described as “anchoring”, i.e., the classification and naming of “foreign 
and threatening phenomena in terms that resonate with those attempting 
to understand the phenomena” (Smith and Joffe 2013: 18; see Chapter 
2, Greenland). As the Palawan case shows, those resonating terms and 
categories are a crucial element of understanding how local individuals 
make sense of climate change. Furthermore, the case demonstrates that 
anchoring also takes place when the English term climate change is not 
translated into the local language but is instead retained and given a 
new specific meaning. According to social representations theory, 
sense-making of unfamiliar and uncertain information depends on the 
interplay between personal everyday experiences and media coverage 
(Smith and Joffe 2013: 28). However, I argue that more dependencies 
should be considered. Individuals’ images, associations, and 
representations about climate change are also determined by national or 
local discourses, which in turn depend in many ways on media coverage 
and personal experiences (or lack thereof), and also influence them. 
Together they form the framework that determines how the traveling 
idea of climate change is eventually received, contextualized, and made 
familiar locally.
This is especially true for Palawan and many other places in the Global 
South, where people’s access to information about climate change and 
media access in general is less comprehensive. Therefore, my extended 
field research on Palawan not only focused on how people receive 
the discourse on climate change in terms of how they obtain relevant 
information, but also on how that discourse is locally reproduced—i.e., 
how climate change knowledge is distributed and communicated apart 
from unidirectional media consumption. 
Palawan is home to a multitude of sources from which knowledge 
about (and thus public awareness of) climate change is drawn and 
disseminated. For example, media sources (radio, TV, internet, and, to a 
lesser degree, newspapers) are quite accessible on the island, especially 
in the capital Puerto Princesa City. Furthermore, the people of Palawan 
learn about climate change in educational institutions (governmental 
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as well as non-governmental), discuss it in community meetings, 
hear about it in churches, are affected by its political implications and 
implementations, and talk about it with family, friends, and neighbors. 
Scientific terms such as climate change, global warming, greenhouse effect, or 
sea level rise are introduced to society through these various information 
channels. In order to examine how climate-change discourse is received 
and locally reproduced, one of my fieldwork goals was to identify 
relevant “translation regimes” (De Wit 2015), by which I mean all 
local agents, institutions, communication patterns, discourses, and 
narratives that help to translate the global discourse into a generally 
intelligible common sense understanding, and thus significantly shape 
the perception, conceptualization, and communication about climate 
change. Translation regimes—which include, but are not limited to, the 
media—embed the scientific notion of anthropogenic climate change 
into meaningful local contexts. Together they provide the socio-cultural, 
discursive, and epistemic basis for how knowledge about climate 
change is distributed, organized, and structured throughout society. 
Since local translation regimes are integral parts of local society and 
culture, they enable us to research processes of anchoring, translating, 
interpreting, reproducing, and thus sense-making of climate change 
as dialectical rather than unidirectional. Below I describe one such 
regime from Palawan—an amateur theatre—to demonstrate how local 
concepts, narratives, and values pertaining to the relationship between 
the island’s population and their natural environment are reflected in 
climate change communication. In the conclusion, I recommend that 
climate change communicators pay more attention to local peculiarities 
and corresponding translation regimes in order to understand how 
people make sense of climate change, and why they do it in a particular 
way.
Localizing the Study of Climate Communication
Much of the research to date on public perceptions of climate change has 
been based on large-scale national and international surveys (e.g. TNS 
Opinion & Social 2017). There have been few qualitative investigations of 
how people integrate scientific knowledge into existing local knowledge 
and meaning contexts. Ethnographic fieldwork is particularly suited 
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to this purpose. Qualitative methods not only help to determine what 
people know and how their knowledge is embedded into broader 
socio-cultural contexts; they can also elicit tacit forms of knowledge 
that people rarely articulate explicitly, if at all, e.g., in interviews. This 
chapter is based on ethnographic fieldwork that used multiple methods 
of collecting and analyzing empirical data to obtain a more holistic view 
of how local knowledge about climate change is reproduced, distributed, 
and applied discursively. As further described in the methods section, 
these include participant observation, guided interviews, a survey, and 
experimental methods of cognitive anthropology. 
One of my main findings was that local investigations of climate 
change knowledge, and the discourses and narratives that shape 
communication about it, should examine local ecological and weather 
knowledge that strongly influences people’s experiences with their 
environment, and thus affects how global climate-change discourse is 
received locally. As  Strauss, for example, has shown in her ethnographic 
description of the Foehn in the Swiss Alps, the people of the small town 
of Leukerbad experience and feel this warm and dry wind, which 
has become as much a vital part of their identity as the surrounding 
mountains. “Wind” Strauss states “is part of the landscape” (Strauss 
2007: 179). Common ecological knowledge in general, as well as basic 
knowledge about the weather, is locally anchored and, to varying 
degrees, socially shared. It is thus not merely information or factual 
knowledge. It also includes tacit knowledge, embodied knowledge, 
basic assumptions, norms and values, as much as it is expressed in 
feelings, discourses, and social behavior. This kind of local knowledge 
is generated and reproduced based on everyday experiences of—and 
interactions with—(changing) environments, e.g., by the regular use of 
natural resources or weather experiences. Yet, since it is also the subject of 
constant negotiations, it is a dynamic form of knowledge. Ingold (2010) 
employs a phenomenological approach to illustrate how knowledge 
is acquired by physically moving through the “weather-world”. This 
strongly resembles the idea of a “local epistemology” (Friedrich 2018), 
but lacks the social dimension of knowledge, i.e., how it is shared and 
socially construed. On the scale of national states, this is what Jasanoff 
emphasizes in her concept of “civic epistemology”, by which she 
means all “institutionalized practices by which members of a given 
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society test and deploy knowledge claims used as a basis for making 
collective choices” (Jasanoff 2007: 255). This does not mean, however, 
that recognition of civic or local epistemologies implies a dismissal of 
scientific standards, or that local knowledge should be romanticized. 
Rather, that acknowledging different epistemologies, i.e., processes of 
knowledge co- and reproduction, allows for a deeper understanding of 
why local translation and integration of global knowledge varies widely 
(Lutes 1998; Roncoli, Crane, and Orlove 2009).
The difficulty of reconciling (global) scientific and (local) non-
scientific systems of knowledge is demonstrated by exploring the 
intersection of global and local knowledge about climate change. It 
has been pointed out many times that people do not experience “the 
climate” as a statistical figure, but the weather, its variations, and 
environmental changes (West and Vásquez-León 2003; Bostrom and 
Lashof 2007; Peterson and Broad 2009; Rudiak-Gould 2012, 2013b). 
Unlike knowledge about natural environments and the weather, natural 
scientific knowledge about climate change is impersonal, apolitical, 
intangible, and universal. Global climate change takes place on a huge 
scale, both spatially and temporally; the physical causes and effects are 
located far from each other. At the same time, the climate is a slowly 
changing system. Climate scientists assert that many climatic changes 
that can be observed today are the result of anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas emissions from past decades, which means that the benefits of 
recently implemented measures to reduce carbon emissions will not 
be realized for decades later, if at all. From a scientific point of view, 
a direct link between the behavior of one individual and climatic or 
weather variations cannot be established. However, to make sense of 
perceived changes in weather and the environment, people do make 
this link to find plausible explanations based on their ontologies. For 
example, Roncoli et al. (2003) found that farmers’ interpretations of 
scientific weather forecasts in Northern Burkina Faso are strongly 
influenced by personal interests and their concept of rain. The authors 
conclude that: “[S]cientific and technical knowledge is not a ‘product’ 
that can be pre-packaged and delivered to ‘users’ without its being 
altered by its incorporation into a different set of meanings and relations 
from those that produced such knowledge” (Roncoli et al. 2003: 197). 
Therefore, from an anthropological point of view, local heuristics or 
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explanatory models are of the utmost importance. Instead of seeing 
them as simple misinterpretations of scientific concepts that have to 
be corrected (c.f. Bostrom and Lashof 2007; Chen 2011), they can also 
be understood as a cultural expression of confirmation bias, i.e., the 
psychological phenomenon that people accept new information only 
when it is consistent with their pre-existing knowledge, and reject it 
when it challenges ingrained concepts (Rayner 2003). This applies to 
environmental or pollution concerns as much as climate change, where 
political, moral, and conceptual plausibility has been demonstrated to 
be more important than physical causality (Douglas and Wildavsky 
1982; Douglas 1992; Jasanoff 2010; Rudiak-Gould 2014b). Thus, 
anthropologists are not interested in whether local people have an 
“accurate” understanding of the complex notion of scientific climate 
change. They instead ask how people conceptualize the idea, how they 
relate it to their environment, how their alternative explanatory models 
fit with what they already know and believe, which local translation 
regimes influence the way they conceptualize and talk about climate 
change, and whether or not their cultural models are challenged by 
science or other “potentially incongruent sources and knowledge 
practices” (Hastrup 2015: 142). 
Models of Knowledge Transfer
This context relates to associated fields like translation, (risk) 
communication and public understanding of science (Rudiak-Gould 
2012). One of the shortcomings in past research on science communication 
has been identified as the expert/lay dichotomy that distinguishes 
between two groups believed to be homogeneous, i.e., “scientists”, as 
the discourse producers, and “the public”, as the discourse recipients 
(Thompson and Rayner 1998). The underlying assumption of this 
dichotomy, “that it is possible to separate what the risks really are from 
what the public erroneously believe them to be” (Thompson and Rayner 
1998: 165), not only simplifies the complex discourse and ignores the 
heterogeneity of those that constitute it. It has also led to incorrect 
conclusions in social scientific research, public information campaigns, 
and policy-making. With reference to the pioneering work of Kempton 
et al. (1995), who showed among other things how fundamentally 
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US-Americans’ perceptions of climate change are based on different pre-
existing cultural models that are widely shared, Thompson and Rayner 
conclude that “the accuracy of the detailed information that members 
of the public are receiving from media discussion or public awareness 
campaigns is largely irrelevant” (Thompson and Rayner 1998,: 148). 
Thus, they conclude that more precise science communication does 
not necessarily lead to a more accurate public understanding of the 
problem. For example, a number of studies have shown a widespread 
phenomenon, which I also encountered on Palawan (described in more 
detail below), that lay people usually confuse climate change with ozone 
depletion (Löfstedt 1991; Kempton 1991; Bostrom et al. 1994; Kempton, 
Boster, and Hartley 1995; Thompson and Rayner 1998; Smith and Joffe 
2013; Friedrich 2017). A popular “solution” for such phenomena would 
be to correct this misconception by better communicating scientific 
knowledge, also known as the (information) deficit model. By providing 
targeted education about the actual causal interconnections, it is 
assumed that the public will eventually see the world the way scientists 
do. This unidirectional sender/receiver structure of communication 
has been criticized as psychologically and sociologically naïve (Stern 
1992; Kearney 1994; Wynne 1995; Thompson and Rayner 1998; Blake 
1999; Weingart, Engels, and Pansegrau 2000; Jasanoff 2007; Hulme 2009; 
Jasanoff 2010; Rudiak-Gould 2013b). Indeed, the deficit model ignores 
the fact that the acquisition of new knowledge is a selective process, 
and that receiving new information does not necessarily lead to the 
understanding intended. In order to integrate it into pre-existing systems 
of knowledge and meaning, there must be a certain amount of coherence 
and plausibility, since “a series of isolated facts or details do not create 
meaning” (Kearney 1994: 430). Creating meaning, however, is a creative 
and thus active process that does not fit into a unidirectional structure 
of communication. Instead of trying to correct “wrong” concepts with 
more detailed scientific information, these concepts should be taken into 
serious consideration. Another limitation of the deficit model is what 
environmental psychology labels the knowledge-behavior or value-
action gap. This refers to the problem that people apparently do not act 
as desired, for example by changing their consumption patterns, even 
though they seem to know enough about their individual and collective 
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impact on the environment, and hold high environmental values (Blake 
1999). 
In comparison, the sociocultural model explains the relationship 
between knowledge and behavior much better; it is less knowledge-
based and considers norms, values and social actors. Because, as 
Jasanoff has stated, “without human actors […] even scientific claims 
have no power to move others” (Jasanoff 2004a: 36). Among others, 
she has pointed out that science alone cannot provide a moral basis for 
action (Milton 1996, p. 124; Thompson and Rayner 1998; Jasanoff 2007). 
Instead of a unidirectional transfer of climate change knowledge, the 
sociocultural model assumes a more dialogical communication along 
“cultural circuits” (Hulme 2009), like science, politics, media, and the 
public that represent distinct domains in which “[m]essages about 
climate change have no starting point and no ending point; they travel 
around this circuitry, changing frame, form and meaning as they go” 
(Hulme 2009: 221).
A third model that more strongly emphasizes the meaning of 
discourses and their role in the selectivity of knowledge acquisition 
can be called the discourse model. Discourses provide an epistemological 
and normative structure to determine what particular information 
is relevant, and what can be ignored or rejected. By considering the 
national and local translation regimes—i.e., social agents, institutions, 
communicational patterns, narratives, and discourses that mediate 
and translate the global discourse on climate change—the manifold 
local manifestations of this discourse eventually become explainable. 
Translation regimes show us how, where, and by whom relevant 
knowledge is actively shared, verbally or non-verbally. Identifying and 
analyzing such regimes is indispensable to delineate how the scientific 
discourse is being received and reproduced on a local scale. 
Language is another significant factor that permeates all the models 
described. The anthropologist Rudiak-Gould emphasized that the 
communication of scientific climate change knowledge is not only an 
issue in terms of translating ideas, concepts and cultural models; it is 
also a linguistic problem:
Climate change communication is ultimately an issue of translation: the 
cultural translation from scholarly communities to citizens; the cultural 
translation from Western and other elite developers of climate science to 
88 Global Warming in Local Discourses
indigenous people and other non-Westerners; the linguistic translation 
from specialized climatological jargon to the colloquial language of 
citizens; and the linguistic translation from English, and other languages 
in which the notion of anthropogenic global warming has been 
formulated and studied, to the languages of those who are called upon 
to prevent or prepare for it. (Rudiak-Gould 2012: 46)
During his fieldwork on the Marshall Islands, Rudiak-Gould found that 
the local term that is used to translate climate change into Marshallese 
language already holds various meanings, and thus influences how 
climate change as a concept is understood. He assumes that this kind 
of mistranslation (deficit model) or reinterpretation (sociocultural 
and discourse model) occurs in many other societies and languages 
as well. Instead of dismissing those local concepts as a result of failed 
communication, however, he suggests that they may provide the 
opportunity for real dialogue (Rudiak-Gould 2012, 2014b). In this 
context, anthropologists, linguists and other social scientists familiar 
with local patterns of meaning can make a decisive contribution to 
improving climate communication.
In the Philippines, the English term climate change is predominately 
used in public discourse, since English is the country’s second lingua 
franca. For instance, in national television broadcasts, where “Taglish” 
is predominately spoken (a common mix of the first lingua franca, 
Tagalog or Filipino, and English), the term climate change is clearly 
preferred to its Tagalog translation pagbabago ng klima. However, even 
if the same term is used as in global scientific discourse, this does not 
mean that its meaning has not changed or will not change further 
along the chain of communication. The question of translation does not 
disappear just because there is no linguistic translation. What remains 
is cultural translation. The Philippine example therefore demonstrates 
why a distinction must be made in climate change communication 
between knowledge and meaning as much as between local and global 
discourses.
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Communicating Climate Change in the Philippines2
As an archipelago, the Philippines is among the countries most 
vulnerable to climate change. The IPCC defines climate change 
vulnerability as “the degree to which geophysical, biological and socio-
economic systems are susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse 
impacts of climate change” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 2007: 21). In international comparisons, the Philippines is always 
ranked highest because even without climate change, it experiences 
multiple extreme weather events that regularly cause massive damage 
and casualties. Each year between May and November, around twenty 
tropical cyclones enter the Philippine Area of Responsibility, almost 
half of which make landfall. According to the Global Climate Risk 
Index (Eckstein, Künzel, and Schäfer 2017), the Philippines is ranked 
the fifth most affected by weather extremes and subsequent events 
like floods or mudslides between 1997 and 2016. In 2013, it even led 
the ranking as a consequence of super typhoon Yolanda (international 
name: Haiyan) that is considered to be the strongest typhoon that 
has ever made landfall (Kreft et al. 2014). Against this background, 
it becomes comprehensible that numerous Philippine policies, laws, 
and regulations have incorporated natural and environmental hazards 
and their consequences. For example, a natural disaster discourse is 
virtually ubiquitous in the country. As elaborated below, this discourse 
plays a pivotal role in the way climate change is commonly understood 
and adopted in policy-making processes. On Palawan, the dovetail of 
natural disaster discourse and climate-change discourse is an integral 
part of local translation regimes that help to translate the scientific 
discourse on climate change into a more intelligible and tangible 
understanding, taking actual experiences (or lack thereof) into account. 
In order to understand climate change communication on Palawan, it is 
thus worthwhile to first examine official national climate policy and its 
implications for local contexts.
The Philippines was one of the first countries in the world to make 
climate change a legal issue. As early as 1991, then-President Corazon 
Aquino signed Administrative Order No. 220, which provided for the 
2  Modified versions of this and the following section can also be found in Friedrich 
(2018).
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foundation of a national climate change committee. The first IPCC 
assessment report was published just one year before the Philippines 
officially accepted the “mounting scientific evidence of an impending 
global warming” (President of the Philippines 1991). In 1994, it ratified 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
nine years later, the Kyoto Protocol. In 2007, the fourth IPCC assessment 
report was published, which again had a strong impact on Philippine 
legislation. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued a decree that 
year which stated, with regard to the IPCC, that “climate change poses 
serious threats to the lives and welfare of the people, especially the poor 
households, and sustainable development of the country” (President 
of the Philippines 2007). The decree also ordered the foundation of a 
task force on climate change that eventually merged with the former 
climate change committee in 2009 to form the current Climate Change 
Commission (Republic of the Philippines 2009). As demonstrated 
here, the Philippines is understood as a country that is very vulnerable 
to the impacts of climate change. It is located within the so-called 
Typhoon Belt, “experiencing [an] unusual number of high-intensity 
typhoons that have wrought devastations and anguished to our people” 
(President of the Philippines 2007). The commission was tasked with 
informing and educating the public about the issue of climate change, 
raising awareness of its adverse effects, and mobilizing appropriate 
responses. The dissemination of climate change knowledge therefore 
became official, and eventually resulted in a country-specific discourse 
that explicitly prioritizes knowledge “from the Philippine perspective”, 
and adaptation as a preferred strategy to deal with climate change 
(Climate Change Commission 2011). According to the National Climate 
Change Action Plan, the communication of climate change knowledge 
must consider the specific local context: 
Having access to relevant information and localizing it from the Philippine 
perspective: There is a lot of scientific information about climate change 
in [sic] the global level. […] Climate-change impacts vary from one place 
to another and so researches [sic] on the local impacts are important. 
[…] Development of […] communication materials should consider who 
the target is and what type of materials are suitable to them. (Climate 
Change Commission 2011: 33)
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What is locally known about climate change in the Philippines, therefore, 
is not just the result of an incidental loss of information along a long 
chain of communicating, translating, and simplifying the complex and 
comprehensive scientific knowledge from the global to the local level 
(as in the children’s game “Chinese whispers”). Instead, the Philippine 
government intentionally pre-selects and stresses particular knowledge 
content and discards others. Considering the country’s continuous 
experience of extreme weather events and natural hazards, and its 
overall educational situation, this policy reflects a very pragmatic 
approach to the climate change issue, and therefore serves as a good 
example of how political discourses as part of laws and regulations, 
initiatives and programmes, but also across the media, continuously 
constitute access to, dissemination of, and interpretation of knowledge. 
This also applies to the local scale, where global scientific and national 
political discourses encounter specific local discourses and narratives 
that may or may not be compatible with one another. In the following 
this is shown by the example of the island of Palawan, which is special 
on many levels compared to the rest of the archipelago.
“Palawan is Different!”
Consistent with the Filipino population in general (Social Weather 
Stations 2013), the vast majority of the people that I encountered during 
my fieldwork on Palawan were convinced that climate change is real: 
fifty out of fifty-three respondents (94%) to my survey3 agreed with 
the statement “Climate change is a calamity which is happening in the 
Philippines right now”. However, 84% also agreed with the statement 
“We experience climate change in Palawan. But other parts of the 
Philippines experience it much stronger than us”. This is just one of 
many indicators that a notably large percentage of my interlocutors 
continually made a strong distinction between their island and the 
rest of the country. This predominately positive demarcation was also 
expressed in terms of safety issues, general quality of life, environmental 
matters and even geophysical phenomena. Respondents stated that, 
3  For a detailed description of how the data were collected and how the sample was 
constructed, see subsequent section.
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unlike in the Philippines in general, there are no earthquakes, volcanoes 
or very strong typhoons on Palawan. This claim is largely supported by 
scientific accounts, since the island does have some exceptional features 
regarding its tectonic structure. Although, like most of the country, it is 
geologically part of the Sunda Plate, the island is not affected by orogenic 
movements (i.e., the formation of mountains). As a significant amount 
of endemic species of flora and fauna, as well as different soil conditions 
indicate, Palawan is more closely related to Borneo and the continental 
part of South East Asia as opposed to the remaining archipelago, which 
is of volcanic origin (Baillie, Evangelista, and Inciong 2000; Esselstyn, 
Widmann, and Heaney 2004). This also means that Palawan is not part of 
the Pacific Ring of Fire and is thus considered to be an “aseismic region” 
(Lagmay et al. 2009). Moreover, it does not lie within the Typhoon Belt, 
which makes the island less vulnerable to the strong typhoons that 
usually approach the country from the Eastern Pacific. However, as 
a deeper look into historical typhoon paths reveals and the typhoon 
season of 2017 has once again demonstrated, the island is certainly not 
typhoon-free (Palawan Council for Sustainable Development 2004: 49; 
WWF Philippines and BPI Foundation 2014). 
Another distinctive feature that is always brought up by Palawan’s 
inhabitants when asked what is so special about their island is its unique, 
albeit vulnerable, natural environment. The island is known as “the last 
(ecological) frontier” in the Philippines due to its massive forest cover,4 
biodiversity, healthy coral reefs and low population density. Almost 
40% of Philippine fauna can be found here, including many endemic 
and endangered species (Palawan Council for Sustainable Development 
2004). Palawan is also home to about one-fourth of the Philippines’ 
intact mangrove forests (Long and Giri 2011). Despite being the 
largest province in the Philippines by area, only around 1% of the total 
population lives there. In 1990, the UNESCO declared the province a Man 
and Biosphere Reserve and a model region for sustainable development 
(United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
2011). Two years later, a national law was passed, known as the Strategic 
Environmental Plan for Palawan Act, which led to the establishment of 
4  Its forest cover of 46.5% is considerably higher than the Philippine average of 22.8% 
(calculation based on Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(2010); Forest Management Bureau (2015)).
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the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) (Republic of 
the Philippines 1992). For more than twenty-five years, the PCSD has 
been responsible for extensive programmes to protect, conserve and 
develop the island’s natural resources, and to educate its population 
on climate issues. It has also become a regional translation regime that 
impacts how the discourse on climate change is perceived on the island.
Fig. 3.1 The island of Palawan with its capital region that consists of 
both urban and rural areas (source: author, 2020).
On a local scale, the same can be said for the city administration of 
Palawan’s capital, Puerto Princesa City. My fieldwork and all my data 
collection took place within its municipal boundaries. In the same year 
the PCSD was created, 1992, a new mayor took office in Puerto Princesa 
City, who was praised shortly afterwards by the United Nations 
Environment Programme in 1997 as “the first Filipino political leader to 
make environmental protection the centerpiece of his administration” 
(UNEP 2004: 2011). At this time, and for the third time in a row, the 
city won the national contest for the “Cleanest and Greenest Component 
City in the Philippines” due to its very successful “operation cleanliness” 
(Tagalog: oplan linis). During this mayor’s term of office until 2013 (with 
94 Global Warming in Local Discourses
a short break between 2001 and 2002), Puerto Princesa City rapidly 
developed from a former penal colony administration into a best practice 
example for successful climate change adaptation, and one of South 
Asia’s prime eco-tourism destinations (Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources 2012; WWF Philippines and BPI Foundation 2014). 
As my overall findings indicate, those and other policy implementations 
have had a huge and sustainable impact on the thinking and behavior 
of the city’s inhabitants regarding how they value nature and how they 
understand their individual and collective impacts on natural processes. 
In a nutshell, environmentalism virtually became common sense. 
One of the key components of local environmental rhetoric has been 
about not only protecting but also improving the island’s vegetation by 
planting trees to enhance its resilience to weather-related disasters and 
sea level rise. Palawan hosts two of Southeast Asia’s oldest and most 
popular tree planting festivals (Friedrich 2017). Bearing in mind the 
specific historical, political, and environmental context of Palawan and 
its capital, an intriguing finding of my research thus becomes clear—that 
the island’s above-mentioned biogeographical exceptionalities strongly 
correlate with people’s attitudes and behavior towards their natural 
environment and climate change. As my data shows, there is a strong 
consensual perception of climate change as just one hazard among 
others. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of my sample reported 
that what they understood as “proper environmental behavior” was 
also understood as a significant factor in preventing natural disasters on 
Palawan, including climate change. 
Methods
Determining how the people of Palawan understand and make sense 
of climate change entails intricate methodological challenges. While 
there are many ways to assess what people know about a certain 
subject, it is much more difficult to determine how they comprehend 
a concept. You might ask them what they know about climate change 
and they might tell you a lot about it (irrespective of whether it is 
scientifically correct), but evaluating understanding requires much 
more than factual knowledge. Although people might understand 
climate change somehow, they may not be able to verbalize it 
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explicitly. As social representations theory states, anchoring and 
comprehending an unfamiliar scientific concept like climate change 
requires a system of reference that constitutes whether or not new 
knowledge content makes sense (cf. Smith and Joffe 2013: 18). From 
a local perspective of understanding, this function is commonly 
fulfilled by pre-existing systems of knowledge and meaning that 
include basic, underlying assumptions. In the case of climate change, 
these assumptions include fundamental beliefs about how nature and 
the weather generally work, i.e., how natural processes are interrelated 
or what impacts humans have on these processes and vice versa. This 
kind of tacit knowledge can be shared widely within a social group. 
However, possession of such cultural models does not necessarily 
enable its members to reflect them. Despite this knowledge being 
taken for granted—or perhaps because of that—people do not talk 
about it. Therefore, in order to reconstruct local people’s perspectives 
on climate change, I used a strongly bottom-up, data-driven approach 
with multiple methods of data collection that also took implicit forms 
of knowledge into account and allowed for maximum empirical 
openness by reducing the probability of biasing the results with 
my own underlying assumptions about the scientific concept of 
global climate change. Following this methodological approach, 
which was largely inspired by Grounded Theory (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967), each method of data collection was built on previous 
collections and continuously compared. This section briefly presents 
each of the data collection methods as well as some of their crucial 
results.5 Subsequently, more emphasis will be put on the participant 
observation part of my fieldwork, with a more practical example of 
how climate change knowledge is communicated, transferred, and 
disseminated on Palawan beyond media consumption.
My fieldwork took place for a total of seven months between 2013 
and 2015. The central data collection was carried out between October 
2013 and March 2014. During that time, I successively collected various 
data formats from almost 100 people living in the municipality of Puerto 
Princesa City, using a multi-method approach that included qualitative 
as well as quantitative methods. In addition to participant observation, 
5  For a detailed description, reflection, and discussion of the overall methodology, see 
Friedrich (2017).
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conducting interviews and administering a survey, further methods 
from cognitive anthropology have been applied, namely freelists and 
pilesorts, which proved particularly suitable to my research question.6 
Each of these data formats, collected in different, partly overlapping 
groups of informants, represented a certain perspective on the topic; 
however, they complemented each other and eventually provided a 
more complete picture. Accordingly, my overall findings are the result 
of the triangulation of all these methods. 
Data analysis was carried out at the same time as data collection and 
thus also followed the methodological approach of Grounded Theory, 
leading to the emergence and development of empirically based, local 
concepts, categories, and ideas, which in turn led to hypotheses that 
were integrated into the design of the next phase of data collection. For 
instance, most of the survey statements with which participants were 
asked to agree or disagree were the result of a cluster analysis of the 
pilesorts that were mainly based on the results of the freelists. Many of 
those statements would never have found their way into the survey if 
I had designed it at the beginning of my fieldwork. “Being there” and 
collecting data was an essential requirement for eliciting what eventually 
proved to be culturally relevant statements and interpreting the overall 
data adequately. By constantly cross-referencing data formats with 
background information and personal observations, this exploratory 
mix of methods produced findings that were more valid and plausible 
within their sociocultural, historical, and political context. Furthermore, 
participant observation was particularly helpful for comprehending 
how people’s knowledge about climate change was put into practice in 
everyday life and on special occasions. 
6  Freelists and pilesorts are techniques used to elicit items, elements or members of a 
certain cultural domain. They are lists of free associations that help to detect what 
cognitive anthropologists describe as cultural domains or mental categories, i.e., 
culturally relevant clusters of items or subdomains (e.g., “edible fishes”). For an 
overview of how those and other cognitive methods are applied, see Borgatti and 
Halgin (2013). For a more detailed description of how I conducted and analyzed 
the freelists and pilesorts, see Friedrich (2018).
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Findings
One of the freelist tasks that was administered in both English and 
Tagalog was to note down personal associations with the term climate 
change. The results show that more than half of the respondents who 
performed this task (n = 31) linked climate change to natural disasters 
and extreme weather events such as those occurring in the Philippines. 
Almost half of them mentioned predominantly negative effects on 
society and the general weather. The following interview sequence with 
Abraham7 provides an example: 
Thomas: Personally, have you already experienced the impacts of climate 
change?
Abraham: I’m sick because of climate change.
Thomas: And why is that?
Abraham: You know, the changing weather. Sometimes I wonder, is it 
Christmas today? You know? Sometimes we experience this [changes] in 
November or October, but now even early morning. Not only today but 
also in the past. (Interview with Abraham, 17 January 2014)
By “Christmas” Abraham refers to the northeast monsoon called 
amihan that brings cool winds to Palawan between October/November 
and February/March. The beginning of this dry season more or less 
coincides with the Christmas season that starts around September in the 
Philippines. Abraham wondered about the perceived shift in seasons 
that was expressed by many of my interlocutors, including too much 
or too little precipitation or somehow “wrong” temperatures in the 
past few years. Tetina, a woman from one of the Indigenous groups of 
Palawan, the Tagbanwa, gives another example: 
Thomas: How would you describe, in general, the weather here in Puerto 
Princesa City or Palawan?
Tetina: With regards to weather my observations before was (sic): If 
it’s summertime, it is summertime—it is the dry season. And if it is the 
rainy season, it is raining. But now, I think, like three years ago, there are 
changes based on my personal observations. (Interview with Tetina, 21 
January 2014)
7  To maintain anonymity, an alias was created for all informants.
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Respondents provided a rather diverse set of answers in the freelists. 
However, when specifically asked about the causes and effects of climate 
change, about two-thirds named general harm to the environment as 
a major cause. For almost half of them this included damage caused 
to trees or the forest in general. For about one-third the wrong use of 
waste, e.g., burning plastic, was another culprit. In sum, over 80% of the 
causes mentioned could be classified as human induced, which is also 
reflected more explicitly in the survey statement “Global warming is 
man-made”, which 87% of participants (n = 53) agreed with. Climate 
change skepticism does not appear to be an issue on Palawan. Apart 
from natural disasters and extreme weather events, climate change 
effects were strongly associated with adverse effects on the environment, 
general weather, and society. 
The freelists results were subsequently incorporated into a pilesort (n 
= 34), i.e., a card-sorting task. The most common terms mentioned in all 
freelists were identified and written on thirty-two cards, combined with 
further terms, e.g., from the scientific discourse on climate change, and 
then randomly shuffled and handed over to another set of participants 
who independently sorted them into piles according to what they 
believed to be affiliation. At the end of each sorting activity, participants 
were asked to explain the topic of each of their piles. The answers given 
to this question were of the utmost importance for understanding the 
categories or domains of thinking used to cognitively structure those 
terms within a common knowledge context. A cluster analysis of all 
the pilesorts revealed a dominant pattern of domains that clearly 
distinguished between what were perceived to be positive and negative 
human activities (e.g., tree planting and burning garbage, respectively) 
and their impacts on nature (see Friedrich 2018 for an analysis). 
A consensus analysis of the pilesorts and the survey showed an 
overwhelming agreement regarding how my interlocutors thought 
about climate change and their natural environment. Climaxing 
in several survey statements with an agreement up to 100% of all 
independently interviewed participants, this consensus was so strong 
that it would not be unreasonable to suggest that it not only applies 
to my sample but to the population of Puerto Princesa City, or maybe 
even Palawan in general. For example, one of the statements with 100% 
agreement was “It’s not enough to let nature just recover itself. We have 
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to protect, conserve and restore it actively, for instance by planting trees”. 
Another was “Development means that we have to take good care of our 
environment. This is the reason why all the tourists come to Palawan”. 
The manifold levels of meaning of those statements are hard to decipher 
without the necessary background information that was briefly outlined 
earlier. The importance of collective tree planting activities or the strongly 
positive connotation of development (Tagalog: unlad), which expresses 
itself in tree planting in the sense of environmental development, can only 
be understood by taking Palawan’s special features into account (i.e., its 
biogeographical exceptionalities and the strong environmentalism of its 
inhabitants, especially in the capital). As my data show, people strongly 
correlate both features and construe a causal relationship between the 
fact that the island is not affected by earthquakes and rarely hit by strong 
typhoons, and their environmental behavior. Up to 81% agreed with 
the statement “Here in Palawan we don’t have earthquakes and very 
strong typhoons like in other parts of the Philippines, because we take 
much better care of our environment”. Accordingly, this fundamental 
and consensual belief that people’s activities have an important impact 
on natural processes at the local level also frames how climate change 
is perceived and conceptualized. The term climate change was written 
on one of the pilesort cards and was predominantly sorted in a way 
that made it a central component of one the main domains of thinking, 
comprising all other terms that were understood to be natural disasters 
(Friedrich 2018). This means that climate change is understood as 
just another natural force that the Philippines experiences every year. 
In accordance with people’s perceptions and moral sense, the idea of 
climate change is cognitively integrated into a pre-existing system of 
categories, where it is anchored to make sense locally. 
In addition to the methods presented thus far, participant observation 
was a major source of valuable information during my fieldwork. In 
several practical examples that included expected as well as unexpected 
events and happenings, I explored how climate change knowledge is 
communicated, transferred, and disseminated discursively and in social 
practices, and triangulated it with my other modes of data collection. The 
remainder of the chapter focuses on the conditions and circumstances 
that maintain and affirm the way of thinking described above through 
practices of knowledge transfer.
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Local Knowledge Transfer 
A practical case example that I would like to use in the following to 
illustrate a specific form of conveying knowledge about climate change 
is that of the Palawan Conservation Corps (PCC), a non-governmental 
organization located in Puerto Princesa City. The PCC educates and 
trains young people in the field of environmental protection, value 
formation, and restoration. The PCC’s objective is to improve the future 
prospects of adolescents from mainly rural areas (what they refer to as 
“marginalized youth”) by teaching them a combination of practical and 
social skills and environmentally relevant topics. The six-month full-
time training programme takes place in a remote campsite. An essential 
component of the training is rehearsing the so-called ecological theatre 
caravan (eco caravan). This project consists of several stage plays that 
were written and developed by some of the organization’s staff members, 
dealing with ecology, species protection, biodiversity, sustainability, 
conservation of terrestrial and maritime environment, as well as global 
warming and climate change. As one of PCC’s responsible persons 
told me, the eco caravan is designed to teach “basic ecology” and raise 
awareness of “the web of life”, according to the organization’s holistic 
mission statement that “everything on this planet is interrelated—
everything is connected to everything else”. Three of the stage plays that 
explicitly deal with climate change and its consequences are presented 
in more detail below. At the end of each six-month training course, the 
PCC trainees performed the plays in primary and secondary schools. 
Since climate change has not yet been mainstreamed in formal school 
curricula on Palawan, this represented an introduction to the topic for 
many of the children in the audience. The dual transfer of information 
associated with the eco caravan performance made it particularly 
interesting for my research: PCC staff members teach the adolescent 
programme participants, who then serve as mediators of this knowledge 
and transmit it through their performances. In this way, the PCC and its 
eco caravan serves as an insightful example for a translation regime on 
Palawan. Since its foundation in 1999 and the implementation of the eco 
caravan in 2008, the PCC has served as a successful multiplier in the 
field of ecological and climate change communication, having reached 
hundreds of individuals. 
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My first visit to the PCC’s training camp was in November 2013, only 
a few weeks after super typhoon Yolanda devastated large parts of the 
Philippines (Friedrich 2018). It was located in a forest outside the city 
center, where the organization had a long-term lease agreement with 
the city government that included a teaching building and a simple 
dormitory. During that time, around twenty trainees and two staff 
members were spending their last month there. When I arrived with one 
of my key informants, Jesus, I was very optimistic that I would be able to 
observe what kind of knowledge is communicated, i.e., how a lesson is 
structured, what sources are used to inform and educate the attendees, 
and who exactly passes on which information. My original intention 
was to investigate how the PCC functions as a translation regime. I 
was hoping to conduct interviews or collect other forms of data in a 
subsequent visit to assess what the participants actually know about 
climate change. However, things soon turned out very differently since 
Jesus, without my knowledge, had announced our visit in advance. 
People were not only expecting us when we arrived but suddenly and 
willingly stopped their daily routines to welcome us. As a result, largely 
unnoticed observations were no longer an option. Instead of being the 
invisible observer that I wanted to be, I became the center of attention. 
And as if that wasn’t bad enough already, Jesus even introduced me as 
a climate change specialist from Germany who was there to tell them 
why our earth is warming and what we can do about it. Unfortunately, 
this introduced a methodological and ethical dilemma since my 
talking about climate change would bias the audience and jeopardize 
future data collection. Obviously, providing information in advance 
alters people’s knowledge—the very knowledge that I was interested 
in. Contrary to my intention, I was no longer able to uphold the role 
of an ethnographer, who aims to elicit information from the people 
under investigation. Instead, I was forced into the role of an educator 
who was expected to share information. That I was not able to do this 
and thus establish reciprocity also bothered me from an ethical point 
of view. Eventually but reluctantly, I accepted my imposed role in this 
most uncomfortable situation, and delivered a short lecture about the 
greenhouse effect, melting glaciers, diminishing polar ice shields, rising 
sea levels, and increasing weather extremes. 
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The Dilemma of Climate Change Communication
At the end of my talk, to make matters even worse, Jesus opened a 
question and answer session. Most of the questions related to whether 
we, in Germany, also have climate change, typhoons like Yolanda, 
and sea level rise. The most challenging question was the last, from 
a very interested young man of eighteen years. He wanted to know 
what the people of Palawan could do to stop climate change. So there 
I stood, surrounded by potential future environmentalists who are 
taught how their behavior can positively and negatively impact their 
natural environment to make their island a cleaner, healthier, and 
safer place. I realized that my answer would affect the motivation of 
these young and eager-to-learn people. How could I tell them that 
whatever they do—no matter how ambitious it may be—will never 
stop climate change? Why should I take away their hope, make them 
aware of their powerlessness and thus discourage them by telling them 
that the Philippine contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions is 
insignificant compared to the emissions of industrialized and emerging 
countries, yet they are disproportionally facing the negative effects of 
a constantly warming planet? This unjust distribution of the causes 
and effects of climate change particularly applies to Palawan, which 
is considered “carbon negative” due to its large forest cover and its 
virtually non-existent heavy industry sector, meaning that it absorbs 
much more CO2 than it emits (Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources 2012). What climate change mitigation measures could I name 
that did not devalue those young men and women as responsible agents 
within a perceived “web of life” in which “everything is connected to 
everything else”, including themselves? Which mitigation measures 
make sense anyway, in a place like this? Using a bicycle rather than a 
car? The people in front of me had neither. Eating less meat? The small 
portions they were offered one or two days a week were mainly poultry 
or pork from the region. This situation highlighted the need for climate 
change communication and action to adapt to the place and people it 
addresses in order to be effective. On this occasion, I eventually decided 
to answer that young man’s question with an activity that is already 
very popular on Palawan—tree planting—and explaining to him how 
afforestation helps both to mitigate global climate change and, in the 
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case of mangrove planting along the coast, is an effective protective 
measure against sea level rise. 
Fig. 3.2 Giving an unexpected lecture to trainees at PCC’s training camp 
(photo by author, October 2013), CC BY-4.0.
After the question and answer session I sat down, and Jesus briefly 
summarized my lecture again in Tagalog, while I was critically 
reviewing it in my mind. Did I describe the complex relationships of 
climate change correctly, or did I present its relevant processes too 
simply? Did I forget something important or was there anything that 
I should have dropped? My new and imposed role as an educator 
started to take effect. I was wondering how exactly climate change 
knowledge should be communicated in such a context. Despite my own 
self-imposed methodological restrictions regarding what I should or 
shouldn’t say, there were obviously good didactical reasons not to use 
the scientific language of the IPCC with this audience. But how is it 
possible to translate and facilitate scientific knowledge contexts without 
altering them in ways that cause misconceptions? The experience 
of being an educator against my will helped me to truly understand 
the dilemma of climate change communication, i.e., how to make 
expert knowledge comprehensible for lay people, without reducing 
its complex causalities to a degree that enables scientifically untenable 
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heuristics. It became obvious to me that translating scientific key terms 
into easy-to-understand local terms is not enough, especially when 
those terms already have manifold connotations. If climate change 
communicators want to avoid attaching non-scientific meaning to 
concepts, interconnections, and causalities of scientific climate-change 
discourse, they need to ensure that knowledge and meaning are 
transferred together. But how is simplified communication about climate 
change then even possible? Sitting on a plastic chair in a remote forest 
camp on a Philippine island, I perceived myself to be at a possible end 
of the imaginary line of communication along the scientific discourse 
on climate change from its global production to its local reception. Even 
though I was unable to collect the data that I originally intended, the 
unexpected role play highlighted the difficulty (or even impossibility) 
of communicating climate change knowledge that is both scientifically 
accurate and culturally comprehensible. 
The Eco Caravan
Two weeks after my visit to the PCC training camp, I had the 
opportunity to watch the eco caravan perform at two primary schools 
in two different rural districts of Puerto Princesa City. The audience at 
each performance consisted of at least fifty children and teachers. In 
most of the plays, the actors represented local animal and plant species 
discussing issues of environmental and social relevance, such as conflicts 
between local fishermen and environmental authorities. Human 
characters were portrayed as both destroyers (either intentionally or 
unintentionally) and protectors of nature. The anthropogenic impacts 
on natural processes were hardly ever questioned. As discussed above, 
causal connections were often established between natural disasters 
and environmental behavior that was considered to be morally wrong. 
This section presents three stage plays that were primarily about 
climate change.8 All of them were written and directed by (former) 
PCC staff members. 
8  I want to thank Cherry de Dios for providing the scripts of the plays, and Jessa 
Garibay-Yayen for their translation from Tagalog into English. 
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“Climate”
The name of the first play presented here is “Climate”. It has four main 
characters—the Sun, the Ozone, Joel, and Vincent—and starts with a 
dialogue between Sun and Ozone: 
Ozone: Sun, until when will you continue to give off heat? 
Sun: I don’t know, Ozone. All I know is that this is the role that was given 
to me by Bathala.9
Ozone: Ha, poor humans! They are continually experiencing the constant 
change in the weather.
Sun: It’s their fault, Ozone! They have neglected their duties so much. 
Ozone: And what duties are those, Sun? 
Sun: What are you thinking, Ozone? You still don’t know what they did 
to you. That is why we have these fluctuations in the weather, like the 
warming and sometimes the never-ending rain—because of what they 
did to you!
Ozone does not seem to understand what the Sun is talking about and 
asks her to explain it. So, the Sun invites Ozone to follow her in order to 
show how people are responsible for all those weather variations: 
Sun: Come, accompany me to peek into the plains of the world, and 
we will look for the kind of person which causes the so-called climate 
change, or frequent weather fluctuations.10 
On their lookout through the sky they eventually discover two men on 
an island who illegally cut mangroves with chainsaws. This activity, 
which is illegal on Palawan, is a source of income for many poor people, 
who use the wood for charcoal production. Ozone gets very excited, 
turns to the audience, and says: 
Ozone: Kids, this means that we will find out one of the reasons for the 
warming of the earth. We should all listen, so that we will understand, 
okay? 
9  Bathala is a deity and creator of the universe in pre-Hispanic Filipino mythology.
10  The English term climate change is used here as a literal translation of the Tagalog 
terms for frequent change (pagbabago-bago) and weather (panahon). Panahon, 
however, also means season or time.
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Both Sun and Ozone approach the men and eavesdrop on them. They 
become witnesses to how Vincent is rushing his friend Joel, arguing 
that he doesn’t want to get caught by the police and pay a fine. Since 
it is an unusually hot day, work is getting done slowly. Joel tells 
Vincent that he is concerned about global warming. He explains to 
his ignorant friend that cutting mangroves is one of its causes. He 
notes that it causes droughts to occur, and coral reefs to die. Due 
to the destruction of the forests there will not be left much to clean 
“the smoke of the society”. The ozone that is supposed to control the 
temperature of the earth already has holes due to the human use of 
chlorofluorocarbons.
Joel: That is why the heat of the sun passes through the ozone. It is 
no longer controlled by the ozone. Not like before, when it still didn’t 
have holes. It provides the right warmth and coldness that every living 
creature needs.
Vincent starts to understand. He agrees with Joel that they should 
change their destructive behavior and find a better livelihood, “like the 
right way of fishing and vegetable growing, and farming”. Joel adds 
that it would also be a good idea to take part in the community tree 
planting activities. In the closing scene, Ozone also understands its 
role in the world now. It turns to the audience and requests to always 
protect the environment and support its community in environmental 
activities. 
What is very paradigmatic in “Climate” is how closely intertwined 
the cultural model of climate change and ozone depletion are, which 
confirms many other studies mentioned above. The common ground 
for both models seems to be their anthropogenic causes, which are 
cognitively categorized as environmentally destructive behavior, 
causing interference with the atmosphere and, therefore, the weather. 
According to this localized heuristic, the only logical conclusion is 
to act environmentally friendly in order to stabilize unusual weather 
patterns.
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Fig. 3.3 Eco caravan performing “Climate” in a primary school (photo 
by author, November 2013), CC BY-4.0.
“The Vegetable Patch of Mr Gorio”
The second play, “Ang gulayan ni mang gorio”, is also about climate 
change and its local impacts. But instead of weather variations, it tells 
a story about sea level rise, and interestingly this play does not use 
the English term climate change at all. However, its Tagalog translation 
(nagbabagong klima) is used once and the English term global warming 
is used multiple times. The main character, Mr Gorio, owns a small 
vegetable patch near the sea. He takes care of it as his father and 
grandfather did before him. One morning, when he leaves his house, 
he is shocked to find his patch flooded by seawater. He becomes very 
agitated and calls his wife: 
Gorio: Iska! Iska! Come out here in a hurry! What do you think happened 
to our garden? Why did the water come in? Was it raining last night, Iska? 
Gorio’s wife Iska is shocked and starts to cry. All the vegetables seem 
to be ruined and thus unsaleable in the local market. The family’s 
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traditional and, so far, sound livelihood was suddenly at stake. Together 
they wonder how this could have happened:
Gorio: How did this happen? Well, it seems this is the first time I’ve 
witnessed this. When father was still alive […], I think it was 1960 
(scratches his head), this didn’t happen! Why only now? It seems so 
sudden. 
While the family is lamenting about their loss, the village’s teacher, 
Dalisay, comes along. The family immediately beckon her to ask for her 
professional advice. Dalisay has an answer to what happened to the 
garden: 
Dalisay: That is an effect of global warming or the heating of the earth.
Gorio: What do you mean, glubal warning? 
Dalisay: Not glubal warning (says it with emphasis)! Global warming! 
The earth is continuously heating up, the ice in the colder places, like the 
North and South Pole, is melting bit by bit. […] Ice in the colder places 
continues to melt, according to scientists. That’s why, if they totally melt 
away, the sea level may be raised higher and now engulfs your garden. 
Iska seems to be confused, asking what her vegetables have to do with 
the melting of ice in distant places. Dalisay explains to her how the 
oceans are all connected and thus a rising of the sea level is experienced 
everywhere. In this moment, a new character enters the scene. Buboy, 
an employee of a non-governmental organization that informs and 
educates about climate change, tells Gorio and his wife what to do now. 
He recommends the two IPCC strategies for reducing and managing the 
risks of climate change—adaptation and mitigation:
Buboy: Adaptation is about how we can place ourselves in this situation. 
Do you see that higher part of your land over there? You can move and 
continue your garden there. That part has been studied and it’s been 
found to be suitable for planting. […] [Mitigation is] about how we can 
help reduce global warming. That higher part of your land can still be 
planted with trees to help here. 
On the question of how planting trees will help to fight global warming, 
Buboy explains that forests are “carbon sinks” that prevent “the smoke” 
from reaching the atmosphere, where it causes the warming of our 
 109The Case of Palawan
planet. Gorio and his wife appreciate the information and agree that 
they should move their home:
Gorio: The trees have big roles indeed. I thought they just cradle water 
and give fresh air, but they also suck smoke. Oh, thanks to you, Buboy 
and Dalisay. 
Iska: Let it be, and in the next days we shall be moving to that higher 
ground to live there and continue our garden. 
In addition to highlighting once again the important role of trees in 
climate change adaptation and mitigation, this stage play underpins a 
basic assumption that I encountered in all my data collections (especially 
in the pilesorts and interviews), namely that the terms global warming 
and climate change were not used interchangeably. Global warming was 
more strongly associated with global phenomena, i.e., abstract and 
distant causes like the melting of the polar ice and sea level rise as its 
consequence. The notion of climate change, however, was much more 
local and thus directly perceivable. 
“Rainy Season in Summer”
Finally, the third play about climate change, “Tag-ulan sa tag-araw” 
addresses the topic of apparently shifting seasons mentioned earlier. 
It rarely uses the terms climate change, global warming, or sea level rise, 
and starts with a fisherman’s family that wonders about the strong 
rainfall that now occurs during the usually dry summer months. The 
story of the play includes three generations. Whereas Lolo (grandpa) 
Baste as a person of trust contributes his memories of past times, four 
children represent a rather skeptical position. The main characters are 
the children Palaw and Lawan (a play on words referring to Palawan), 
Luntian (which means the color green in Tagalog), and the skeptical 
Mina. Further, there are Lawan’s parents and his grandfather, who sits 
in front of his house every morning, looking out to the open sea. One 
day the kids ask him what he’s doing. He replies: 
Lolo Baste: I am waiting for the sun to rise. Because only in this time 
can I feel the right amount of warmth that it gives us. And look at the 
bay! Before, the seawater didn’t reach our vegetable plantation. Now, it 
is slowly coming in. 
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Luntian: How can you say so, Lolo Baste? 
Lolo Baste: Because when I was still young, I never witnessed that. But 
now, it is very different. My dear children—look! Because of the seawater, 
our crops are dying. 
The skeptical Mina counters that the world has always changed and 
maybe this is just a normal thing to happen. Just as he, Lolo, is not the 
same man he was decades ago, the sea might change as well. Lolo Baste 
agrees but adds that this kind of change is different. Even the seasons 
were no longer what they used to be. In the rainy season (Tagalog: tag-
ulan), he says, they now have periods of droughts, and the dry season 
(Tagalog: tag-araw) is occasionally affected by heavy rain. Palaw and 
Lawan note that they have heard about climate change in terms of 
changing weather patterns in school and on the radio. Mina, however, 
doesn’t buy it. She thinks that maybe today it is a little warmer than in 
the past but that’s all. Lolo Baste explains to her how he used to think 
like her, but eventually changed his mind. In the past, he admits, he 
cut mangroves without hesitation, because he was not aware of their 
important role regarding climate change.
Lolo Baste: That was my belief before. But we were wrong, because the 
mangroves have a big role in the current change of the climate and global 
warming. And if we do not bring back the mangroves, I assure you, my 
dear children, that this problem will be even more serious. 
Shortly afterwards, Lawan’s father Gusting enters the scene. He came 
back from his fishing trip much earlier than expected. He looks very sad, 
so the kids ask him what has happened. Visibly disappointed, he tells 
them that today’s catch was a very bad one. Lawan asks him whether 
he has an explanation. He answers that according to his experience the 
movement of the sea has changed. Lawan and Luntian remember that 
they have also heard something about that: 
Lawan: According to the radio, the fishes that we usually see in shallow 
water are moving towards deeper water. Because what used to be the 
right amount of heat their bodies can tolerate has changed, and this is 
because of the warming of the earth. 
Luntian: That is not only the effect of the warming of the earth. Because 
even their homes, coral reefs, are slowly broken into smaller pieces or 
degraded because the climate is too hot.
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Mina remains skeptical. In the neighboring village, she argues, there is 
still enough fish to buy. The father explains that those fishermen have 
larger and motorized boats, and that is why they can catch fish in much 
deeper waters. Compared to them, fishermen with small boats like him 
lose out.
Suddenly the sky darkens, and bad weather arrives. While the 
adults run into the house, the children take shelter next to it. After a 
short discussion, they conclude that Lolo Baste is right, including Mina. 
Together they decide to do something about climate change. Right after 
the rain has stopped, they want to collect mangrove seedlings that the 
storm has washed away and plant them. They hope that the weather 
will soon stabilize, and fish come back into the shallow waters of their 
bay again. In a final remark and with special reference to a sustainable 
lifestyle, Mina turns to the audience and states: 
Mina: That’s why we should change! We should love nature and not 
hurt it! And I hope that it will only be used properly, so the coming 
generations can still enjoy it, like us. Right, hopefully?
All three eco caravan plays ended with a positive outlook, offering 
at least one specific action to fight climate change—namely the very 
popular and socially widespread practice of planting trees, especially in 
Puerto Princesa City. Institutions such as the eco caravan contribute to 
maintaining the popularity of tree planting as a means of environmental 
and climate protection. By distributing knowledge about global 
warming and climate change to an audience with limited access to 
such information, the eco caravan can be considered a relevant local 
translation regime in Puerto Princesa City. The plays paradigmatically 
represent how the people of Palawan cognitively structure their 
knowledge about climate change, how they communicate and thus 
make sense of it. The way climate change is expressed here as a localized, 
contextualized concept also perfectly mirrors the results of all my other 
data collections that have been mentioned above (see also Chapter 2, 
Greenland). Consensually experienced as unusual weather variations, 
climate change is perceived as a threat to the vulnerable ecosystem of 
the “last frontier” Palawan that—up to now—has been spared from 
catastrophic natural hazards, including very strong tropical typhoons. 
Protecting its lush forest environment is believed to be a vital measure 
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to keep it that way. Although some of the widely shared heuristics are 
scientifically inaccurate, the benefits of, for example, the thousands of 
mangroves that have been collectively planted along the coast of the 
island can hardly be overstated. 
Conclusion: Minding the Gap?
This chapter illuminated how climate change is made sense of on the 
island of Palawan in the Philippines, and the important role played 
by local processes in translating and reproducing the global discourse 
on climate change. Following a constructionist approach such as the 
sociocultural model (rather than the deficit model) and social representation 
theory, it was emphasized that sense-making is a multi-layered process 
that includes cognition and culture. Based on empirical data that was 
gathered in multi-method fieldwork over several months, it has been 
demonstrated in this chapter how the people of Palawan make sense of 
climate change and how they integrate the idea into their local ontologies. 
By means of various empirical data, it has been shown how climate 
change is locally perceived and understood: as just another natural 
disaster that regularly hits the Philippines but hardly ever Palawan, 
because people there act more environmentally benign. It shows how 
this sense-making process is inextricably linked to the specific ecological, 
socio-political, and cultural context of the island; a process that makes 
climate change a coherent, plausible, and tangible concept that fits into 
what people already believe, experience and do. The local reception of 
climate-change discourse therefore depends on pre-existing, shared 
systems of knowledge and meaning that are reproduced and maintained 
by circular rather than unidirectional communication. Institutions like 
the PCSD or the local government administration of Puerto Princesa 
City are integral components of a complex network of dominant and 
interwoven discourses and narratives such as the national discourse on 
natural disasters and Palawan’s very popular environmentalism. They 
all play a role in how knowledge and meaning about climate change 
are distributed, organized, and structured on the island. The same is 
true for interpersonal or even performative ways of communication, 
as the practical example of the eco caravan shows. As instances of 
local translation regimes, these forms, agents, and interactions of 
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communications more accurately reflect the biogeographical, historical, 
and legal uniqueness of the island, and everyday experiences of its 
inhabitants than supra-regional media coverage can. Irrespective of 
scientific accuracy, local translation regimes therefore much better 
serve the purpose of translating and communicating climate change 
knowledge in a meaningful context. However, the selectivity of knowledge 
reproduction generated by national, regional, and local translation 
regimes (discourse model) should of course be critically examined, 
especially in terms of the unequal access to knowledge and existing 
power relations.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the travelling idea 
of climate change has fallen on very fertile ground on Palawan, where 
it was easily able to adapt to the local conditions in order to thrive and 
prosper. The local understanding of climate change and its causalities is 
widely shared. As Rudiak-Gould found on the Marshall Islands, climate 
change on Palawan also appears to be an idea that “insults their [island, 
as it threatens the livelihoods of the inhabitants], but flatters their 
categories” (Rudiak-Gould 2013a: 177). Basic beliefs and assumptions 
about human-environment and human-weather relationships are 
affirmed rather than challenged by the global discourse. It strengthens 
people’s traditionally strong environmentalism and validates their 
strong rejection of, for example, cutting trees or burning garbage. In 
accordance with social representations theory (Smith and Joffe 2013), 
the way people make scientific climate change knowledge familiar and 
thus comprehensible strongly resonates with pre-existing local terms 
and cognitive categories. To explore the general question of how climate 
change is communicated and made sense of in terms of how climate-
exposed people understand the scientific concept, the case study of 
Palawan demonstrates the importance of taking local ecologies and local 
systems of reference into consideration, i.e., the complex interconnections 
of climate change knowledge with associated knowledge domains. 
In this regard, Palawan is indeed a best practice example of climate 
change adaptation and mitigation (Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources 2012). However, this is not the result of a successful 
communication of scientific climate change knowledge. Rather, the 
island’s success represents an inversion of what is typically meant by the 
knowledge-behavior or value-action gap in regard to climate change. 
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Instead of not acting accordingly, the people of Palawan are very 
committed to preserving and even enhancing their natural environment, 
and they do it for various reasons. Collectively planting thousands of 
trees each year is perhaps their most remarkable social practice. While 
tree planting is framed as a measure to fight climate change, it also 
fulfils other social functions such as insular identity formation and 
self-empowerment. In many respects, the people of Palawan do act 
exceptionally climate friendly. Yet the gap between their apparently 
climate-friendly behavior and what they know about scientific climate 
change remains. This shows two implications. First, the deficit model 
and its assumption of a unidirectional relationship between knowledge 
and action cannot be maintained. Social behavior is complex, and not 
only driven by explicit knowledge. Second, it shows that a perfectly 
accurate public understanding of science is not needed to motivate 
people to implement climate change adaption and mitigation measures. 
Not surprisingly, even without scientifically tenable beliefs about the 
environment, weather, and climate, sustainable thinking and behavior 
are (and have always been) possible. 
On Palawan, the discourse on climate change may have served more 
as post hoc justification than original motivation for past and present 
behavior, but current anthropological literature on climate change 
perception suggests that it may not be an exception in this regard (cf. 
Rudiak-Gould 2013a; Greschke and Tischler 2015; De Wit, Pascht, and 
Haug 2018). Irrespective of whether people embrace or reject the idea 
of anthropogenic climate change, the global discourse apparently has 
the potential to maintain and reinforce local cultures, i.e., pre-existing 
beliefs, values, and behavioral patterns. From this point of view, it 
becomes clear why some societies appear to do the right things for the 
wrong reasons, whereas others appear to do the wrong things despite 
knowing better. Thus, perhaps the gap between knowing and acting 
should not be of great concern to climate change communicators who 
seek to get people involved in climate protection. Rather, they are well 
advised to adapt to the place and people they address, and to take local 
human-environment relationships and connected cultural models of 
nature and the weather into consideration. Instead of focusing only on 
knowledge transfer, they should keep in mind that local knowledge is 
always a complex co-product, and that behavioral motivation is derived 
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from various sources, of which scientific knowledge is not known to be 
the most powerful in the short or medium term. The climate is a slowly 
changing system, and to a certain extent this also applies to societies. 
Whilst there is agreement that the constant provision of relevant 
information based on unequivocal empirical findings is necessary, 
especially on urgent matters like climate change, there should be more 
critical assessment and better understanding of how information is 
translated beyond the realm of science and national policies, and how 
meanings change between the global and the local levels. In order to 
transform communication on climate change into a dialogue rather than 
a one-sided, top-down approach, it is advisable from an anthropological 
point of view to put more effort into understanding “them” better, 
before trying to make “them” understand.
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4. Sense-Making of COP 21 
 among Rural and City 
Residents:  
The Role of Space in Media Reception
Imke Hoppe, Fenja De Silva-Schmidt,  
Michael Brüggemann, and Dorothee Arlt1
This chapter explores the role of space in making sense of climate change. 
The study compares how the United Nations’ summit resulting in the 
Paris Agreement in 2015 was received in an urban (Hamburg) and a 
rural setting (Otterndorf), both located in Northern Germany. In each 
setting, two focus group interviews were held (n = 15), one with long-
term inhabitants and one with newly relocated citizens. Media coverage 
was criticized as depicting climate change as overly complex and distant. 
Use of the local newspaper was more frequent in the rural setting, but 
its reporting was seen as failing to provide a local angle to the climate 
summit. Space plays an important role: people in the rural setting—with 
the rising tides of the North Sea behind the dikes—felt more personally 
concerned by climate change. Furthermore, long-term inhabitants 
drew much stronger links between climate change and their region. 
The duration of stay in a certain setting thus turns out to moderate the 
influence of space on interpretations of climate change. 
1  The research project “Down2Earth” was funded by the German Research 
Foundation‘s “Integrated Climate System Analysis and Prediction” (CliSAP) 
Cluster of Excellence, Universität Hamburg. Further information on the project 
can be found at URL: https://climatematters.blogs.uni-hamburg.de/down-to-
earth/. We would like to thank Aaron McKinnon for his assistance in preparing this 
manuscript, and Josephine B. Schmitt, Irene Neverla and Katharina Kleinen-von 
Königslöw for supporting the study and the publication.
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Introduction
According to Hulme (2015), there are many climate changes 
around the world: it has different meanings for people in different 
contexts. How can the emergence of these different meanings of 
climate change be explained? From a human geography perspective, 
“space” and “place” are important reference points for explaining 
these different perceptions and interpretations (Amunden 2015; 
Ratter and Gee 2012). However, since the “spatial turn” in human 
geography (Warf and Arias 2009), there has been a consensus that 
physical characteristics and political boundaries do not dictate 
certain meanings (Glasze and Mattissek 2012; Ratter and Gee 2012). 
People living in a vulnerable area are not necessarily more aware of 
climate change (Lee et al. 2015).
In human geography, communication is understood as a central 
process in constructing “place”. People negotiate the meanings and 
boundaries of a “place” (Glasze and Mattissek 2012; Agnew 2005). 
Yet, this is rarely reflected in communication studies (stated as 
desideratum by, e.g., Autischer and Maier Rabler 2017; Brüggemann et 
al. 2017; Rodríguez Amat and Brantner 2016; Couldry and McCarthc 
2004; Kleinsteuber and Rossmann 1994; Maier Rabler 1992).
Media play a central role in bringing climate change to people’s 
homes—via TV, newspaper, radio, or social networks. This role 
should be explored in order to better understand climate-related 
attitudes (Newman, Nisbet, and Nisbet 2018; Taddicken 2013; Brulle, 
Carmichael, and Jenkins 2012; Arlt, Hoppe, and Wolling 2011). 
Content analyses have demonstrated that United Nations (UN) 
climate summits (known as Conference of the Parties/COP) are a 
main driver of media attention to climate change (Schäfer, Ivanova, 
and Schmidt, 2014). These COPs take place as annual meetings of 
the 194 UN member states that signed the UNFCCC (United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change). They serve as a focal point 
and gathering spot for international policy makers and journalists, but 
little is known about how audiences relate to these events.
The qualitative study presented in this chapter explores how COP 
coverage is experienced in two different places in order to better 
understand the extent to which audiences draw a link between media 
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coverage and their living environment. We compare two regions 
within the same country, so that spatial factors are not overshadowed 
by substantial differences in culture, language, or socio-economic 
conditions.
We focus our research on (a) how the flow of mediated information 
about a COP varies in different places and (b) how media reception and 
interpretation of coverage of COPs differs. 
The following section will analyze the state of research on how 
climate change coverage is received, and to what extent spatial aspects 
play a role. Then, we proceed to describe the research questions and 
design of the empirical study before discussing the results. 
State of Research
A huge body of literature explores how climate change coverage is 
used, perceived, interpreted, and negotiated (Nisbet 2018). Empirical 
studies have been conducted in different countries—with a clear bias 
towards European and US audiences—but the relevance of spatial 
factors for mediated communication about climate change has not been 
systematically addressed by communication scholars. Thus, it remains 
an open question whether (and which) spatial factors influence the 
process of media reception, and how they may affect climate-change 
awareness and related constructs.
Past studies have focused on three aspects that will structure our 
discussion of the literature: (a) (attributed) spatial distance and/or 
proximity to climate change, (b) personal experiences with nature and 
weather, and (c) social spaces and group identities.
The Role of (Attributed) Spatial Distance of Climate Change
Does the media’s use of proximity (or distance) in depictions of 
climate change influence the audience’s understanding of the issue? 
Human geography scholars stress that the act of describing an area as 
a “place of climate change” is a product of social construction (Agnew 
2005). Similarly, communication scholars agree that media reporting 
that classifies a place as being impacted by climate change is a product 
of mediated social construction (see Neverla et al. 2019). Nonetheless, 
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places “objectively differ in terms of their environmental, social and 
economic characteristics and these will open up or close down the 
possibilities open to individuals and groups to interpret proposed 
place changes” (Manzo and Devine-Wright 2014: 56). The following 
three studies explore how people perceive and interpret places of 
climate change through representations in the news media and the 
effect of (attributed) spatial distance from these places.
O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009) examine fear appeals in media 
coverage, also with respect to spatial aspects. In their research, focus 
group discussions in the United Kingdom showed that pictures from a 
person’s direct living environment (like energy-saving lamps or public 
transport) have positive effects on their intention to act in a climate-
friendly manner. Although climate-change awareness and attention to 
the issue were augmented by ‘dramatic visions or human or animal 
suffering at both local and global scales’ (O’Neill and Nicholson-
Cole: 371–72), aversive imagery (e.g. starving children, famine) was 
found to hinder personal engagement because it provokes helpless 
and overwhelmed sentiments due to the immense dimension of the 
problem. However, spatial proximity portrayed in pictures that depict 
negative impacts on “local or regional places that individuals care 
about and empathize with” (375–76) encouraged people to think 
about the vulnerability of their living environment to climate change. 
Hart and Nisbet (2012) explore whether it matters for a US 
audience if “climate victims” are depicted as inhabitants of the 
participants’ own country or as living in distant places. The authors 
use an experimental design to examine the extent to which people’s 
support for climate mitigation policy (dependent variable) increases 
after reading news articles on the negative health effects of climate 
change (independent variable). Their mediating variables included 
spatial distance (climate victims in France versus the US) and group 
affiliation (Democrats versus Republicans) (Hart and Nisbet 2012: 
710). The authors assume that “social identity cues may activate 
the unintended construct that an issue or problem is not applicable 
to the group to which a message receiver belongs, and thus the 
message may be ineffective or result in a negative impact” (705). 
Their results demonstrate that both mediators indeed influence 
the media effect—a mechanism the authors call the “boomerang 
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effect”. Respondents who strongly identified with a specific US 
political party interpreted the news article on climate victims in line 
with their party’s official position on climate change: Democrats’ 
support for climate mitigation policy was increased by media 
exposure of negative climate-change impacts, and Republicans’ 
support decreased even below their baseline values. Hart and Nisbet 
found that spatial distance also influences perceptions: geographic 
proximity to climate victims enhances support for climate mitigation 
policy among individuals who believe climate change is an important 
problem and decreases support among individuals who deny it. Hart 
and Nisbet (2012) empirically prove the importance, as well as the 
complexity, of the role of spatial factors in climate communication. 
They demonstrate that spatial proximity not only elicits positive 
responses to mitigation policies; it can also lead to stronger cognitive 
and emotional defense reactions. This “boomerang effect” did not 
apply to test subjects who evaluated climate change as an important 
problem beforehand; for these respondents, geographical proximity 
reinforced their awareness of the issue.
Jensen (2017) uses “space” as one of four pillars of his theoretical 
model to analyze how people in Denmark make sense of climate 
change. A central finding on the space-related dimension is that 
“world geography enters into both narratives about the origins 
of climate change and arguments on potential solutions” (449). 
Audience perceptions of climate change develop in conjunction 
with definitions of their “space”—e.g. Denmark is perceived as 
“our little corner of the world” (441), a small country in contrast 
to a superpower like the United States. In consequence, the Danish 
participants feel a need to situate themselves in relation to actors 
in the news of the day, whereas American viewers in a comparable 
study rarely referred to their own place in world geography because 
they perceived their nation as the center of the world. Jensen also 
observed a “North/South” theme in group discussions, related to 
economic growth and the responsibility of developing countries to 
also fulfil CO2 reduction targets. 
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The Role of Personal Experiences of Weather and Nature
Ryghaug, Sorensen and Naess (2011) use focus group discussions 
to analyze how Norwegian audiences use weather to contextualize 
their knowledge about climate change. As one of five “sense-making 
devices” (784), “nature drama” is a typical interpretive schema that 
is inspired by and learned through media coverage: “Nature drama 
events were followed by deliberations with regard to the actual risks. 
In these exchanges, we noted frequent efforts to soften dramatic 
media accounts by participants who invoked their own experiences, 
often to weather” (785). Yet, also the personal experience of “nature 
drama” is highly interconnected with how media coverage frames 
the weather. 
For Chinese audiences, who have on average a very high 
climate-change awareness, Wang (2017) found that media usage 
had no impact on risk perceptions. Instead, a positive correlation 
between self-reported unusual weather experiences and higher risk 
perceptions of climate change was found. Brulle, Carmichael, and 
Jenkins (2012) studied whether extreme weather phenomena in 
the US (NOAA Climate Extremes Index) shifted public opinion on 
climate change over a nine-year period (climate change threat index 
(CCTI)). They concluded that “weather extremes have no effect 
on aggregate public opinion” (169), but that “the extent of these 
changes has not reached a level where these shifts can be measured in 
nationwide polls at the aggregate level. This result may change over 
time if weather disruptions attributable to climate change increase” 
(Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins 2012: 178; see also Chapter 7, 
Attribution Science). Indeed, Zanocco et al. (2018) show in a real-
life experimental setting that the greater the individual damage 
experienced in an extreme weather event, and the more this event 
is discussed in the respective community as attributable to climate 
change, the more it influences climate-change awareness. 
 127Sense-Making of COP 21 among Rural and City Residents
The Social Space:  
The Role of Group Identification and Othering 
To determine how places are related to interpretations of climate 
change coverage, perceptions of physical appearances, as well as 
perceptions and interpretations of the social space (e.g. interpersonal 
networks like neighborhoods or sports clubs, and hyper-local public 
spheres like marketplaces or playgrounds) must be considered. 
Moreover, these social spaces have individual meanings for people, 
for example in processes both of othering (defining “in-groups” and 
“out-groups”) and identification.
Smith and Joffe (2013: 23) conducted semi-structured interviews 
with people from the UK, and demonstrate the functions of othering 
processes: “An ‘othering’ of the most serious impacts distances the 
threat by locating it ‘out there’”. The authors track this view of their 
UK audiences back to the iconography of mass media coverage, e.g., 
droughts in Africa, melting glaciers in the Himalaya, polar bears in 
the Arctic. These processes of othering are thus fostered by media 
coverage, which is focused on geographically distant places affected 
by climate change. By attributing climate change to other places of 
the world, the own “social space” is protected as “a safe place”. This 
outsourcing of the problem is consistent with an assumed vulnerability 
of others, while being unaffected personally. A similar function of 
othering is related to the attribution of responsibility: “The antinomy 
of self versus other plays a core role in everyday conceptualizations 
of global warming. At one level, the self is regarded as the solution, 
whereas the other is seen as the perpetrator” (Smith and Joffe 2013: 
24).
In these studies, space and proximity are social rather than 
geographical concepts. Non-physical social spaces influence opinions 
about climate change and affect the way media coverage is received.
In addition to political affiliation as an instance of group belonging 
and social space, many other facets could be considered important to 
understanding the role of social spaces. For example, locality might 
influence communication flows among meso-structures like sports 
clubs, schools, choirs, church groups, weekly markets, etc., so these 
local communities might have an impact on the flow of interpersonal 
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communication, which is crucial to understanding climate 
communication: “Practices of actively searching for supplementary 
information, and of engaging in many-to-many communication 
online about the climate, appear negligible. Instead, one-to-one 
communication in everyday settings of face-to-face interaction about 
concrete choices with environmental implications is described as 
the predominant form of communicative engagement with climate 
change” (Jensen 2017: 451). How individuals are embedded in 
geographic and social spaces (e.g. family, sports clubs, colleagues, 
church groups, political parties, and affiliations like NGOs), and how 
this affects climate change communication, is a virtually unexplored 
topic. Othering has been proven to be important, but it remains 
unclear when (and how) people feel inspired by media coverage to 
think about their everyday environment as being affected by climate 
change—i.e. the opposite of othering (in the sense of “Climate change 
is a topic for us, not only a threat to others”). Table 4.1 summarizes the 
state of research on space as a dimension to explain the reception of 
climate change communication.
Table 4.1 Spatial aspects of media reception and effects studies on 
climate change
Authors Analyzed Aspects/ Sub-Dimensions Theoretical Background Method




•	 Spatial distance/proximity 
towards “climate victims”








•	 Spatial distance/proximity 
combined with “fear ap-
peals” 
•	 Internal control 








•	 Defining and comparing 
“here” versus “there” •	 Reception analysis
Secondary data 
analysis with 
survey data, focus 
groups
Personal nature and weather experiences as mediated frames













•	 Self-attributed unusual 
weather experiences as con-
sequence of media frames





•	 Extreme weather phenom-
ena and their coverage
•	 Information deficit 
model, agenda set-
ting, elite cues, etc.
Longitudinal 
study with a 
time-series  
analysis
Social space—othering versus identification
Smith and 
Joffe (2013) 
•	 “Othering” as mechanism 
to distance threats and wre-
sponsibilities 







•	 Group affiliation  
(political partisanship)













survey data, focus 
groups
Desiderata and Research Question
Even though the studies discussed above did not focus explicitly on the 
role of spatial aspects in mediated communication about climate change, 
such aspects appear as important cross-cutting or implicit themes in all 
cited publications. Current research on climate change communication 
thus demonstrates that spatial factors do have manifold impacts on 
how people interpret media coverage of the issue, how they make 
sense of it, and how media coverage affects their attitudes, knowledge, 
and behavioral intentions. However, these aspects are analyzed in an 
isolated, fragmented way or the results were primarily side effects of 
other research interests.
We seek a better understanding of the role of spatial aspects and 
how they come into play before, during or after the reception of climate 
change-related coverage. Our research question is: What role do spatial 
factors play in the media reception of COP 21?
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Although this question also calls for comparative international 
approaches, we start by systematically varying spatial factors and 
compare an urban versus a rural social setting in the same country. 
Oriented towards a most similar systems design (MSSD) (Przeworski 
and Teune 1970), we expect to see how this difference shapes spatial 
aspects, namely (a) (attributed) spatial distance and/or proximity to 
climate change, (b) personal nature and weather experiences, and (c) 
social spaces shape media reception.
Thus, we compare a rather small city (Otterndorf, 7,202 inhabitants) 
in a rural area with a huge city in a metropolitan region (Hamburg, 1.8 
million inhabitants), both of which are located in Northern Germany on 
the river Elbe and vulnerable to climate change (see below). Hamburg 
is much further down the river. Otterndorf, while also technically being 
located on the river, instead evokes the feeling of living right by the 
North Sea, just behind the dike. Coastal protection is also much less 
impressive than in Hamburg, with its complex constructions protecting 
the city against high tides and flooding.
We decided to take a deeper look at COPs as transnational media 
events (Brüggemann et al. 2017), because they raise media attention 
across national borders and, potentially, enable audiences to feel 
connected to each other as global citizens. Content analysis has proven 
that climate summits are main drivers of media attention to climate 
change worldwide (Schäfer, Ivanova, and Schmidt 2014). UN climate 
summits are a main point of reference in climate communication 
research; most studies focus on communicators on site such as 
journalists, politicians or NGOs (Lück, Wozniak, and Wessler 2016; 
Roosvall and Tegelberg 2013; Russell 2013), or on the media coverage 
(Lück, Wozniak, and Wessler 2016; Zamith, Pinto, and Villar 2013). 
Yet few studies have explored the audience perspective during climate 
summits (Wonneberger, Meijers and Schuck 2020). Our research (see 
also Brüggemann et al. 2017) was conducted during the COP 21 in 
Paris (2015), which is now seen as a key political event due to its role 
in renewing and extending the Kyoto Protocol by agreeing on the 1.5°C 
target (Hulme 2016). Therefore, COP 21 and its corresponding media 
coverage are not representative of climate summits in general. 
Due to the role of COPs as drivers of worldwide media attention, 
we can make sure that during COP  21 the issue was covered by the 
media in both regions analyzed. However, the salience of the issue in 
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the individual media repertoires of participants in both places is an 
open question. The first sub-question thus addresses the patterns of 
information and news usage in both places:
•	 Sub-Question (a). Patterns of Information: How do people’s me-
dia use and interpersonal communication about COP 21 differ in 
both locations?
As patterns of information and communication inform the interpretation 
and appropriation processes, they are important to consider as they 
provide contextual information for the interpretation of sub-question 
(b), which is our main research interest:
•	 Sub-Question (b). Patterns of Interpretation: How do people in-
terpret media coverage of climate change with regard to spatial dis-
tance, the natural environment they live in and their social space? 
Because local discourses are nourished by physical, interpersonal 
presence, they foster face-to-face communication (Mettler-Meibom 
1992). As a cross-cutting theme, we focus on the role of direct personal 
communication as a bridge between media and local discourses on 
climate change.
Method: Comparing Rural and City Residents
This section compares the two cases with respect to their geographic 
proximity to projected climate threats and selected conditions that 
shape the social space and are relevant to media reception and effects 
(especially the presence of local media). Next, their differences are 
outlined. The last part of this section describes the method of focus 
groups and media diaries, and presents the data sources analyzed in 
this chapter.
Similarities between the Two Study Locations
Hamburg and Otterndorf are both strongly influenced and shaped by 
the North Sea and the River Elbe (see Fig. 4.1). While Otterndorf is 
situated directly on the coast at the extreme end of the Elbe estuary, 
Hamburg lies further upstream on the Elbe. At the position of Hamburg, 
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the tides and tidal range are still very strong. Both regions are therefore 
perceived as being potentially vulnerable to climate change effects, 
especially a higher frequency and potentially more severe impacts of 
storm surges due to the expected sea level rise (Meinke et al. 2010). The 
whole region has experienced grave floods in the past such as the North 
Sea flood of 1962, which has become part of the collective memory in 
the region (Trümper and Neverla 2013; NLWKN 2017a). The region has 
also been recently affected by severe storm surges. In November 2007, 
windstorm Tilo hit the German bight (St. Pauli/Hamburg: NN + 5,42 
m; Cuxhaven/Otterndorf: NN + 4,44 m); in December 2013 it was Xaver 
(St. Pauli/Hamburg: NN + 6,09 m Bremerhaven/Otterndorf: NN + 
4,99m).
Fig. 4.1 Locations of Hamburg and Otterndorf. © OpenStreetMap 
contributors, CC BY-SA.
Storm Xaver in 2013 produced “one of the most severe storm surges of 
the past hundred years”, raising the water level by three meters in some 
areas (NLWKN 2017b: author’s translation). The dike system, which 
is built along the entire North Sea coast, prevented injuries and major 
property damage in both study areas.
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Fig. 4.2 Impact of storm surges. Above: Otterndorf at the beginning of 
the storm surge in 2013 (photo by Ekkehard Drath, CC-BY-NC). Below: 
Hamburg during a storm surge in 2016 (photo by Olle August, from 
Pixabay, https://pixabay.com/photos/
high-water-hamburg-port-motifs-3930235/). 
Otterndorf is directly exposed to the North Sea, and as part of the 
Wadden Sea Region (WSR) it is especially at risk from sea level rise 
(Gerkensmeier, Ratter, and Vollmer 2016). Coastal researchers have 
called for the development of an integrative risk management approach 
for the region. 
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Although Hamburg is less directly exposed to the North Sea, it would 
still be at risk during storm surges without its flood protection system; 
seventeen of its districts are officially categorized as risk areas. In the 
city’s most dire risk scenario—an extreme storm surge combined with 
a collapse of the protection system—33,000 persons would be directly 
affected (Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg 2013). 
In Germany, climate-change awareness of the public is quite high. 
Accordingly, we found in the quantitative survey data that both regions 
have a similarly high climate-change awareness, which does not differ 
from the average population in Germany (Brüggemann et al. 2017). 
While 55% of the country’s population agrees that “global climate 
change is a very serious problem”, fewer than 20% feel “very concerned 
it will personally harm them during their lifetime” (Stokes, Wike, and 
Carle 2015). A yearly telephone survey administered to approximately 
500 Hamburg inhabitants from 2008 to 2018 has generated quantitative 
data about residents’ risk perceptions and personal concerns about 
climate change (Ratter 2018). In contrast to the objective risk assessments 
discussed above, 40% of respondents do not believe they will be affected 
by any natural catastrophes such as storm flooding, heatwaves or 
heavy rainfall. The results even show a decline in risk perceptions for 
Hamburg from 2008 to 2011. However, no clear trend can be observed. 
Unfortunately, these data are not available for rural residents along the 
German North coast. 
Ratter and Gee (2012) describe Heimat as a German concept of 
regional perception and identity. For the Wadden Sea Region, “Natural 
resources play a strong role in shaping people’s perception of Heimat. 
Specific mentions included resources such as the Wadden Sea, beaches, 
the coastal landscape, nature on the coast, fresh air, as well as fish and 
seafood, all of which are used by the people living on the coast in many 
different ways” (131). As both locations are part of the Wadden Sea 
Region, one can assume that this description also applies to Hamburg 
and Otterndorf, although Hamburg is less exposed to the sea than 
Otterndorf. 
In both locations, local print media play an important role. In 
Hamburg, the Hamburger Abendblatt has a large distribution; also, 
many hyperlocal (online) newspapers are published. In Otterndorf, the 
Niederelbe Zeitung has a lower circulation — due to the lower number of 
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residents — it is complemented by the weekly newspaper Hadler Kurier. 
Table 4.2 compares the two locations.
Table 4.2 Spatial aspects indicating similarities between 
Otterndorf and Hamburg
Indicator Hamburg and Otterndorf Source
Exposure to  
climate change 
•	 Strongly influenced and 
shaped by the North Sea and 
the River Elbe
•	 Potentially vulnerable to cli-
mate change effects, especially 
a higher frequency and po-
tentially more severe impact 
of storm surges due to the 
expected sea level rise
(Meinke et al. 2010)
Coastal protection •	 Dike systems (Müller and Gönnert 2016)
Shared features  
of Heimat 
understandings
•	 Natural resources like water 
and fresh air are important, 
as well as food (fish) and the 
coastal landscape
(Ratter and Gee 2012)
Local media
•	 Hamburger Abendblatt (167,000 
copies daily)
•	 Niederelbe Zeitung (7,400  
copies daily)
•	 Hadler Kurier (25,800 copies 
per weekly issue)
(Informationsgemein-
schaft zur Feststellung 






•	 Both regions are located in 
Germany—where climate 
awareness is quite high on  
average but people feel  
personally affected by climate 
change only to a lesser degree
(Brüggemann et al. 2017; 
Stokes, Wike, and Carle 
2015)
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Differences between the Two Locations 
While Hamburg is Germany’s second-largest city with a high population 
density and approximately 1,78 million residents (Statistisches Amt für 
Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein 2019), Otterndorf is a small town in a 
rural area with 7,202 inhabitants (Landesamt für Statistik Niedersachsen 
2017). Hamburg has a huge but less dense social network that makes it 
possible to stay isolated. Otterndorf is located in a rural area with a low 
population density (Stadt Otterndorf 2016).
In the literature it is assumed that in rural settings, “everyone knows 
everyone”, and that social connections are closer than in the city: “[C]
ompared to personal networks in urban settings, personal networks in 
rural settings contain ties of greater intensity and role multiplexity, are 
based more on kinship and neighborhood solidarities rather than on 
friendship, are smaller, are denser, and have greater educational, race-
ethnic, and religious homogeneity, but less age and gender homogeneity” 
(Beggs, Haines, and Hurlbert 1996: 306). 
Cities in general have a far more heterogeneous population than 
smaller communities, which can lead to the formation of sub-cultures 
and sub-networks in which traditional ties (e.g. relatives, neighbors) 
no longer play a role: “community, notably urbanism, also affects the 
social contexts from which people draw their relations, albeit far more 
weakly than social class, life cycle, and other personal traits” (Fischer 
1982: 79-80).
Coastal protection plays an important role in climate change 
adaptation. Hamburg has a EUR 600 million flood protection system 
consisting of mechanical barriers and a central warning system (called 
KATWARN). Detailed risk maps define the dangers and protection 
measures for the neighborhoods close to the river (Müller and Gönnert 
2016). The system has been constructed with future upgrades in mind, 
required due to sea level rise (Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg 2012). 
Otterndorf, in contrast, has not recently renewed its protections, the 
most important of which is the dike. Some of its pumping stations 
and floodgates have been in use for decades (Niedersächsischer 
Landesbetrieb für Wasserwirtschaft, Küsten- und Naturschutz) or even 
centuries (the Otterndorf floodgate was put into service in 1854 and last 
reworked in 1985, Kosch 2020). 
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Table 4.3: Spatial aspects indicating differences between 
Otterndorf and Hamburg
Indicator Hamburg Otterndorf Source
Social  
structure
•	 Approx. 1,78  
million inhabitants
•	 Mean age:  
42.75 years
•	 Approx. 7,202 
inhabitants
•	 Mean age:  
21–64 years  
(60 %)
(Statistisches Amt 
für Hamburg und 
Schleswig-Holstein 






•	 High population 
density, “big city 
life”—huge, but 
less dense social 
network
•	 Low population 












•	 Mechanical flood 
protection system 
with capacities for 
further extensions
•	 Central  
mechanical  
barriers in need of 
renewal







•	 High financial 
capacities for new 
protective  
measures
•	 No recent  
investments




This study is part of a larger research project at the Universität Hamburg 
called “Down to Earth”2 (Brüggemann et al. 2017). It analyzes how the 
media coverage of COP 21 reached and affected citizens in Germany. 
The project combines three interconnected sub-studies with different 
methodological approaches: a quota-based online panel survey (n 
= 1,121) including three waves, digital communication diaries (n = 
42), and four focus group interviews (n = 15). All sub-studies have a 
2  The project was funded by the German Research Foundation’s “Integrated Climate 
System Analysis and Prediction” (CliSAP) Cluster of Excellence, Universität 
Hamburg. Further information can be found at https://climatematters.blogs.uni-
hamburg.de/down-to-earth/
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common interest in shedding light on media reception of climate politics. 
The qualitative parts of the project allow us a deeper understanding 
of how people make sense of COP 21, while the standardized survey 
allows to draw broader conclusions about public perceptions of climate 
policy in Germany. In this chapter, we concentrate on material from the 
focus groups and media diaries and contextualize the results with data 
obtained from the online survey. 
Focus group discussions: We conducted four focus group discussions—
two in Otterndorf (n = 9) and two in Hamburg (n = 6)—during the final 
week of COP 21. The conference was on the media agenda, but the focus 
groups took place before the final press conference, so the outcome of 
the conference did not overshadow participants’ memories of the entire 
coverage. Participants were aged 30 to 75. A “contrasting case selection” 
sampling strategy (Flick 2007) was used, which aims to vary the central 
aspect of theoretical interest so that alternative explanations can be 
found, and thereby helps to explore the research question as openly as 
possible. If spatial aspects play a central role in the reception of climate 
change communication, the results from both groups should vary, at 
least in parts.
On the basis of the literature analysis we assume that it is not only 
the physical space that effects how people interpret media coverage 
on climate change, but also the social aspects of space, for example a 
feeling of “Heimat” [belonging], the degree of connectedness to others, 
the set of experiences made at a certain place (e.g. floodings), etc. Thus, 
for the focus groups we varied the degree of connectedness people 
have to their living spaces. We were not able to realize pre-interviews 
to fully understand these aspects a priori. Instead, we focused on a 
more objective criterion, which is the length someone had lived at her/
his current address. We grouped participants in each location in two 
homogenous groups, one with “long-term inhabitants” and one with 
“short-term inhabitants” (living less than six years in the current place). 
Additionally, a rough quota target for diversity regarding age (min: 
30; max: 75), gender (5 w: 10 m) and professions (e.g., administration 
employee, electro technician, translator, pensioner, teacher) was 
implemented. 
The collected data was analyzed via a qualitative content analysis 
(Schreier 2013), and categories were built inductively and deductively. 
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The initial classification mainly contains the two dimensions detailed in 
sub-research questions (a) patterns of information and communication 
and (b) patterns of interpretation.
Communication diaries: During the two weeks of COP 21, 42 participants 
from Hamburg and Otterndorf filled out digital communication diaries 
on a daily basis. In these online diaries, they noted their daily media 
use and face-to-face conversations about climate change. To encourage 
steady participation, the respondents received a financial incentive. The 
focus group participants were also part of the diary survey.
Three-wave online panel survey (n = 1.121): A three-wave online 
panel survey was administered throughout the event: the baseline 
measurement was conducted two weeks before COP 21, the main 
survey was carried out during the conference, and a final survey four 
weeks after. 
Results
This section interprets the findings of the focus groups and media diaries; 
the results of the online panel study are described to contextualize the 
statements of the participants. Quotes are translated, and participants’ 
names are pseudonyms.
Patterns of Information
During the conference, media diary participants reported each day 
whether they had noticed media coverage of the COP 21 or on climate 
change in general. Compared to the baseline study that covered the 
German population (results published in Brüggemann et al. 2017), the 
findings for the participants of the study in Hamburg and Otterndorf 
demonstrate that people received information about the climate 
conference through their usual media repertoires, and that the amount 
of information did not differ by location (see Table 4.4); participants 
from both places recalled an average of ten media contacts about COP 
21. However, some of their regular sources did not seem to contribute 
news on the topic at all. For example, while private television news 
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is popular for rural participants, they hardly noticed climate change 
reporting there (on 0.3 days on average during COP 21).
Table 4.4 News reception in Hamburg and Otterndorf during 
COP 21
Medium Hamburg M (SD)
Otterndorf 
M (SD)
“Do you remember one or more news items on climate change today?” 
(summative index from 0 to 13 days)
News and information on public television  
(incl. online) 2.5 (2.7) 2.7 (1.8)
News and information on private television 
(incl. online) 0.1 (0.3) 0.3 (0.8)
News and information on radio (incl. on-
line) 2.0 (2.6) 1.4 (2.0)
Printed national newspaper 0.4 (1.2) 0.1 (0.3)
Printed weekly magazine 0.2 (0.5) 0.0 (0.0)
Printed local newspaper* 1.0 (1.6) 2.5 (2.1)
Bild-Zeitung (tabloid press) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
Online newspaper 2.7 (2.8) 2.5 (2.4)
Online portal (like google news) 0.6 (1.1) 0.1 (0.3)
Social networks 0.2 (0.5) 0.4 (1.4)
Blogs and online discussions 0.3 (1.0) 0.0 (0.0)
Video platforms 0.1 (0.3) 0.0 (0.0)
Total number of news contacts (on average) 10.10 10.00
Note: n = 13 for Otterndorf; n = 29 for Hamburg; summative index: 
added the answer (yes = 1; no = 0) for the entire enquiry period 
(30 November—12 December 2015). Significant differences between 
Hamburg and Otterndorf are printed in bold, *p ≤ .05.
Respondents in both places received information from public television 
and online newspapers most often (on average on almost three out of 
thirteen days, see Table 4.4), followed by radio (De Silva-Schmidt and 
Brüggemann 2019). Individual variances between respondents were 
high in both locations. Some respondents only mentioned two or three 
different sources of media information during the entire enquiry period 
(mostly a print newspaper and public radio or TV). Others named a 
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variety of online sources such as TEDTalks on Youtube, science blogs, 
and media websites, while using traditional media at the same time. 
This wide variance in our sample also explains the high standard 
deviation for most items and might be a reason why there is only one 
significant difference: the use of local print newspapers. About two-
thirds of respondents (both younger and older) read local papers at 
least sometimes. While Hamburg residents read information on climate 
politics in their local news on only one day during the entire study 
period, Otterndorf participants noted an average of two-and-a-half days. 
Interestingly, none of the participants who recently moved to Otterndorf 
or Hamburg read a local newspaper, suggesting that exposure to local 
news is connected to how long a person has lived in their current area. 
As we show below, this is also likely to lead to a less localized perception 
of climate change.
During the climate summit, residents from Hamburg and Otterndorf 
also mentioned a lot of interpersonal communication in their media 
diaries.
Table 4.5 Interpersonal communication during COP 21
Medium Hamburg M (SD)
Otterndorf 
M (SD)
“Do you remember talking about climate change today?”
… with family and friends 1.2 (1.5) 2.2 (2.5)
… with colleagues and acquaintances 0.4 (0.6) 0.7 (1.1)
 
Note: n = 13 for Otterndorf; n = 29 for Hamburg; summative index: 
added the answer (yes = 1; no = 0) for the entire enquiry period (30 
November—12 December 2015). Index scales ranges from min = 0 days 
to max = 13 days. There are no significant differences between groups. 
 In both places, there were many “non-talkers”—sixteen in total, which 
again explains the high standard deviation and is possibly a reason 
why there was no significance in the t-test. However, of those who did 
talk about climate change during the COP 21, regional differences are 
notable. 
First, the number of conversations about climate change differs. 
Respondents from Otterndorf (n = 13) noted 47 individual conversations 
(3.6 per person) about climate change during the enquiry period, which 
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is over one-and-a-half times more conversations per person than the 
participants from Hamburg (n = 29, talks: 59). Otterndorf residents not 
only talked more often about climate change, but they also had more 
diverse interlocutors, conversing with family and friends as well as 
acquaintances and colleagues about the topic 
Second, the topic of the conversations varied. Participants in Hamburg 
talked more about the climate conference, about technological measures 
to prevent climate change (“carbon capture and storage”, Niklas, twenty-
eight years old), and about the endangering effects on nature in general, 
such as the extinction of vulnerable species. The group discussions 
revealed that Hamburg participants discussed climate change more 
often in the context of their professions (e.g. in the energy sector) or 
lifestyle choices (e.g. with their flat-sharing community). In contrast, 
respondents in Otterndorf talked more often about the negative effects 
of climate change on their living environment (i.e. high tides, floods 
and heavy rains, also having other consequences such as climate 
refugees) and local adaptation measures. Many of them discussed their 
personal responsibility. Helge, a sixty-two-year-old long-term resident 
of Otterndorf, declared: “We need to start with our own consumption 
behavior. If everyone does it, we are many”.
For the Otterndorf participants, interpersonal communication also 
served the purpose of sharing and trading knowledge, especially on 
local issues such as dike protection and storm surges. Max, 31 years 
old, recently moved to Otterndorf, said: “I heard our colleague [...] 
speak. And he said that [...] behind the dike not everything is as safe 
as we all believe. I don’t know what area he referred to”. Florian, thirty-
three years old, recently moved to Otterndorf, replied: “Altenbruch? [a 
neighboring village]”. Max: “Yes, he said it’s just a matter of time before 
it [the dike] collapses”. 
With reference to the section on differences between the two regions, 
Max’s assumption fits with the objective data about Otterndorf’s 
vulnerability and the quality of the dikes, some of which are obsolete 
and in need of renewal. This example demonstrates that in Otterndorf, 
interpersonal communication serves as an important medium to ask for, 
spread and negotiate information on local issues such as dike quality 
and climate change adaption. It thus compensates for a perceived lack 
of reporting from local journalism. The participants asserted that this 
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is an urgent issue not covered in local newspapers or radio stations. 
Manuel, forty-one, who has lived in Otterndorf for six years, reported: 
“I have been asking myself in the last few days how the quality of the 
dike actually is, and the opinions differ very much on how good the 
dike here in Otterndorf is at all. [...] There are also voices that claim that 
the dikes here are not that good”.
Elderly Otterndorf participants assumed that dike protection and 
storm surges were not of interest to younger people. According to 
Anton, a sixty-four-year-old long-term resident: 
Yes, I think for the older generation in particular it is even more [a topic] 
than for the younger generation. Because [the older generation] saw that 
from childhood on, what the storm surges were like, or what it means to 
have floods. Or if the dikes start breaking, we’ll have seen it all here. [...] 
One has enormous fears, yes. Young people haven’t even experienced it: 
“Oh, the dike is safe”. They don’t care at all. 
Indeed, in the second group with younger participants, Otterndorf 
respondents assessed that climate change was irrelevant. Florian, thirty-
three years old, recently moved to Otterndorf, assumed: “Yes, maybe 
we will have a higher sea level. But we have great dikes, so to me this 
discussion is not relevant”.
Hamburg participants also mentioned that climate change in general 
is not salient enough for private conversations. Participants from both 
locations reported that climate change is not an issue in their circle of 
friends and colleagues. Dirk, sixty-two years old, reported: “I notice that 
in my personal discussion, with friends or colleagues, it [the refugee 
crisis, high numbers of refugees coming to Germany due to the war in 
Syria in 2015] plays a greater role than climate”. 
The participants also assume that climate change does not bring 
enough news value for private conversations. Dirk explains: “In my 
circle of friends, a real debate about the topic is not possible because the 
problem is universally known”, and Stefanie (thirty-eight, Hamburg) 
added “We have more serious problems at the moment here, for 
Hamburg the application for the Olympic Games”. Anton (sixty-
four, Otterndorf) stated similarly: “…because you just don’t feel the 
immediate threat, right? That is, I think, how many people think. It’s 
just hard to keep thinking about future generations”. 
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Patterns of Interpretation
The first part of this section discusses the common patterns of 
interpretation in both locations. When asked about their perception 
of news on COP 21, the following patterns are characteristic of the 
reception and interpretation: a perceived neglect of the issue in media 
coverage, complexity, abstractness, and single key moments of being 
overwhelmed and having obtained new insights. 
Weak Salience of the Issue in Broadcasting Media—Disappointment with 
Local News
From a scholarly perspective, it is often assumed that climate change 
is a tough topic for journalism because it does not interest broad 
audiences (see, e.g., Jensen 2017). Yet, we find that the respondents 
complained about too little media coverage of climate change on TV and 
radio. Participants from both locations criticized journalistic coverage 
for providing too short and superficial news items—a complaint that 
is widely confirmed by the country-wide survey (n = 1,121) (De Silva 
Schmidt and Brüggemann 2019; Brüggemann et al. 2017). For example, 
84% stated that the media did not report enough on the COP 21 
negotiations, 85% agreed that the media did not report appropriately 
on political parties’ conflicts and strategies, and 82% accused the media 
of reporting insufficiently on climate change in general. Margret (sixty-
two, Otterndorf) complained about “insufficient coverage in public 
service broadcasting”, and Sandra (forty-five, Hamburg) noted “far 
too few pieces of information”. The opposite was true for national daily 
newspapers. Fewer participants read them, but those who did reported 
that they provide much-appreciated detailed insights (e.g., Margret: 
“The article was really captivating and well-written”), although 
others mentioned not having enough time to read them properly: 
“Unfortunately, I only had time to skim through” (Luisa, twenty-six, 
Hamburg). 
The local print media, however, were rated extremely poorly, 
especially by the long-term residents—e.g. by Anton, sixty-four, long-
term resident in Otterndorf: “I think it is so important, that the local 
newspapers in particular, that they regularly supply their readers with 
what happens there [at the COP 21 conference]—but this just wasn’t 
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the case!”). Both groups assessed their local newspaper as biased 
and negative, using the sparse coverage of COP 21 as an example. 
Participants worried about other people in their city or region who use 
the local newspaper as their single source of information, supposedly 
elderly people (“I worry about people who do not have the opportunity 
to read online news”, Anton, Otterndorf). Economic interests of the 
publisher were held responsible for the poor performance of the local 
Hamburg newspaper. Elisabeth, sixty-two, and a long-term resident of 
Hamburg, criticized: “In our obedient and submissive local newspaper 
there was nothing on COP 21. In comparison to e.g. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
our local newspaper in Hamburg is a provincial newspaper”. Here, 
the spatial reference (“provincial”) was used to negatively connote the 
failure of local newspapers to convey the local angle of climate change. 
They do not connect what happened at COP 21 in Paris to Hamburg, 
but more importantly they do not connect the elite discourse on climate 
change to local discourses, and thereby fail to create a social space of 
communication. 
In summary, our first result is that participants would have liked to 
receive more information on climate change and COP 21. This finding is 
confirmed by the survey data and is thus a general pattern of reception 
of COP 21 in Germany (Brüggemann et al. 2017), and not limited to 
the cases of Otterndorf and Hamburg. Especially regarding their local 
newspapers, many respondents were disappointed about the low 
salience of the issue in their own local media outlet and the perceived 
failure to connect the issue to local discourses. 
Complexity and Abstractness— 
Climate Change and the COP as Distant Issues
One reason for the complaints about too little information on COP 21 in 
media coverage could be rooted in the perceived high level of complexity 
of the issue. Local audiences were unable to make sense of the multiple 
facets of climate change and of climate politics. Respondents referred to 
the complex terminology used in media coverage, and describe it as hard 
to understand and to translate into their everyday language (Anton: 
“Very, very complex issue, I had to learn a lot in order to be able to 
pursue the discussion. And the terminology, 2 °C target and the like”). 
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Moreover, they criticized cumbersome and long-winded printed news 
articles, which are not understandable and readable within a normal 
amount of time. “Abstractness” is a related concept, but it comes with 
the feeling of not being able to grasp the meaning of climate change for 
one’s own daily life. 
Participants described the COP 21 as far away from their everyday 
life reality (Anton, sixty-four, Otterndorf,: “These climate summits 
are relatively far away. We need a concrete example on the ground to 
make sense of climate change. So, for us, this would be the dike”). This 
statement demonstrates that the perceived distance from the event 
in Paris has a cognitive, emotional and social dimension. Instead of 
receiving “abstract” information, participants would have liked to learn 
about the consequences climate change has for their local environment. 
In addition, Hannah (forty-three, Hamburg) reported: “In my circle of 
friends, I feel there is a big distance from the topic”. Here, the spatial 
metaphor is also employed to describe the basic feelings and cognitions 
about climate change. Distance may refer less to geographic distance 
and more to the perceived disconnect between climate change and one’s 
personal life within its social and physical space. 
Being Overwhelmed and Affected by Media Coverage— 
Moments of Connection
Although the participants described a fundamental sense of distance, 
touching moments of very personal connection were reported as well—
when the media coverage opens up a social space of genuine encounter. 
A sense of “being overwhelmed” is very salient in our focus group data. 
Also, participants of the group discussions felt touched by the coverage 
on rare occasions—not as a persistent feeling, but in extraordinary 
moments. 
Triggers can be media persona (fictional and non-fictional characters) 
who are perceived to be socially close and directly affected by climate 
change in the near future, e.g. Barbara (sixty-two, Otterndorf) said 
“What touches me the most is if people tell how they are affected by 
climate change, e.g. a farmer who said that he will be able to farm 
another two years but after that his land will be washed away”. These 
can also be people who act as a personification of powerful values, here 
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in the form of Native Americans: “When Indians appear in their outfits 
and demand (a change) from industrialized countries” (Barbara), who 
are perceived as ambassadors bridging various forms of cognitive and 
emotional distance. 
The “happy ending” of the COP in Paris was much reported in the 
media diaries and perceived as a touching moment: “Everyone waited 
all day long for the result and talked about how it would be. Then when 
the news of the signing came, that was great” (Margret, sixty-two, 
Otterndorf). Others felt “joy and hope after the conference” (Birgit, 
fifty-three, Hamburg) as well as relief: “Which I did not dare to hope... 
after twenty-three years finally a working approach, unfortunately still 
(with) many compromises and perhaps also too late” (Susanne, forty-
nine, Hamburg). Here, another reason for the described distance from 
the issue came to the surface: due to many failed previous conferences, 
and an inability at the policy level to reach progress, the topic was 
considered too frustrating. Distance thus also serves as a mechanism of 
“self-protection” from bad news, such that the “good news” encouraged 
people to re-connect. 
The dimension “getting new insights” includes a positive experience 
as well: learning new facts during COP 21—even ones that question ones’ 
own beliefs—was evaluated as positive. Dirk (sixty-two, Hamburg) 
reported: 
I have already learned a lot during the COP, especially about the interests 
of individual states. So, for example […] this smog situation in Beijing, 
then you (thought before) “Oh God, thank God it’s not like that here”, 
but what I did not know is that China, for example, does a lot for climate 
protection, which does not yet have the addressed effects, but they are 
very active there.
Climate reporting was positively assessed if it facilitated insights into 
geographically and socially distant countries to which the respondents 
otherwise had no access.
“We are Vulnerable” versus “We are a Leading Industrial Nation”
A main finding with respect to the relevance of spatial aspects for 
reception and interpretation is that long-term residents were more likely 
to link COP 21 coverage to their region or city.
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Moderator: “Did you think about Otterndorf while you watched 
coverage of the climate summit?” Anton, sixty-four: “Yes, yes, yes. It is a 
huge topic for us”. Klaus, sixty-eight, long-term resident in Otterndorf, 
immediately added “I have a dinghy in my garden!”
However, this connection is sometimes, again, followed by mechanisms 
of suppression.
Anton: “You have to care for yourself to not get depressed. Otherwise 
you cannot live with that fear”, and Martin, forty-six, agreed: “There’s 
always a certain fear, that’s for sure. And we assume it [the dike] will 
hold. Otherwise we would not make any new developments in this area, 
we would not have built us a house”. 
For long-term Otterndorf residents, fear and serious concerns about 
their area seemed to be enormous, yet rather hidden, as an everyday life 
issue. Klaus, sixty-eight, long-term resident of Otterndorf: 
Yes, climate change is a fast-moving issue, especially if you consider 
the connection to infrastructural projects like Elbe dredging [with 
consequences for the height of storm surges], that is also a huge topic 
for us here. It’s all connected. And that’s why we all should walk around 
here every day complaining [about our situation]. But at some point 
you get depressed. [Agreement from the entire group.] If you can’t do 
anything and still have the danger on the back of your neck. 
The Otterndorfers described themselves as affected by huge 
infrastructure projects such as dredging to deepen the Elbe, to support 
Hamburg’s huge harbor industry. This economically motivated 
infrastructure project places an additional strain on the dike system, on 
top of climate change. The participants reported that the dredging has 
already made floods and storm tides more destructive.
For the long-term Hamburg residents, the harbor and its 
responsibility for climate change (e.g., emissions of cruise liners) were 
the main reference point in responding to the question if Hamburg 
would be directly affected by climate politics. Elisabeth, sixty-two, stated 
that “economy and jobs in Hamburg are reasons put forward, especially 
cruise liners as most dirty polluters like Queen Mary”. Local media 
coverage is evaluated as extremely unsatisfying and disappointing by 
the long-term residents of Hamburg, due to a perceived lack of coverage 
of the manifold meanings of climate change for the city. They especially 
miss a particularly critical investigation: “There was once a report, that 
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is really long ago, and it was about the ‘Hafencity’ [the newly built 
harbor district], because of the air pollution the Hafencity performed so 
poorly!” (Elisabeth, sixty-two). Some new residents of Hamburg assume 
that the media’s lack of localizing COP issues for the city indicates that 
climate change is not a risk for Hamburg and that there is no reason 
to worry. Karl (forty, Hamburg): “There is no relevance for Hamburg, 
otherwise the media would have had reported on that”.
Many participants, both from Otterndorf and Hamburg, viewed the 
aim of COP 21 as engaging “other countries” in climate policy, assuming 
that Germany already had a pioneering role.
Max, thirty-one, newly moved to Otterndorf: “Germany already has 
a leading position in climate protection; COP 21 is more about engaging 
other countries”.
They attribute responsibility for climate change to other nations’ 
governments and declare that Germany is a leading industry and 
technology nation that cannot be affected by climate change. Othering 
was applied to qualify their country’s responsibility against those of 
others; moreover, Germany is seen as completely untouched by the 
effects of climate change due to technical fixes. Max asserts:
Here in Germany, we are lucky. Because we have great dikes, the coverage 
on COP 21 and its effects on Otterndorf are irrelevant to me. Even if a 
dike breaks down, we’ll build a new one. So, we are lucky in Germany. 
They can’t do that on those small islands in the Pacific. So, there the sea 
level rises, and then they go down. 
Similarly, Karl, forty, a new inhabitant of Hamburg, stated: “I do not see 
a link between COP 21 and Hamburg. Consequences of climate change 
happen elsewhere. Even if the River Elbe rises about a metre, so what? 
We can handle that. In other countries, the situation is much more severe. 
Droughts, lack of water. One storm more or less, we will survive”. This 
statement shows how he creates a perceived distance between his home 
environment and “other countries”, “elsewhere”, which can be seen as 
a case of othering.
The study participants exhibit the same pattern of thinking as in the 
panel survey: There has to be more engagement on climate protection, but 
someone else, somewhere else (other countries, the politicians) should 
act (Brüggemann et al. 2017). However, it is striking that people who 
have lived in the same place for a long time—in both locations—think 
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and talk much more about their personal responsibility and that of their 
community than those who recently moved to their area. “There are a 
lot of grassroot initiatives in this region, and they organize, for example, 
local country markets to sell products from local farms”. Klaus, sixty-
eight: “Yes, but that is not the majority. These initiatives are noticed by 
a minority only”. Margret, sixty-two, Otterndorf added: “Indeed, these 
initiatives are not our typical everyday life—that is our supermarket”. 
References to the Physical Environment— 
Similar but Different 
The most prominent climate change concern for all respondents is 
flooding and dike protection. For Hamburg, the harbor is an equally 
important point of reference. Residents of Hamburg and Otterndorf 
differ in the extent to which they are personally concerned about 
potential climate-change impacts. Respondents from Hamburg seem 
to feel that climate change is unlikely to concern them personally, or 
only in an abstract way since it might affect humanity as a whole. One 
participant (Karl, forty, short-term resident) reported: ‘I didn’t see a 
direct connection to Hamburg [...] because the really painful effects 
will take place somewhere else. So, even if the Elbe rises a meter, 
that’s still all doable”. Although Hamburg is potentially vulnerable to 
flooding, participants from the city did not believe they were likely to be 
personally affected by storm surges or other climate change effects. Even 
though “land submerged in the North” (Annette, forty-five, short-term 
resident) is a tangible consequence of climate change for them—it will 
not affect them personally. According to sixty-two-year-old Elisabeth, a 
long-term resident: “That Wilhelmsburg [suburb of Hamburg heavily 
affected by the 1962 storm surge] is flooded again, that can’t happen to 
us today. So, I had the feeling, yes, we can sit back and relax now, and we 
are also warned in time [...] to drive away our car”.
Hamburg residents perceive the effects of climate change and sea 
level rise at an emotional distance (which some respondents refer 
to as “suppression” of the disturbing knowledge); problems only 
seem to exist elsewhere, e.g. “in Africa” (Birgit, fifty-three, long-term 
resident). Yet, for respondents from Otterndorf, high tides in the Elbe 
and floods are dangers that are easy to grasp and represent a direct 
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threat to their physical environment. Thus, a major difference is that 
Hamburg participants feel much less threatened by climate change than 
Otterndorf participants, who are located much closer to the North Sea 
and have several weak points in their dike systems. 
Although the participants from Otterndorf also mention serious 
consequences for faraway regions such as the Fiji Islands, they paint a 
much clearer picture of how climate change might affect their hometown. 
They talk about past experiences of “high tides in the Elbe” (Margret, 
sixty-two, long-term resident), and future “storm flooding warnings for 
our coastal region”, and even think about the possibility of losing their 
home in the future: “in case of a sea level rise, there might be a wave of 
refugees coming from the North Sea region” (both quotes by Anton, 
sixty-four, long-term resident in Otterndorf). They also specifically refer 
to themselves: “We talked about how climate change is connected to our 
town, what we can do, what has already changed. We just became aware 
that this topic also concerns us” (Margret, sixty, long-term resident). 
Conclusion
The study compared media reception and sense-making of news on 
climate change in a big city versus a small rural town located directly on 
the coast. As Hamburg and Otterndorf are located close to each other 
in Northern Germany, it is not surprising that common patterns of both 
media use and interpretations of climate change emerge. Yet, we found 
that spatial factors play an important role in both (a) how news about 
climate change and policy making are received, and (b) how people 
engage and make sense of it. 
Sub-Question (a): The findings demonstrate that people received 
information about the climate conference COP 21 through their usual 
media repertoires, as the quantitative survey data and media diaries 
show. However, many regular media sources provided little information 
about the event and the issue. By testing group differences statistically, 
it turns out that the amount of information received did not differ 
by location, so that differences in perception and interpretation of 
both groups (sub-question b) cannot have been influenced hereby. 
Many of the regular sources—such as private television news—
did not seem to contribute news on the topic at all. Rural residents 
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(Otterndorf) significantly accessed more local sources of news (i.e., 
local newspapers), as demonstrated by the survey data and media 
diaries. They are engaged with the issue more closely by talking more 
about climate change, and they connect climate change more to their 
direct living environment. Interpersonal communication plays a more 
important role in the rural setting: personal conversations serve to pass 
on knowledge about vulnerable aspects of the area, especially between 
new and old residents. It is reasonable to assume that living right next 
to a dike in a rural setting with more first-hand experience of weather 
phenomena makes the issue of climate change more salient.
Sub-Question (b): We found common patterns related to sense-making 
of news on COP 21. Spatial references abound among both groups of 
participants. A perceived weak salience of the issue in mass media 
coverage is echoed by the perception of a weak salience in personal 
discussions. The study participants are disappointed by the perceived 
failure of local media to account for the importance of the negotiations 
in Paris for their region. Climate change and climate policy are perceived 
as complex and abstract and the media are blamed for not explaining 
them well. Thus, local publics experienced the issue of climate change 
and the COP 21 negotiations as distant events. Yet, media personas 
and some iconic personal stories, even if being from other parts of the 
world, are able to bridge the perceived social and geographical distance 
and establish an emotional connection with climate change and policy 
making.
These differences in information pathways go hand in hand with 
different interpretations of climate change. Residents from the rural 
setting and from the city experience the spatial distance to climate 
change slightly differently. Many of the spatial aspects identified 
in previous studies in the literature could also be found in our data. 
Although climate change is an abstract and “far-away” concept for all 
of our respondents, personal concerns were more prominent in the 
rural setting and connected to a feeling of potentially being personally 
affected. For participants from Otterndorf, climate change was more 
relevant to one’s personal life and fears. Respondents from Hamburg felt 
less personally concerned and saw themselves less as potential victims 
but (partly) as responsible for causing climate change. These different 
feelings are connected to different nature and weather experiences, 
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and the variation in the strength of dikes and protection systems in 
both places leads to different risk perceptions of the inhabitants. Some 
participants domesticated climate change in interpersonal discussions 
by referring to the current weather or the natural environment. 
An important finding is that the differences presented were more 
salient for the long-term residents in our sample. People who are more 
rooted in the area they live in seem to perceive climate change as more 
severe. Local newspapers are mainly used by those who have lived in an 
area for longer, and connections between climate change and one’s own 
living environment were mostly drawn by long-term residents. It seems 
that the longer a person lives in a place and the more connected he or 
she feels to it, the more relevant spatial factors become for his or her 
experience of climate change. The time spent living in one place, and the 
extent of being rooted in that space, seems to be an important variable 
that mediates the influence of space.
This mediating factor emerging from our study has important 
implications in a world that has become increasingly mobile and less 
rooted in physical space: the more people move around, the less they will 
access local media, and the less they will know about (or be interested 
in) their local area and how climate change might affect it. They might 
be more inclined to view climate change as a distant issue that has no 
implications for one’s personal life. If the local media, for those long-
term residents who use them, are also failing to draw the connection 
between global warming and local development, this might constitute 
a barrier to initiate and promote adaptation and mitigation processes 
on the local level—but this would have to be tested by future research. 
Talks about climate change also reflect the economic inequality 
between the city, that is better shielded against floods and the 
(perceived) neglect of dikes in the rural area. Climate change may 
deepen the (perceived) inequality between wealthy and important 
cities and the far less privileged countryside. Local media fail in the 
perception of our interviewees to critically discuss these problems. 
The failure of local media is partly compensated through face-to-face 
discussions, particularly among long-term inhabitants who seem to be 
more inclined to draw the link between global policy-making at COP 21 
and local politics. 
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5. What Does Climate Change 
Mean to Us, the Maasai?: 
How Climate-Change Discourse is 
Translated in Maasailand, Northern 
Tanzania1
Sara de Wit
This chapter explores the varying ways in which the Maasai pastoralists 
in Terrat village in northern Tanzania give meaning to climate-
change discourses. This study moves away from the idea that there 
is a “linear” (from global to local/science to citizen) and “correct” 
way of interpreting and understanding climate change as a scientific 
discourse, but turns the question around by asking “what does climate 
change mean to the Maasai”? Based on fourteen months of multi-sited 
ethnographic fieldwork, this chapter contextualizes climate-change 
discourses in the historical, environmental and political dimensions of 
the Maasai’s “interpretive horizons”. It is argued that local discourses 
and interpretations are not just barriers in the global pursuit for climate 
change adaptation, even if they contradict global discourses and policies, 
but reveal crucial insights about local priorities, values, and agency. 
In other words, the rejection of this new discourse should not be seen 
as a form of ignorance, but rather as an act of cultural translation and 
resistance.  
1  This chapter is based on research that I carried out in 2012–13 for my PhD at the 
University of Cologne, and is a reworked version of Chapter 8 of my dissertation 
(de Wit 2017). My research was funded by the DFG, part of the SPP1448 priority 
programme, and supervised by Michael Bollig and Dorothy Hodgson, to whom I 
am greatly indebted. 
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Introduction: Climate-change discourse Dawns on 
Terrat 
In northern Tanzania, where the Maasai pastoralists dwell, a nascent 
discourse about a changing climate is dawning on the rural village of 
Terrat. This new story resonates with the experience of some herders, 
who have observed a decline in rainfall levels, which they attribute to 
a decreased sense of morality in society. Others who have heard about 
“this thing called climate change” find this new scientific explanation 
unconvincing, or utterly confusing, since they see climate variability 
as old news. After all, the semi-arid plains of their homeland have 
always been prone to climatic extremes and fluctuations. The elderly 
in particular report that they have not observed unusual changes in the 
weather or climate recently, and they emphasize that the region has 
always experienced “bad years”. 
Villagers who listen to the radio in Terrat hear about a global 
problem that is already affecting their locality, which will only become 
more severe in the future. And they are told that the main culprits of the 
looming crisis are the rich countries with their polluting industries, but 
that the Maasai—and all the other poor people in the world—will suffer 
the most. However, they are also told (mainly by their own government) 
that they are part of the problem, because they cut down trees for 
firewood and have too many cattle. They are encouraged to plant trees, 
and explain that carbon dioxide is dangerous, that God has nothing to 
do with it, that there is something called an ozone layer protecting the 
earth that humans are depleting and that science is real (more real than 
God), among many other things. 
While the new prophecy is disseminated through multiple sources, 
such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), researchers (like 
myself), the church and the radio, I observed an overall lack of climate 
change information, awareness and conversation.2 Furthermore, while 
2  The main language in Terrat is Maa, the Maasai language, which is spoken by the 
whole Maasai population, whereas the level of Swahili is generally dependent 
upon education, connectivity and exposure to external influences. There is one 
radio station in Terrat, which is the only radio station in Tanzania that broadcasts 
programmes in both Swahili and Maa. Many villagers own a mobile phone, but few 
have a smartphone, so internet access is very limited. Despite recent efforts to give 
women access to radios, they are still predominantly owned and listened to by men. 
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many informants indeed complained about the lack of rain, people’s 
day-to-day worries did not center on the global climate crisis; they 
had more pressing concerns like a fear of losing their land, having 
access to basic health care, vaccinations for their animals, education 
and secure access to natural resources like land, water and grasses. 
Environmental hardships, such as recurring droughts and irregular 
rainfall, exacerbate this complex set of challenges (De Wit 2019). 
Based on fourteen months of multi-sited research carried out in 
Tanzania, this chapter discusses how climate-change discourse is 
translated, communicated and “received” in Terrat village.3 While 
much of the anthropological literature has focused on “observing” 
climate change (how communities perceive climate change directly 
as a sensory process), and a few studies have explored “receiving” 
(the uptake of scientific information through secondary sources), 
scant attention has been paid to interactions between the two (Rudiak-
Gould 2013). In line with Rudiak-Gould, in this chapter I argue that 
understanding how people make sense of climate-change discourse 
requires taking both observation and reception into account. This is 
not only because people’s environment and climate play an important 
role in how this new discourse is ascribed meaning; new discourses 
about a changing climate also shape the ways in which people talk 
about their environment (De Wit 2019; Rosengren 2018; De Wit 2015; 
Rudiak-Gould 2011). The first and most obvious reason for the lack 
of climate-change awareness—as a scientific and anthropogenic 
discourse—is a lack of access to information and education. However, 
my research made it clear that this “void” must be understood in 
light of Maasailand’s complex historical, political, environmental, and 
ontological dimensions that comprise the broader interpretive context 
through which people make sense of climate-change discourses (De 
Wit 2017). But there is more to this absence, since there are villagers 
who have heard about climate change but were not impressed by (or 
were indifferent to) its apocalyptic undertone. This chapter explores 
3  While the concept of “receiving” climate change is commonly used in reception 
studies (as proposed by Rudiak-Gould 2011), it has a somewhat passive connotation 
(the term “reader response” as used in hermeneutics overcomes this problem). I 
prefer to use the notion of translation, which denotes agency—a process in which 
the producer and reader of a text make an equal contribution.
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this complex mixture of absence, translation, observation, and 
reception (including rejection). It investigates how the climate-change 
discourse is interpreted in Terrat and entangles old and new horizons, 
and how it is at times embraced by some, but refuted by others.
In dominant models of risk perception, communication and 
management, found in fields like natural hazard research and 
psychometric risk studies, a passive recipient of an independent 
stimulus is implied, as it is essentially concerned with information 
transmission and how to educate the recipient with minimum 
distortion (Rayner 1992: 85). While this insight is not new in media 
and cultural studies (see, e.g., Hall 1973), in relation to climate change 
research the preoccupation remains largely concerned with the 
question how to tailor messages to audiences (Nerlich 2017; Moser 
2016, 2010). Both cultural theory and reception studies (in the modern 
hermeneutical tradition), diverge from such conventional theories of 
risk perception and the perceiver of information, or “the reader”, is 
treated as an active and social agent. Furthermore, against a common 
reductionist trend that exists in the social sciences and policy literature 
that views religion (and at times culture) as barriers in the larger 
project of climate change adaptation (e.g. Haraway 2016; Kuruppu 
and Liverman 2011; Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop 2010; Taylor 1999), I 
explore the meaning-making processes as emergent knowledge spaces 
in their own right (Hastrup 2015) that emerge when climate change 
is received by the Maasai in Terrat. I argue against the “purification” 
(Latour 1993) of scientific and religious knowledges but rather focus 
attention to the ways in which people navigate different registers as 
they make sense of climate change and the agentive possibilities it 
affords. The disregard for both cultural but even more so religious 
perspectives in the literature emerges from a misunderstanding and 
secular rejection of religious thought, underpinned by “the desire 
to enforce the boundaries between the religious and the scientific” 
(Fair 2018: 5; Kempf 2017; Hulme 2014). In this chapter, I argue that 
the rejection of this travelling discourse should not be perceived as 
a form of ignorance, but as resistance—an attempt to remain faithful 
to one’s own set of norms, values, beliefs, principles of causality and 
“cosmological configuration” (Hermann and Kempf 2018; Fair 2018: 9; 
Kempf 2017: 34; Rudiak-Gould 2014, 2013). The (partial) refusal and 
other ways that appear to disrupt the hegemonic framing of climate 
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science can be seen as a form of agency in its own right (Fair 2018: 9; 
Hermann and Kempf 2018; Kempf 2017: 34).
In this chapter, I examine what happens when a rural village like 
Terrat is confronted with a new narrative about a changing world that 
carries a message of doom and decay. How do villagers, who have never 
seen industries, receive and translate this story for which they hold no 
responsibility, and within which God is relegated to the margins? The 
following account provides insights into a village that is confronted 
with a new (and still somewhat alien) discourse, which brings new 
explanatory pathways about a changing world and climate into being. I 
conclude by advancing the argument that translating this new discourse 
can only be meaningful for the Maasai if consideration is given to the 
question what climate change means to them.
Climate-change discourse is here referred to as “a set of various 
concepts, models and representations that comprises of scientific 
information about climate and climate change, which undergoes 
continuous translation by an array of translators such as scientists, 
journalists, governments, NGOs, activists, anthropologists, local 
communities etc.” (De Wit et al. 2018: 3). It is important to point out 
that climate science is not a monolithic but a vast and heterogeneous 
body of knowledge that consists of an array of varying perspectives, 
positions, methods, internal translations, etc. (cf. Dürr and Pascht 
2017:  3). Furthermore, climate science (or climate scientists for that 
matter) is not necessarily secular, but this dichotomy might emerge 
in the translation of a “modern” discourse vs. a “traditional” one. I 
also do not assume an opposition between science and other “modes 
of existence” but scrutinize the emergent meaning making processes 
(Latour 1993). As philosopher of religion Berry has observed, while 
not being a novel insight per se, “over the past two decades many 
anthropologists have contributed to a critique of purportedly ‘objective’ 
scientific ways of producing environmental knowledge, arguing that, 
like the cosmologically grounded vision of many Indigenous societies, 
so too are the ecological ideas of Euro-American cultures colored by 
religious elements” (Berry 2016: 78), or underpinned by different 
“myths” of nature (Rayner and Heyward 2014; Hulme 2009).
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Fig. 5.1 Terrat in Simanjiro District (Manyara Region). Cartography by 
Monika Feinen, produced in November 2015, CC-BY-ND.
 Translating Climate Change in Terrat
In an educational short movie clip called “Climate Conscious 
Programme”, made by several NGOs and recorded in Terrat with 
a group of villagers, Maasai pastoralist Leboi4 is herding cows in the 
Simanjiro Plains.5 He and his fellow “actors” are lamenting about a 
changing world: 
Actor 1: There are changes in this world and I don’t know why.
Leboi: There has been a prolonged drought, at least three years with little 
rain. Even those who came here from Kenya had their cattle die because 
of the drought.
Actor 2: So where will I give my cows water?
Then Emmanuel, a documentary filmmaker, sits with them under a tree 
and begins to explain in Maa:
4  To ensure confidentiality, the names of informants and organizations may have 
been changed or left unmentioned.
5  This movie was produced by an international NGO together with Tanzanian based 
organizations. The movie is scripted, so that is why I refer to these Maasai herders 
as actors. Translation from Maa was provided by documentary makers.
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Emmanuel: Let me tell you something. I learned about this at school. We 
are not the only ones experiencing these changes. It is like if you pinch 
yourself on the finger. You will feel the pain all over. It is the same for 
the world. 
Then Emmanuel takes a football that symbolizes the globe. He continues 
his explanation:
 Emmanuel: Let’s say this is the world we are living on.
 Actor 2: That ball?
In the next shot the ball has turned into a globe.
Emmanuel: There is a place called America, which is here (points it out 
on the globe). And a place called Europe, here, and another one called 
China. These places produce a lot of smoke because they have a lot of 
vehicles, and airplanes, and they have these things called industries 
[see Fig. 5.2]. They burn a lot of fuels, like diesel, petroleum and oil. 
After they burn, the smoke comes out, which is called carbon dioxide. 
That is the bad one. The pollution rises into the sky where it affects our 
protective blanket. Then the blanket becomes denser and denser. And 
the whole world becomes hot. 
Leboi: So now the world is like someone who is suffering from malaria. 
It is heated, becomes hot, and gets malaria.
Emmanuel: Right, these climate changes we are getting is because the 
world is heated. Droughts come and we don’t get rains when we expect, 
like these past ten years. It is caused by humans and humans should fix 
it. 
Actor 1: So it is not God’s fault?
Emmanuel: It is not God’s fault. This is not caused by God. It is caused 
by humans themselves. Like those countries I mentioned. So don’t cry to 
God, we are destroying our environment ourselves.
Actor 1: So humans are beating themselves?
Emmanuel: Yes, we are. It is caused by humans and humans should fix 
it. Yes, humans should have to stop cutting the rainforests we still have. 
And protect the world’s forests for our future generation. Our protected 
trees will help meet the growing generation.
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Fig. 5.2 Image from an educational video in which a documentary 
filmmaker explains to several Maasai from Terrat about CO2 and 
industries as the causes of climate change (ResourceAfrica UK). “The 
World Has Malaria—ClimateConscious”, 7:30, posted online by Max 
Thabiso Edkins, YouTube, 15 August 2012, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=_Ay1snatTl8&t=2s
While this scripted video was created partly for educational purposes, 
considering its limited grassroots outreach possibilities, it may also 
have been intended to target donors and other policy-makers.6 The clip 
offers vivid insights into the process of translating climate change—
including the mediating forms, materiality of communication tools 
and practices—at the very end of the “translation chain”. It reveals 
a glimpse of the climate narrative in the making; here, a story 
(supposedly) told by the Maasai to the Maasai, yet a clear NGO 
rhetoric can be discerned, in which a new allegiance is forged between 
Terrat and the globe. The actors are placed in the role of ignorant and 
helpless victims who need to be enlightened by NGOs, who operate 
as true “pedagogues of progress” (Englund 2011). At the same time, 
the villagers’ “observations” are used to confirm that climate change 
is real and actually happening. As historical geographer  Bravo (2009) 
has pointed out, Indigenous people around the world are used as 
“proxies” of climate change, warning us of a looming catastrophe that 
one day will befall all of us (cf. Farbotko and Lazrus 2012; Farbotko 
6  The educational movie was shown at the COP 17 in Durban, where it won a 
prize. Produced by ResourceAfrica UK, in collaboration with Ujamaa Community 
Resource Team (UCRT) and Tanzania Natural Resources Forum (TNRF).
 169What Does Climate Change Mean to Us, the Maasai?
2010). The video implies that the Maasai, while wandering around, 
are complaining to each other about a hotter world, questioning what 
is going on in the world, and therefore seek recourse to the NGO for 
clarification. Of course, the reverse is actually happening: the NGO 
aims to enlighten the villagers, and makes them question “what all this 
is”, prior to, and as a necessary step towards, their own intervention. 
The NGO is engaged in a process of “problematization”: it defines 
the nature of the problem and then “makes itself indispensable” to 
solving it (cf. Rottenburg 2005, 2002; Roe 1999; Roe 1991; Ferguson 
1990; Callon 1984).7 
This fragment can be read as the (staged) culmination point of a 
positive-feedback cycle in which different epistemologies are brought 
together and (unconsciously) strengthen each other’s gaze (see De Wit et 
al. 2018). It also reveals how the global is localized (e.g., the analogy with 
malaria, and how remote industries have a direct impact in Maasailand), 
and how the local is made global (plant trees to protect the globe). And 
while the polluting countries are named as the major culprit, the Maasai 
are also reminded of their own role as environmental destroyers. While I 
will touch here on the notion of cultural decline as trajectory narrative (see 
Rudiak-Gould 2013), inherent to the Maasai society’s self-critique, I will 
not elaborate on questions of externally imposed blame and responsibility 
(i.e. blaming the victims), since I have written about this issue in another 
context in which it was more prominent (De Wit 2015).8 Here, I focus on the 
7  I have addressed this field of post-colonial power relations elsewhere, which pays 
more attention to the politics and practice of development and emerging frictions 
and shifting positionalities as actors move across different constituencies. In this 
development space, climate change becomes a political resource to maneuver 
oppressive politics, to leverage change and create opportunities in the absence 
of a benevolent state (De Wit 2019, 2018). These insights build on a larger body 
of literature of “brokers and translators” and critiques of development practice 
(Mosse and Lewis 2006; Mosse 2005; Bierschenk et al. 2002; Bierschenk et al. 2000; 
Rottenburg 2005, 2002; Roe 1999:5; Ferguson 1990)
8  See also the work of anthropologists Rudiak-Gould (2013) and Eguavoen (2013) 
on trajectories of blame and the translation of climate change. Their studies also 
demonstrate how climate-change discourses and local observations become part 
of the cultural narrative of “in-group blame”. However, they come to diverging 
conclusions. Eguavoen sees self-blame as something that “ignorant” societies need 
to be liberated from through education, while Rudiak-Gould argues that we need to 
approach it as a form of local agency. The latter conclusion is in line with my own 
research findings. Yet an important difference is that in Rudiak-Gould’s analysis 
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cultural and political meanings that emerge in the process of translating 
climate change through trajectory narratives that have been shaped by the 
complex and historically produced power structures within which this 
new discourse travels and is sustained. Trajectory narratives are defined 
by Rudiak-Gould (2013) as “discourses of the moral direction of society 
or the cosmos, with an associated sense of responsibility or blame for that 
trend” (Rudiak-Gould 2013: 10).
It is very tempting to understand the worldview of the Maasai (and 
other remote societies) in relation to natural dangers as “traditional”, 
and radically different from a “modern” understanding of the world. 
As one of the binary fruits of enlightenment thinking, we too easily 
create a dichotomy in which societies that are without science and 
technology are driven by superstition, whereas modern societies are 
allegedly intellectually free and have an “objective” view of natural 
dangers, such as climate change. Following Douglas (1985; Douglas 
and Wildavsky 1982; Douglas 1966) the common view has been that 
for all other societies that have come “before us”, every natural disaster 
is weighted with meaning and nature is thus seen as constructed and 
endowed with political, social, and moral significance. This is often 
thought to contrast with our understanding of modern society—that 
owes much to science—which is supposed to see nature as “it really is”, 
morally neutral and politically empty (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). 
The authors’ objection to this alluring opposition is:
But no! Try not to get into an argument about reality and illusion when 
talking about physical dangers. […] On this subject we shall see that 
there is not much difference between modern times and ages past. They 
politicized nature by inventing mysterious connections between moral 
transgressions and natural disasters as well as by their selection among 
dangers. We moderns can do a lot of politicising merely by our selection 
of dangers (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).
Building on “cultural theory of risk”,9 in the following I explore the 
role of culture in risk perception and how beliefs about (the interaction 
local communities embraced climate change, while in Terrat people were overall 
much more reluctant towards accepting it.
9  In line with Rudiak-Gould 2013, I adhere to the “general” model of cultural theory 
of risk rather than Douglas’s more rigid scheme based on group/grid distinction 
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between) society and nature, or worldviews, emerge as expressions 
of cultural priorities and preferences (Douglas 1985; Douglas and 
Wildavsky 1982) when the Maasai make sense of this new global 
threat. Following Douglas (1992), first of all (environmental) risks 
are undoubtedly always selected in ways that inhere in, protect and 
maintain a certain existing social order. Second, an important insight 
that has been reiterated by Rayner, Hulme and others in relation to 
climate change, is the universal phenomenon that moral and political 
beliefs are justified with appeals to nature (Hulme 2009; Rayner 2003). 
Nature is a mirror of societal behavior and thus operates as “a direct 
source of moral feedback for behavior, desirable or undesirable” 
(Rayner 2003: 278). The video fragment above underpins the highly-
moralized tone of climate-change narratives. God is discarded as a 
causal agent and even fully removed from the explanatory horizon, 
yet anthropogenic causality and morality take center stage: “Humans 
are causing it, so humans should fix it”.
To explain different forms of causality attributed to natural 
dangers, Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) distinguish between two 
forms of pollution. The first concerns a strict technical type (like river 
or air pollution) that rests upon a clear idea of a pre-polluted situation 
that can be measured precisely and carries no moral load. The second 
notion of pollution is nontechnical and indicates a contagious and 
harmful state, with mysterious origins, which carries the idea of 
moral defect (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). The latter, nontechnical 
pollution, which they refer to as “pollution beliefs” or “pollution 
ideas”, is of particular importance to my analysis. Yet when talking 
about observable changes in the environment or the weather, many of 
my informants referred to the first (technical) form of pollution. This 
is perhaps not surprising, as dwindling resources like grasses, plants, 
trees, rivers and water are more tangible, and indeed observable and 
measurable, than an abstract phenomenon like the climate. In the 
following analysis, I have reduced observations of climate change (or 
rather variability) to two main variables—rain and drought—because 
my respondents named them as the quintessential features of the 
(Rudiak-Gould 2013: 9). 
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climate (rising temperatures were only rarely mentioned) in this 
environment.10
Nothing New under the Sun: On the Climate’s Inherent 
Variability in Simanjiro
In a good year, the period of long rains produces an abundance of 
lush pastures, blossoming flowers, and sufficient crops like maize or 
beans to feed the family. It is a time of exceptional beauty and plenty. 
The rains give both people and cattle the chance to recover from the 
harshness of the dry season and regain their strength in preparation 
for the next dry season. There is no need for long-distance movement 
during this season, because the grasses and water can usually be found 
nearby. Families are united; there is time for leisure and ceremonies as 
there is enough milk and meat to share. 
The contrast with the dry season could not be sharper: the area 
turns into a semi-desert with dust clouds covering the pastures. The 
water resources slowly dry up, and food for people and cattle gradually 
diminish. Both must travel greater distances to search for green 
pastures and water sources. The selected illmuran (young men, often 
called warriors) are sent out on their exploration journey (eleenore), 
and then report their findings in the traditional meeting (engigwana 
engishu) in which strategies for the dry season are planned. It is the 
time of scarcity. Women’s daily activities become an ever-greater 
burden as women need to walk great distances to find firewood and 
water. Cattle and people lose weight and strength, and their concerns 
grow until the first signs of rain appear.
10  Although the climate consists of many more components than rainfall, its vital role 
in shaping and maintaining pastoralists’ livelihoods (and religious convictions) 
legitimizes the overall focus on rain, and drought, as its counterpart (see Chapter 7, 
Attribution Science).
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Fig. 5.3 Children milking a goat (photo by author, 2013), CC-BY-4.0.
The seasonal variations in Terrat’s climate impinge powerfully upon 
peoples’ day-to-day activities and their physical and social well-being, 
as well as upon the environment and the ways they perceive and relate 
to it. Mainly elderly villagers did not give testimony to (conspicuous) 
changes in the weather and the climate, nor were they familiar with 
climate-change discourse. Because they had never heard the term 
climate change (in any language), their accounts principally relied on the 
experience of sensory observations and (social) memory—i.e. the entire 
body of customary climate knowledge and environmental lore (Oba 
2014). The ways in which social memory is passed on and reproduced 
in Terrat include warrior songs, in which illmuran sing about past 
hardships and adaptation strategies, and the names that are given to 
weather and social eventful years. 
During interviews, my research partners and I asked informants 
whether they had observed changes in the weather, rainfall, or seasons 
compared to when they were young.11 Their social memory echoed 
many dry spells, climate fluctuations and variability, years of hardships, 
environmental catastrophes, hunger, and events that were remembered 
11  For translation of the concepts I relied heavily on the skills of my research partner 
Saruni Shuaka Kaleya, who did an extraordinary job of communicating the nuances 
in Swahili and Maa. Musa Kameika and Naini Morell were also indispensable in 
the whole research process. Language is crucial in the interpretation process, and 
especially challenging in this case as the term climate change is translated from 
Swahili to Maa, for which no official term is established, yet its linguistic politics 
reveal the struggles for meaning making. For a more detailed discussion of language 
and the translation dilemma, see De Wit 2017: 157. 
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by their own parents. Some elders recalled the years when they suffered 
from hunger. For instance, they mentioned years in which they were 
forced to eat the skin of their animals to survive. This was during the 
time when they were nomadic and did not use maize or other crops to 
supplement their diet. They pointed out two crucial coping strategies 
that enabled them to survive the dry season: mobility and drinking 
animal blood. Many elders referred to the period in which drinking 
blood was still a common practice, some with nostalgia but others with 
God-fearing disdain, which is a more recent sentiment inspired by 
Christian churches, mainly propagated by the Pentecostal church but 
is found in other denominations as well (De Wit 2017). But there was a 
consensus regarding the importance of both practices as vital survival 
strategies in the past. In brief, flexible adaptation mechanisms formed 
the lifeblood of a nomadic way of life in Maasailand, as hardships, 
environmental hazards, and catastrophes have been part and parcel of 
the highly variable climate.
Against this background, the first question related to pollution 
beliefs arises. If pollution indeed denotes an abnormal state, how does 
one, under such stochastic conditions, define the “normal” condition 
that is breached? In order to understand the reasons why climate change 
as a new global discourse enters as an alien idea, and is somewhat at 
odds with local realities, we need to make sense of the climate in Terrat 
and in the wider Simanjiro Plains, which is spatially and temporally 
highly variable (Leslie and McCabe 2013). This semi-arid environment 
is characterized by unpredictable, pronounced climate variability. As 
one informant explained, “[…] in our locality the climate knows a lot of 
fluctuations. One year you might expect rain and there will be no rain, 
in another year you expect drought and there is enough rainfall”. Some 
informants found my question about changes in the rainfall compared 
to the past incomprehensible and referred to this variability as being 
the norm. For example, one responded: “of course the rains have 
changed; they have never been the same in this locality”. A woman of 
approximately one-hundred years old reported, “There are no changes. 
The weather was like this from the very beginning. Sometimes there 
is less rain, sometimes there is more”. The climate follows a bi-modal 
rainfall pattern, consisting of short rains (November—December) and 
a long rainy season (March—May/June). The fact that many people 
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named different periods for the long and short rains also attests to an 
inherently variable climate. 
Moreover, my informants pointed out that the unpredictable climate 
of this area was a great obstacle to cultivation, which was characterized 
as random trial and error. For example, one man told me that, “farming 
is some sort of gambling game, sometimes you win but more often you 
lose”. Yet, despite frequent crop failures many villagers continue to 
cultivate, as the benefits of one successful harvest may outweigh the 
costs of many failed attempts. 
Socio-Environmental Context of Simanjiro
Depending on the altitude, rainfall in the semi-arid rangelands of 
Simanjiro averages around 500–800 mm (Igoe and Brockingtion 1999) or 
650–700 mm annually (Sachedina and Pippa 2009). This drought-prone 
region is among the most diverse and complex grassland savannah 
ecosystems in the world (Baird 2014; Olson and Dinerstein 1998). 
Despite the lack of meteorological data available for the wider area, the 
defining characteristics of unpredictability and fluctuation stand out. 
My informants highlighted the extreme spatial rainfall variability in the 
area. For instance, Meshack, the traditional leader, said, “It can rain here 
in this boma, but look at that boma over there and you see, there is no rain 
at all!” So how does one define a norm—and, consequently, a deviation 
from the norm—within such a hazard-prone and unstable environment? 
Despite the fluctuations, there is of course an approximation of regular 
seasonal patterns within the irregularity. Yet, while a clear dry season 
can be discerned, the rains differ greatly from year to year and place 
to place. Hence, some of the climate-cognizant informants found 
this notion of climate change challenging; for them it rather echoed 
something that the Maasai have already experienced in the past, as the 
following interview fragment with the traditional ruler of Terrat shows:
Traditional ruler: The first time I heard about climate change was in 2009, 
when some people who were sent by the government were going around 
telling about climate change. And also there were some people who 
came to observe climate change [researchers] and I was taken to ewas 
(dry season reserve). I tried to ask them many questions, and they told 
me that it is the industries destroying the ozone layer. That is what these 
white men told me. […] So, when I heard about these changes, I went 
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to Dar es Salaam, talking about climate change [together with Leboi]. 
[…] So now I really observed the changes because the Maasai have their 
own way of predicting rainfall, but nowadays it is very complicated. It is 
difficult to apply. You may apply but the answer may come in the wrong, 
wrong direction.
Researcher: And what did you think when you heard about it for the 
first time?
Traditional ruler: So, when I heard about this climate change for the first 
time, I thought it is just a repetition of the past. Because many years ago 
you may find five good years and then again seven not-so-good years. So, 
this is what I thought when I heard about climate change, that it is about 
these old changes of five good years, and seven bad years. But by then, I 
did not know about the industries yet. Because I am saying only what I 
know. Here in Tanzania there are no big industries, which could maybe 
destroy the ozone layer or change the climate of the earth.
Researcher: Do you understand now what it means?
Traditional ruler: I don’t understand it very well because I did not carry 
on with those researchers. The government is not serving to educate 
people here in the village about climate change anymore. But I think that 
these changes are maybe those changes of five good years and seven not 
very much good years. We had many drought spells in our history.
[…] it seems that with our generation the situation is going in a bad 
direction. Also, the life expectancy of the people. In the past, people could 
live for 100 years up till 150 years sometimes. But nowadays a person can 
live only 70 years and we say “the man is too old, he is 70 years”. 
Notwithstanding the manifold statements about the lack of rain and 
intensifying drought and irregularities, communicating climate change 
is fraught with translation challenges, since global discourses on climate 
change tend to portray an unstable climate as a deviation from normality, 
albeit on much longer timescales than is recounted in oral memory. We 
spoke with an eighty-five-year-old man who had never heard of climate 
change. When we tried to explain it to him, he recalled the droughts 
of the past, and the years in which the Maasai suffered from hunger: 
“These are the same changes that we had in the past. First, there are 
seven good years, and then three bad years”. His comments highlight 
how talking about changes in the weather and rainfall patterns cannot 
be detached from societal changes, since they go hand in hand with 
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accounts of people’s general wellbeing, altered lifestyle and customs, 
and eroding values and morals. This finding is in line with Fleming and 
Jankovic (2011), who advocate a less reductionist view of the climate 
as “a framing device in which the verities of life such as food, health, 
wars, housing, economy, social movement, or local identity change 
synchronically with Klima”.12
It is crucial to bear in mind that the villagers of Terrat have abandoned 
their nomadic lives based solely on pastoralism, and cultivation and 
living in more permanent settlements is common nowadays due to a 
history of enforced relocations into permanent settlements and land 
alienation.13 This has inevitably changed peoples’ understanding of (and 
relation to) the climate. Mobility restrictions and the loss of grazing 
areas have changed their livelihoods and encouraged diversification 
strategies such as cultivation, and have deeply altered what it means to 
be Maasai. A middle-aged man commented on how shifting human—
environment relations and changing perceptions of the climate go hand 
in hand: “It could be that the rains are less nowadays, but it is hard to 
tell because we are also more dependent on rain because we live and eat 
differently. Our mentality has changed”.
In a similar vein, a middle-aged woman explained how she perceived 
a change in relation to ritual prayer, as opposed to the church: 
The years have changed, and people have changed. Nowadays people 
are eating a lot. In the past, you could have one bag of maize, but now 
you buy a lot of bags and put them in store, and you finish all of them. 
Families are big now. Now we also don’t take blood because the church 
has prohibited the drinking of blood. And when there was no rain, we 
would just take a goat and women prayed to God and sacrificed a goat, 
then it would rain again. During the days of sacrifice it rained a lot.
12  Klima is of Greek origin. It refers to the inclination of the sun in relation to the earth, 
which partly regulates the global climate.
13  The Tanzanian government’s attempt to relocate and “promote” agriculture and 
the sedentary life goes back to colonial times when the Maasai were forced to 
live in one of the most desolate areas in the country, but was also part of Ujamaa, 
which established a nationwide villagization programme that forcibly relocated 
people into so-called Ujamaa villages. In northern Tanzania, this resettlement was 
known as Operation Embarnat (Maa: “permanent settlement”), and many Maasai 
herders saw this operation as another attempt by the state to appropriate pastoral 
rangelands (Sachedina 2008: 110).
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A lady, approximately ninety years old, spoke about land use and the 
difference in individual property as opposed to open access: ‘There 
was one year without rain when I was a child that I cannot forget. 
Nowadays it happens more often. But in the past land didn’t belong to 
anybody, so we moved until we found grass. Now everybody has his or 
her own land, so you have to stay in your own land.’ Another very old 
woman remarked about changes in the weather: ‘Perhaps the weather 
has changed, but we have changed too. We used to follow the clouds; 
nowadays we have settled.’ 
Thus, while following the clouds guided the Maasai’s relationship 
with their environment and the climate, due to drastic changes in their 
ways of living, it is not fruitful to disentangle climatic and societal 
changes. What can we learn from these stories about change in relation 
to pollution beliefs? Following Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), since 
pollution beliefs are based on the idea of moral defect, they serve as 
a useful political argument because they trace causal chains from 
actions to disasters. Furthermore, as discussed below, these ideas about 
pollution are also the product of an ongoing political debate about the 
ideal society (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). Talking about the climate 
is more than just a discussion of an atmospheric reality; it encompasses 
the socio-cultural, political and religious realms of society.14 
On the Climate—Morality—Religion Nexus
Thinking about nature and climate in relation to culture and human society 
is as old as anthropology itself (and goes all the way back to intellectual 
forebears, who developed “climate theories”, such as Hippocrates, 
Montesquieu, Ratzel, etc.; see Dove 2014). Recently, a large body of 
anthropological and social science literature is emerging that casts new 
light on these questions of morality, causality (blame/responsibility), 
and belief (rejection) in relation to climate change. Reception studies is 
one of such subfields (see Rudiak-Gould 2011) that seeks to account for 
a “located hermeneutics” (Livingstone 2005) by exploring the widely 
14  This chapter focuses largely on the basic cosmology of the Maasai and the encounter 
with climate-change. Yet, I emphasize elsewhere that adaptation to climate change 
is intricately bound to the politics of land use and long history of marginalisation 
(de Wit 2018; 2017). 
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varying and radically different interpretations of the idea of climate 
change across the world. In the course of my fieldwork it became 
increasingly clear to me that what I perceived to be a climate change 
“void”, in the sense that climate change was not prominently discussed, 
in fact revealed something very crucial, perhaps even existential. While I 
was interested in peoples’ understanding of climate change and related 
(weather) observations, our conversations largely prompted stories 
about the loss of culture and respect, society, love, money, globalization, 
church, traditional religion versus Christianity—almost everything 
that encompasses the changing Maasai culture and ways of being and 
believing. Therefore, making sense of local climate accounts required 
broadening my “environmental horizon” and being attentive to the 
life worlds, practices and ontologies that overlapped in peoples’ rain 
tales. For example, many elderly informants recalled that they and 
their forefathers had adapted to the climate by “following the clouds as 
long as we can remember” and deplored its current impossibility. And 
while pondering the climate and environment of the past, their nomadic 
lifestyle was often invoked, but so was their cultural identity and what 
it once meant to be a “true” Maasai. I argue that understanding these 
stories of cultural and environmental decline is vital for making sense 
of how climate change is interpreted and translated. As many scholars 
have demonstrated, these “prior commitments” (Jasanoff 2010) or 
pre-existing political norms (Cass 2007) profoundly influence how 
people assess, translate, respond to and render anthropogenic climate 
change meaningful (or not). Moreover, they shape the ways in which 
responsibility and blame are attributed to society (Eguavoen 2013; 
Rudiak-Gould 2013).
On Temporality and Degradation 
While the older group of informants often emphasized the physical 
hardships of the past and did not romanticize the nomadic way of life 
per se, their social memory similarly spoke of ecological abundance, and 
echoed the vigor of cultural norms and values that they perceived to 
be prevalent in those days. Sufficient grasses, abundant trees, plenty 
of water, animals, and flowing streams were all imagined as part of 
the ideal past and mentioned on a par with the rootedness of cultural 
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values such as respect, love, reciprocity, faithfulness and solidarity. In 
early ethnographies it is clear that mutual respect, enkanyit, formed the 
heart of Maasai culture and sociality. Enkanyit has been the lifeblood 
that sustained relationships of reciprocity and access to shared natural 
resources, and was expressed through appropriate greetings, forms of 
address and behavioral codes that differed according to age, gender, and 
kinship relations (Hodgson 2005; Waller 1999; Spear and Waller 1993a). 
The themes of love and respect were very prominent during interviews 
and referred to principles of solidarity and reciprocity that are said to be 
disappearing from society. Male informants often attributed this moral 
decline to encounters with other cultures, and processes of globalization 
and modernization, as Petro explained:
People were spreading love a lot. So they were visiting each other during 
the night and during the day, to exchange ideas and to spread love. 
But this is now disappearing. These things are changing because of the 
introduction of other cultures. 
A very old man related the changes of culture and rain in society to the 
introduction of industrial oil, which can be understood as a symbol of a 
monetary economy:
Rain is a big problem. Things have totally changed and the one who 
changes these things is God. A big problem is lack of rain and human 
diseases. Increasing of diseases and this is due to industry oil that 
nowadays people prefer rather than butter. And also during the dry 
season—during hunger year—we drank blood from the cow and cooked 
it for kids, but nowadays you cannot do something like that. […]
Men by and large spoke about money, modernization, and globalization 
in general, or a change in oregie (culture and customs). Fascinatingly, 
the group of elder women unequivocally deplored the eroding of 
enkanyit and enyorotto—the disappearance of respect and love—from 
society, which was often brought up in relation to the lack of rainfall. 
This female preoccupation with respect can be explained by a gendered 
conception of morality, as historically women were considered to be 
naturally more religious and closer to Eng’ai (see below). As such, they 
saw it as their responsibility to ensure the moral order of the daily world 
(Hodgson 2005); a role that they continue to assume and fulfil today 
(Hodgson 2011; see also the work of Todd Sanders (2004) on gender 
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and reproduction, power, ritual and rain in Tanzania). A widely shared 
explanation given by female informants of the decreased rainfall was 
based on the moral conduct of society, and the lack of enkanyit. The 
following quotes from female informants illustrate the close association 
between rain, morality and (more implicitly) gender:
The rains are bad nowadays because we are behaving badly; nobody is 
respecting each other any longer.
People nowadays cannot even greet you properly any longer. Our society 
is losing its culture, and people do not love each other anymore. This is 
what is causing climate change to happen.
When God decided to give us no rain, it is because we have sinned. People 
only want money nowadays. So they kill each other, have abortions and 
go to the mines.
When I hear that there are changes in the weather this is maybe because 
of wrongdoings like homosexuality. 
Attributing responsibility for natural disasters (or climate and weather 
anomalies) to society is a common way to protect a particular set of 
values, which belong to a particular way of life (Douglas and Wildavsky 
1982). Sufficient rainfall denotes a condition in which a stable and 
peaceful world is imagined, and things are as they ought to be. God is 
content and expresses Her satisfaction by blessing people with rainfall.15 
In a year of severe drought, pollution beliefs speak about chaos and 
instability due to society’s moral defects and invoke Maasai’s cultural 
loyalty and religious faithfulness of the past. Faced with past and ongoing 
pressures from the forces of “modernization” and political economy, it 
is not surprising that for the Maasai, values that deserve protection are 
mostly related to their cultural identity, which they feel is under threat. 
In other words, discussions about the climate and the environment also 
have a temporal dimension in which a somewhat utopian and timeless 
culture (including knowledge and power) of the past is remembered, 
mirroring the ecologies of abundance.16 As mentioned above, this does 
15  The Maasai supreme being Eng’ai is almost universally referred to as female.
16  An anonymous reviewer commented that “the utopian vision of the Maasai past 
is not just an imaginary time of abundance; it’s an account of nineteenth-century 
Maasai dominance of the regional political economy”. My answer to this is that 
social memory is shaped both by historical events and trajectory narratives (i.e. a 
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not mean that the climate or environment were (imagined as) stable; 
rather, these trajectory narratives of the past should be understood in 
the context of conceptions of time about the future to which I now turn.
Two questions arise in this context. First, what can we learn from 
an imagined pristine past and a perceived-to-be eroding present? 
Second, how do we give meaning to a relationship between nature 
and morality that is inextricably intertwined? I first briefly explore the 
temporal dimension before probing the question of morality and the 
climate in more detail. As mentioned before, rain tales about the past are 
a commentary on an ideal present. To paraphrase anthropologist van 
Beek (2000, 1999), there is a strong identification between society and 
the climate, as the latter forms part of a shared identity. What follows 
from this observation is that “we are the climate”, and conversations 
about the climate are meta-commentaries on society. As such, van Beek 
(2000) argues that climate-change discourses are a critique of society in 
which worries about the future are expressed. To explore the question of 
whether environmental degradation has repercussions on oral traditions 
(myths and other stories reflecting on the relationship between humans 
with their source of existence), van Beek explores projected futures in 
various cultures, and interrogates tales about end times. 
Furthermore, van Beek argues that inherent to this message of decay, 
in which the present is less powerful than the past and the future is 
again less powerful than the present, is the notion of diminished 
resources as well as the loss of power and knowledge.17 And based on 
my own findings, because relations of reciprocity are vital in times of 
duress such as drought, talking about the climate of the past similarly 
evoked a nostalgia for a time in which faith, culture, love and respect 
were strongly anchored in the social and cultural fabric of life. Finally, 
according to van Beek, the explanation of this sense of gradual loss in 
tradition and ecology over time stems from the dynamics of orality. So 
in rituals and local discourse, tradition is considered to encompass the 
wisdom and practices that are passed on from previous generations, 
culturalist narrative of decline, see Rudiak-Gould 2014) that inhere in a society/
culture, and in which a particular future trend is imagined.
17  The discourses on tradition are different from the dynamics of tradition itself, 
which are flexible and adaptive (van Beek 2000). Horton also states that many 
African people see their cosmologies as timeless, which does not mean they are 
frozen (Horton 1975).
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which is seen as a weak reflection of the past and leads to an even 
bleaker future (van Beek 2000). This observation indeed resonates with 
the ways in which my informants spoke about the current generation, 
and the fears they expressed about for example, “the direction of the 
bad changes for the future”. Rain was a tangible trope for contemplation 
and what Rudiak-Gould calls “in-group blame” (Rudiak-Gould 2014), 
as the following quote from Rehema, a female elder, illustrates:
Our culture is changing a lot because when we were young the children 
used to have respect for their parents. But this generation does not listen 
to their parents. […] Today there is no love among the people; that is why 
life has changed. Today you can identify somebody who is poor, but in 
the past you could not because of love among people. […] There are also 
changes in rainfall. In the past there was enough rainfall but currently 
there is not enough rain, which puts people in trouble. These changes in 
rainfall are caused by the church. Because in the past we used to sing in 
case of a bad year. We sang, gathered together with the women and sang 
to God “give us the rain”. We were also going to Oloiboni. He told us “do 
this and do that” and the rain came. But today people are not visiting 
Oloiboni any longer—that is why it is not raining as usual.
Here too, temporality and the trajectory narratives of culturalist decline 
play a role, which go back to the colonial encounter but also to the more 
recent establishment of the first Christian churches. In the quote above, 
Rehema attributes society’s moral failure and the lack of rain to the 
introduction of the church, although she is a Christian herself. When 
I asked her about this, she explained that early Christians were very 
different from the contemporary Christians, because the first churches 
(e.g., Catholic) were much more tolerant towards Maasai culture, while 
the more recently established denominations (e.g., Pentecostal) have 
suppressed varying forms of Maasai cultural expressions and material 
culture, like wearing ritual attires and jewelry. The trajectory narrative 
of cultural decline is coupled with in-group blame—a causal and moral 
explanation of that trend—in which the Maasai are ultimately to be 
blamed for their own cultural abandonment (cf. Rudiak-Gould 2013, 
2014). 
Her account also touches on other dimensions related to the second 
question posed above. In order to make sense of climate change 
“realities” (both observation and reception) in Terrat, we need to gain 
insight into the complex interconnection between the climate, morality 
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and religiosity, which is in turn vested in local institutions and systems 
of power. It is important to note that, although we owe many conceptual 
polarities (e.g. nature/culture; body/mind; fact/value; subject/object) 
to Enlightenment thought and practice, the contrast between the 
“sacred”, “religious”, and “spiritual” as opposed to the “secular” realm 
is a residue of the same purification process (Armstrong 2009; Taylor 
2007; Hodgson 2005; Latour 1993). Nevertheless, as Hodgson (2005) 
argues, while this opposition might hold true for some societies, the 
case of the Maasai reveals that until the twentieth century the secular 
and the sacred were one and the same.18 Indeed, the Maa religion has no 
word for religion; they have adopted the Swahili term dini (from Arabic) 
(Hodgson 2005). Therefore, in line with Hodgson I use “religion” as 
an analytic term to probe and discuss the beliefs, convictions, (ritual) 
practices and experiences that express a relationship to some powerful 
divine being(s) or essence(s) (see Hodgson 2005), and to explore 
the stories that reflect on the Maasai’s relationship to their source of 
existence (van Beek 2000).
On Continuity: Eng’ai ai!
God is God. Who enables the sun to shine and the rains to fall. Eng’ai 
means three things: God, sky [or heaven] and all its contents, and rain 
(Koko Theresia).
The most common answers to the question of what could cause these 
changes in rainfall were “I don’t know”, “Only God knows”, “We 
cannot know God’s secret”, “God brings us the rain”, “God decides”, 
“It is God’s plan and She changed a lot”, “Nobody can change the 
years but God and we can receive the changes from God”, “Nobody 
but God is causing this, so nobody is causing it. Just the condition of 
the weather by God Herself is causing these changes”. Thus, while the 
former section revealed how people are seeking an explanation within 
society—the climate as a mirror of society’s behaviour—the realm of 
18  Philosopher Charles Taylor, in his seminal book A Secular Age, has also stated that 
it does not make sense to distinguish between aspects of society as we do in the 
West, such as the political, economic, religious etc. Hence, the role of religion in 
“early” societies should be treated as interwoven with everything else rather than 
as a separate “sphere” of its own (Armstrong 2009; Taylor 2007: 2). 
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rain ultimately and exclusively belongs to the sole supreme entity, 
Eng’ai. And it should be emphasized that in addition to the gentle 
eschatology mentioned above—in which time might be running down 
and fading away gradually, an idea in which the present is a weak echo 
of the past—for the Maasai, the future remains an inaccessible domain 
shrouded in obscurity. Considering the precarious bond that has existed 
between Maasai pastoralists and rain, it comes as no surprise that the 
nature—culture connection is engrained with religious and symbolic 
meaning and ritual interaction. My conversations with people revealed 
that an intrinsic transcendental and moral connection exists between 
God, society, and the climate: indeed, the most significant word in Maa, 
Eng’ai, simultaneously means God, rain, and the sky (or heaven). The 
weather is a tangible manifestation of Eng’ai, a way to communicate 
Her satisfaction as well as discontent with the people. Sufficient rain is 
received as God’s grace, while prolonged droughts are understood as 
a curse. Drawing on early ethnographies (such as Merker 1910; Hollis 
1905; Johnston 1902), Hodgson (2005) describes the Maasai and their 
relationship to the environment and religious practices as follows:
As pastoralists, Maasai had a close customary relationship to and 
dependence on the environment for their sustenance and social 
reproduction. Nature and its elements were understood as manifestations 
of Eng’ai or expressions of Her will, and were therefore central to Maasai 
religious beliefs and practices. The symbolic meanings of these aspects of 
nature were dynamic and contextual; they were shaped (and reshaped) 
through their use in ritual practice, and, in turn, shaped the form and 
content of these practices (Hodgson 2005: 25).
Although Eng’ai manifests Herself in different forms and goes by many 
different names, the Maasai religion is a monotheistic belief system. 
Despite the mass conversion to Christianity that took place in Maasailand 
relatively recently,19 tales about the weather in relation to God and society 
form a testimony to this persistent and intricate relationship. While the 
Maasai’s adoption of Christianity (or Christianity’s adaptation to the 
Maasai) has entailed ruptures in certain cultural and religious forms and 
practices, a continuity in religious conviction and belief can be observed 
19  For example, as late as 1969 it was estimated that there were no more than 300 
practicing Maasai Christians in the Evangelical Lutheran Church, even though 
many more had been baptized (Groop 2006).
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in exploring climate—society interactions. I argue that the continuity of 
an entrenched faith in Eng’ai, which helped smooth the conversion to 
Christianity, for the very same reason makes climate change (and the 
ways it is translated) difficult to accept. 
The notion of an inner spirit or soul (oltau) is also important to the 
Maasai. As Hodgson demonstrates, conversion was seen as a process 
that took place outside of an individual’s will; it was instead found 
in the readiness of a person’s oltau (Hodgson 2005). Disentangling 
“Maasai religion” or cosmology from Christianity is unfruitful. As 
with any tradition or culture, Maasai culture, religious beliefs and 
practices have always been in flux, highly diverse and dynamic (Spear 
and Waller 1993b). Furthermore, what are now considered “Maasai” 
practices and beliefs are amalgamations that resulted from complex 
histories of exchange and earlier encounters with other ethnic groups. 
Christianity is also just as dynamic and idiosyncratic as the Maasai 
religion, and must thus be understood in its local expressions and 
manifestations (Hodgson 2005). For example, Terrat has a highly 
diverse proliferation of churches; the different denominations all have 
their own prescriptions, convictions, values, prayers, doctrine, (ritual) 
practices, (sacred) symbols, media, and material forms, etc. I do not 
seek here to map out the complexities associated with these various 
cults, but rather to point out that climate change is translated via the 
ontological and epistemological context that results from the encounter 
between Christianity and Maasai religion. While it is clearly impossible 
to exhaust all its constituents, we can distil some basic patterns of the 
pre-existing norms and commitments. As such, my take on Maasai 
“tradition” or culture aligns with a “coproduction theory”, which treats 
it as the ‘result of creative friction between past lifeways and newer 
influences’ (Rudiak-Gould 2013: 11). 
As an influential and externally imposed belief system that has 
travelled to Maasailand, we might very well draw lessons from the ways 
in which Christianity has taken root in the African context in general 
and in Maasailand in particular. Horton (1975) discusses comparative 
African pathways of conversion, and finds that the acceptance or 
rejection of Islam or Christianity is based less on the external religions 
themselves and more on the pre-existing thought patterns, values and 
socio-economic structure in the receiving society (what he refers to as 
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their “basic cosmology”). However, instead of seeking to find selection 
principles in either the basic cosmology or in external variables, I 
focus on the interaction and relation between the two in the “fusion of 
horizons”, which is the moment when an existential meaning occurs 
(Gadamer 1975). I approach interpretations of climate change as 
agentive cultural expressions or translations that emerge and become 
meaningful through existing interpretive horizons.
In the following, I discuss continuities and ruptures, with a focus on 
Eng’ai (supreme being) and the oloiboni (the local diviner and spiritual 
healer), who both appeared prominently in local rain tales.
According to my informants, the major difference between the Maasai 
religion and Christianity lies in the ways of worshipping—which relates 
to ritual practices and the enactment and strengthening of relations 
of reciprocity—and not in the “essence” of faith or believing in God 
itself. Informants spoke about faith at times as a way “to be faithful to” 
someone or something as a deliberate activity, thus implying a personal 
choice. There is a large body of literature on the anthropology of religion 
dealing with the difference between faith and belief, which is beyond 
the scope of this chapter, and I explore the terms here ethnographically. In 
their conversion process, their image of the divine being had remained 
largely unaltered; Eng’ai is still Eng’ai, as one elder woman explained: 
There are not two Gods, there is only a single God. The only difference 
is the way of worshipping. That is why people used to surround a tree 
called oreteti. That is a tree that they believed when you surround it and 
sing God can listen to your prayers. […] And normally they went to 
Oloiboni and tried to make him their God. But actually, there is only one 
God.
The Supreme Being played (and continues to play) the quintessential 
role as provider of rain, and all-natural phenomena—particularly those 
related to the weather—were understood as a manifestation of Her 
divine powers. The weather thus echoed God’s judgement—a common 
theme in religious traditions worldwide. In Maasai society, praying and 
asking for rain required mediation through authorized practices and 
ritual forms of purification, which were guided by the spiritual diviner 
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and prophet.20 Yet the realm of God (and thus the climate) could not be 
known. Anthropologist Spencer (2003: 6) has argued that the Maasai 
see God as an all-powerful and arbitrary force of providence whose 
intentions cannot be known, even by the prophets, “who have no more 
than a dim notion of the nature of the cosmos”. As mentioned before, 
this notion of God (and the transcendental) as an undisclosed sphere 
inevitably influences ideas of the future. Spencer (2003: 6) goes further 
to argue that “the flamboyance of Maasai ceremony and self-regard is 
offset by a sense of resignation to an unknown and unknowable future. 
They see themselves rather like Plato’s prisoners in a cave, ill-equipped 
to delve into ultimate truths”.
While I am hesitant to speak of “ultimate truths”, my informants 
highlighted the notion of an unknowable future; they refuted any attempt 
to probe future climate scenarios, or any ideas of the future for that 
matter. Questions about the future were always cast aside with laughter, 
followed by “we cannot know”, or “only God knows”. Yet mediation 
with God was common and necessary, as the Maasai used sacrifices and 
(communal) prayers in attempts to repent their sins, re-establish social 
and moral order, and reinforce their bond with Eng’ai. Women served as 
the midwives between Eng’ai and Her people, for women were given the 
power to create new life (Hodgson 2005; cf. Sanders 2004). The forms of 
mediation and intercession with Eng’ai have changed since Christianity 
has made its way to Terrat, which has affected ritual practices that for 
example regulated access to natural resources.
On Rupture: Oloiboni
In the past, the mediation of rain took place through the ritual prayer 
under a sacred tree (oreteti), or close to a water source by sacrificing a 
black sheep or a goat.21 As women were considered to be more religious 
than men, to have a greater sense of spirituality and to be closer to 
Eng’ai (Hodgson 2005), this ritual was carried out by several women 
(in different stages of fertility) who prayed and sang naked while 
surrounding a dam. This ceremony was guided by the oloiboni, who was 
20  According to my informants in Terrat, this practice has drastically declined over the 
years, but is still widely practiced in some other parts of Maasailand.
21  It must be a black one because this relates to morality and signifies a gentle God.
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responsible for the timing and for giving instructions to the participants. 
The rain prayer now takes place in church, under the guidance of a 
pastor. Yet any member of the church (not only the pastor) can instigate 
the rain prayer. Whereas many elder women did not rejoice in this 
Christian democratic principle of praying for rain, others argued that 
the God of the church is still capable of bringing rain, “perhaps a little 
bit slower though” and “less powerful than in the past”. Overall, there 
is a decreased sense of the bond between God, society, and rainfall, for 
which people sought an explanation in either the lack of ritual or the 
loss of faith. 
Mediating rainfall has always occurred through the dominant 
(religious) authorities and was brought about in connection with a 
transcendental force, Eng’ai. This hierarchy inevitably touches upon 
notions of power, and the question emerges: who has the authority to 
mediate (the epistemics of) the climate and rain? Female informants in 
particular have attributed the lack of rain to the fact that this ritual prayer 
through sacrifice has ceased to exist and blame the church for prohibiting 
this practice. One older woman recalled the effectiveness and power of 
this prayer: ‘After we carried out this practice by surrounding a dam, the 
rain occurred the same day and not any other day. The same day the rain 
fell down. But nowadays the church is not allowing us to go’.
Fig. 5.4 Koko (elder women, or grandmothers) dressed for a 
circumcision ceremony in the neighboring village Sukuro (photo by 
author, 2013), CC-BY-4.0. 
190 Global Warming in Local Discourses
The ritual prayer guided by the power of the oloiboni was important 
to bring rain, but faith also played a vital role. As one old man (non-
Christian) put it:
When I was young people went to pray for rain with oloiboni. Praying for 
rain is about faith. When people went they had very strong faith, they 
were very faithful to him. Nowadays people go to church because they 
love church. It is difficult to know if they are truly faithful. The oloiboni is 
not remembered because they pray for Jesus. But the difference was that 
people were faithful and he gave the instruction of what to do. Now in 
church there are no sacrifices. In church there is only preaching.
A middle-aged man who was quite happy in church explained: “We do 
not longer believe in the power of oloiboni so we directly pray to God. 
Sometimes we make a special prayer for rain in church so that the rain 
may come. God normally listens to our prayers. When we realized that 
the rains came when we prayed to God, we left the oloiboni”.
However, many women made opposite claims. While generally being 
content with the church, they regretted that the ritual rain prayer—and 
their own role as moral mediators therein—no longer existed. While 
expressing their disdain about the contemporary oloiboni, in terms of 
channeling rainfall they found them to be good ritual leaders in the past, 
as they gave precise instructions about what to do. It is crucial to note 
that the oloiboni was not the one empowered to bring rain himself; rather, 
he was endowed with the power to mediate rain through Eng’ai. As one 
koko explained: “We visited the oloiboni and he tried to do something. 
Sometimes it would rain but not because of the oloiboni but only because 
God decided to give us rain”. Rain and power are intrinsically connected, 
particularly in a context where rain sustains all forms of life (for studies 
on rain and power in Tanzania, see also Sheridan 2012; Sanders 2004). 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that rain is seen as a sacred matter 
that in part, both conceptually and linguistically, coalesces with the 
Supreme Being. When it rains, people exclaim, “There is Eng’ai!”. The 
disappearance of the ritual rain prayer—accompanied by the collective 
sacrificing of a black animal as a gift for Eng’ai—has entailed a weakening 
of the ways in which people (mainly women) sought redress for society’s 
behavior and maintained a relationship with Eng’ai. This ritual power 
and redress were important regulatory principles that guided access to 
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natural resources and relations of exchange and reciprocity, which were 
crucial in adaptation to climatic fluctuations and drought. 
Hence, they also find the explanation for the lack of rainfall in the 
eroding power of the oloiboni. Apart from the church, there is a more 
intrinsic reason for the oloiboni’s loss of ritual authority. When I asked 
people whether they still believed in the power of the oloiboni, many 
replied that this depends on the faith of the people. As Leboi explained: 
“God also depends on the faith of people. If somebody believes in the 
church he may succeed there, if they pray to the Maasai God they may 
also succeed there. It depends on the faith of the people”.
Because of people’s strong resentment of the diviner, I had assumed 
that this attitude also entailed a new and exclusive ontology that 
discarded his powers altogether. However, it appeared that the oloiboni’s 
powers are not necessarily “unreal” or that they cease to exist, but rather 
that getting in touch with him or establishing a bond involves engaging 
with ungodly spirits and the realm of the “occult”. Furthermore, just 
as one’s spirit or soul (oltau) operates like another inside oneself, who 
decides for you what to believe, the power of the oloiboni is not an intrinsic 
agentive force that belongs exclusively to him that he can exert over the 
people. Put otherwise, in addition to his own derogatory practices (that 
have become known as such as propagated by the Christian church) that 
in part corroded his power, for the oloiboni’s power to “work” he needed 
the dialectical enforcement from below that is enacted through people’s 
faith. As one (Lutheran) man recalled: “When I was young others went 
to pray for rain with the oloiboni. It is about faith. […] The difference 
was that people were very faithful, and he [oloiboni] gave directions for 
what to do in case of diseases. Now in church there are no sacrifices. In 
church, there is only preaching”.
In this section I have explored the historically complex and intricate 
relationship between society, rain, and God, in which morality featured 
prominently and was sustained through ritual prayer and other 
ceremonies. These rituals fulfilled a particularly vital role in the face of 
severe drought in order to maintain social cohesion, strengthen relations 
of reciprocity and keep society together (for a comparison with Brazil, 
see Taddei 2013; 2012). Furthermore, whatever the external influences 
that brought about new cosmological configurations, and institutional 
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or ritual ruptures, the deeply entrenched notion of Eng’ai remains the 
quintessential lifeblood that serves as the foundation for this bond.22
Climate Change as Disenchantment
The radio is one of the primary sources of information on global 
discourses in Terrat. The radio’s reach in Maasailand makes it the only 
platform in their own language that weaves connections to international 
and national concerns and local environmental realities. Orkonerei Radio 
Service (ORS community radio) is headquartered in Terrat.23 Its main 
vision is to enhance knowledge and educate the pastoralist community 
for the purposes of development by promoting accountability, equality, 
peace and unity. The service also seeks to empower Maasai women by 
establishing radio community groups and donating radios to women. 
However, I found that while the majority of men own a radio and listen 
regularly to radio programmes, women do so to a much lesser extent. 
Moreover, when women are at home, they have less time than men to sit 
and listen because they are burdened with an array of time-consuming 
household tasks. Hence, among my informants there were more climate-
cognizant men than women, and often they had received the relevant 
information from the radio. 
The ORS is an important source of information for the Maasai 
because it is the only radio station that broadcasts in the Maa language. 
It connects the Maasai to global concerns and mediates culture and 
tradition. In a sense it thus invokes and remediates notions of Maasai 
identity. The story of Babu (elder man) is a good example. When the 
radio station was established Babu was invited to present a programme 
22  This is not to say that Eng’ai is stable and unchanging, as peoples’ relation to Her 
were and still are continuously enacted and sustained through certain cultural 
and religious practices, but because both Christianity and Maasai religion are 
monotheistic belief systems, conversion afforded a certain continuity in religious 
experience of a continued existence of the Supreme Being. This is different from 
the encounter with Christianity and many other local/Indigenous religions in the 
world, where local deities and animist ontologies were largely perceived to form a 
threat to the gospel. 
23  The radio station was initially owned by the Institute of the Orkonerei Pastoralist 
Advancement, which is a voluntary community membership organization founded 
in 1991. From 2009, the of the radio station’s ownership was transferred to Orkonerei 
Mass Media, a Maasai-run company.
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called “Orngara le Maa” [to unite the Maasai] about the Maasai language 
and culture. The programme seeks to unite all the Maasai throughout 
Tanzania and Kenya by informing people about their language and 
traditions. During the programme, Babu receives phone calls from 
Maasai from many different regions and they ask him questions about 
particular Maa words, ceremonies and habits, etc. According to Babu, 
this radio programme is very important because he has observed many 
cultural changes that are eroding important values such as enkanyit. He 
explained:
People are not following the Maasai tradition as in the past. For example, 
to make holes in the ears. Also, when there was no milk they could drink 
the blood from the cow but nowadays people are no longer doing that. 
The major effect is that people are leaving the culture and some people 
are dying.
For Babu, the radio programme is very important for keeping Maasai 
traditions alive; reminding the Maasai of their own traditions and 
language. However, while remediating tradition and cultural values, the 
radio also plays into the complex relationship between Maasai traditions 
and the disenchantments associated with modernity. As Englund (2011: 
2326) compellingly demonstrated in his study of the role of the radio 
(and the hundreds of mundane stories that radio listeners shared) in 
Malawi, “insights emerge into how Africans pursue their desires under 
the condition of globalization”.24
But in Terrat, the radio also increases listeners’ disenchantment 
with the world, and informs them of the dangers of globalization. For 
example, people hear about scientists who reject the existence of God, 
about nuclear wars, environmental destruction, industries, explosive 
weapons, air pollution, cancer, and climate change. When Babu heard 
about climate change on the radio, he thought it referred to a change 
in culture and the lack of respect in society. One ORS radio programme 
“Mazungumzo ya Mazingira” [Talk about the environment] devoted an 
entire episode to the topic of climate change. A special guest was invited, 
called Hassan, to explain the concept to the people:
24  The role of the radio in Maasailand merits its own ethnographic study. See for 
example the work of Englund 2011.
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Hassan: It is the change based on environment, e.g. temperature, moving 
winds and rainfall. These changes are repeating all the time. […] Scientific 
investigation found that changes are occurring […]. Climate change can 
be human induced, and it is also naturally occurring. This is because 
human activities pollute the atmosphere. Human activities like burning 
charcoal and burning forests increase the level of CO2 in the atmosphere 
and causes global warming. The industrial revolution, which began in 
1730 caused emission of poisonous gases that made a layer of thick gases, 
and allows rays to penetrate, but prevented gases from escaping. These 
poisonous gases come from different places such as industries, volcanic 
eruption, burning charcoal or forest, explosion of weapons used in wars. 
[…] Trees that normally absorb carbon dioxide are being cut and this is 
very dangerous.
His advice to the people was to minimize industries and the burning 
of forests, and to motivate people to plant trees to reduce gases like 
CO2. This explanation seems rather complicated for people who have 
never heard of CO2, the atmosphere, the industrial revolution, or even 
science. Moreover, a giant leap is made between the global causes 
(industries) and local responsibility (planting trees). Another invited 
guest explained his ideas about climate change:
Frederik: This is caused directly by human activities. How does this 
climate change take place? Like I said. Directly by human activities. 
A human being because of her poverty can go into the forest and cut 
down trees for different purposes. For example, for charcoal burning and 
the smoke that is produced in this process is directly released into the 
atmosphere and causes climate change. This ozone layer is destroyed, 
and some holes are appearing, ozone layer depletion. […] We are also the 
causes of this thing, since we are cutting many trees, burning charcoal 
[…].
The rest of the programme was dedicated to tree talk and how to sensitize 
people about tree planting and prevent them from cutting down trees. 
The anthropogenic approach to the climate features prominently in 
climate-change discourses. The NGO in the video fragment described 
above also explained to the group of actors that they should “stop 
praying to God for it is not God’s fault”, and that they have to plant 
trees instead, since humans—including the Maasai—are responsible. 
While in the educational movie the actors obviously accepted this 
scientific explanation, as Leboi has been perfectly able to reproduce it 
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in different public fora (including in his accounts to me), the reality of 
interpreting and translating climate change proved much more subtle, 
stubborn and complicated. In one of my many conversations with Leboi, 
he asked me a question that I had grown familiar with in the course of 
my stay in Terrat, and it evoked a fascinating and controversial point 
in the translation of climate change: “Is it true that there are people in 
Europe who call themselves scientists and who don’t believe in God?”
Researcher: Yes, that is why many people in Europe maybe don’t believe 
in God because they cannot find proof that God exists, because science 
is all about proving things and if you believe that you have to prove 
something before it can exist, you might lose faith in God. And instead 
you focus on science and technology. What do you think about science 
Leboi?
Leboi: I do not know the meaning of science. Probably you learn about 
that when you get education.
Researcher: Okay, well for example this climate change is based on 
scientific findings by measuring the temperature and rainfall.
Leboi: If these scientists are saying that climate change is happening, I 
can say it is true, these men may be correct in some things maybe. But if 
those scientists are saying there is no God, they are wrong. Because when 
I was growing up my parents never told me that God was present. But 
one day when I was still very young I was walking in the forest. I was 
alone. Suddenly, a very big and dangerous snake appeared and then I 
screamed: “Eng’ai ai! Oh my God”. I just mentioned it. So, I questioned 
myself and wondered: if my soul [oltau] itself seems to know about God, 
then really She must be present.
Leboi: So if these scientists say that God does not exist, do they have a 
different God?
Leboi’s confusion about the meaning of science was quite common; 
several others inquired about it too. And despite the scientific rationale 
that dominated these climate-change explanations, according to my 
informants it was impossible as well as completely senseless to reduce 
the narrative solely to a secular causality. The sheer idea of having no 
God (as those scientists and some NGO workers appear to claim) must 
mean that they have at least a different God, as Leboi’s oltau has revealed 
to him. The ways in which climate-change discourse and its scientific 
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underpinnings is translated by different mediators (radio makers, NGOs, 
educators, government officials, scientists, etc.) can be characterized 
as a hermetically sealed ontology in which human-induced climate 
change has discarded God as a causal agent or final moral arbiter. This 
explanation or translation does not resonate with the ways in which the 
villagers of Terrat perceive and relate to the climate, which is a cosmology 
based on inclusivity and continued transcendence. While for some it 
seemed possible to embrace (at least parts of) the new cosmological 
configuration called climate change—including a new vocabulary that 
speaks of industries, CO2, and the atmosphere—nature’s entanglements 
remain characterized by inclusivity, with Eng’ai as the seat of life and 
rain. This particular translation of climate change seeks to dislodge the 
weight of a relationship between rain, God and society, with a profane 
worldview emptied of God and purged of “superstition”. The scientific 
complexity of the story also played a part in the demystification of 
nature. From Leboi’s account we also learn that accepting or rejecting 
climate change is not a binary choice. His meaning-making process is 
agentive, as he put forward his own conditions within which he can 
accept (a part of) this new prophecy. In other words, he is willing to 
accept the explanation for the idea that the weather/climate is changing, 
but not if he cannot stay true to his own set of values. 
The example of Rebecca, a middle-aged Maasai woman living in 
Terrat, exemplifies a more general point about causality. We met Rebecca 
in Arusha during one of the many climate change workshops in which 
my research partner and I participated. Several Maasai villagers attended 
this workshop from different regions along with a few researchers and 
NGO workers. During the meeting, which was designed to sensitize 
grassroots people to the subject of climate change, I wondered what 
residents of a village like Terrat would possibly make of these graphs, 
models and statistics presented to them in PowerPoint. After we realized 
that one of the participants lived in Terrat, we got the chance to ask 
her these questions once we were back home. She explained that she 
was invited by PINGOs, the organizing NGO, after attending a village 
meeting in Terrat. When we asked her what she thought about climate 
change she replied: “It was very tough to learn about climate change 
because it was my first time and it was very complicated. But I myself 
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cannot know what causes these changes. Only God knows. Only God is 
the One who changes everything”.
For Rebecca, Eng’ai remains axiomatic in the ultimate judgment 
of the world, manifested in the weather. Similar to the process of 
embracing Christianity, the new climate-change discourse involves 
several approaches to belief and understanding that are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Leboi contends that the realm of rain is under the 
purview of Eng’ai and cannot be explained by science alone: human 
beings or industries might play a role in destroying the environment, 
but it is up to God whether to endow people with rain or not. In a 
similar vein, villagers perceived the role of scientists (at least what they 
were told about science and scientists)—who not only claim to be able 
to predict the weather, but also discard the existence of God—as some 
sort of self-declared apotheosis, the ultimate form of hubris. For indeed, 
nobody but God can decide about the rain and the climate. One of the 
schoolteachers who measures rainfall in Terrat explained to us that 
“People do not trust the information from the weather forecast on the 
radio because they do not know where they get the information from. 
Because there is no communication with God. Only if they communicate 
with God will they trust it”. A middle-aged man (here mzee, Swahili 
for older man) who seriously questioned the notion of climate change 
asked me the following revealing questions:
Mzee: We hear nowadays that scientists say there is no God, is it true?
Researcher: Yes. Some at least. […]
Mzee: I think there is a God because She is the one who created us. Do 
you have an oloiboni in your country? […]
Researcher: No. Not really […]
Mzee: In your country there is no rainfall? Because in our country we 
say the rain comes from God. How do you explain rain? What about a 
thunderstorm? We say that it is God talking. What about in your country?
Researcher: We say that it is just friction between hot and cold air. 
Mzee: Ai, ai, ai, it seems that science is really trying to say there is no 
God at all!
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The role of the scientist is perceived as a self-declared “weather 
prophet” and is therefore rejected, for he assumes to be able to unearth 
God’s secret and thus incorporate Her power. It appeared that some 
cognizant informants were (in their own ways) able to relate to the 
scientific rationale underpinning climate change and its anthropogenic 
origin, and to take it seriously. But the notion that science could develop 
models for the future was irreconcilable with their own worldview. Eli, 
a forty-year-old man, explained:
I have heard about climate change on the radio. First of all, temperatures 
have increased. And also rainfall has declined. Industries which emit 
fumes in the atmosphere are causing this climate change to occur. And 
also, the application of weapons, explosive weapons during the war 
which turn the ground soil to come up. And also, cutting down of trees. 
[…] But nobody can answer the question how it will be in the future, 
because nobody can predict.
Although the church leader has taken over the ritual power to pray 
for rain from the oloiboni, the deification of the latter ultimately led to 
his own symbolic (and institutional) downgrading. Thus, whereas the 
pastor now assumes only a mediating role, the oloiboni has been taken to 
task for claiming to possess prophetic qualities, inspired by the Christian 
values that have been propagated. The fate of the scientist—who not 
only intervenes in the realm of Eng’ai by claiming to have forecasting 
skills, but at times even denies the existence of God altogether—seems 
to be similarly disqualified. 
Yet the fact that people did not express “trust” in science and 
scientists does not mean they discarded all anthropogenic causes of 
climate change. As mentioned before, there has always been a strong 
bond between society, morals and nature, which means that humans 
do have agency to bring about cosmological harmony. From historical 
sources, we learn that Eng’ai (as in God, sky and rain) had a dialectical 
relationship of mutual dependency with enkop (the land or earth). So 
there was a complementarity between Eng’ai and enkop, heaven and 
earth; both possessed the agency to alter and maintain the relationship, 
for both humans and Eng’ai created and nurtured life (Hodgson 2005). 
So, bringing deforestation, population growth, and even industries 
and CO2 into the causal chain of blame and pollution beliefs was for 
some informants acceptable and reconcilable with their own “prior 
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commitments”. But discarding Eng’ai as an agentive force was considered 
to be a true disenchantment of the world. 
The traditional leader who was very well aware about climate-
change discourse, contested the initial Maa translation proposed by the 
radio station workers, engibelekenyata engijape engop [a change of air and 
earth]. He proposed a remarkable alternative: engibelekenyata (a change 
by Eng’ai). He explained: “You talk about rainfall, plants, temperature. 
Is there anybody who can change these things? No! Only God!” He also 
contended that the official Swahili version should not be translated 
literally (mabadiliko ya tabia nchi). As he stated: “Nchi [meaning country, 
earth or ground] is referring to us, but it is not us. We should not try to 
translate directly, because it will be misleading. You should look at what 
this means for us”. According to the traditional leader, while explaining 
that industries are the principle cause of climate change, the domain of 
rain, air, and sky (or heaven) is, ultimately, in the hands of Eng’ai (De 
Wit 2018). 
Concluding Reflections
Recently, scholars have begun to critique attempts that view religion as 
the basis for climate denial/rejection and thus merely as barriers in the 
larger pursuit of adaptation. What these perspectives share is the idea 
of a somewhat passive recipient whose local belief system stands in the 
way of a correct interpretation of climate change (Fair 2018; Kempf 2017; 
Donner 2007). Instead, I argue against this purification and rather wish 
to foreground the need for what Fair calls, “the potential for more-than-
scientific yet not anti-scientific responses that are locally meaningful and 
morally compelling” (Fair 2018: 11). More critical scholars have recently 
identified different explanations for denial, such as in-group blame 
and trajectory narratives of decline (Rudiak-Gould 2014; 2013), or the 
incommensurability between specific spatio/temporal configurations 
(Rubow and Bird 2016); or the extent to which it offends a separation 
between sky and earth (Donner 2007). According to Donner (2007), 
denial and skepticism are a philosophical problem and are due to the 
conflict between an idea of human-induced climate change on the 
one hand, and the ancient belief that earth and sky are two separate 
domains on the other (Donner 2007). Donner’s point seems to hold true 
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in Maasailand, yet there appears to be room for a “negotiated reading” 
(Hall 1980)25 in which an interpretation becomes possible that is not 
necessarily antithetical to science. This means that, for example, both 
the industries and moral decay within society can be blamed for climate 
change, while at the same time it is in God’s hand to express and define 
the directionality of this change. By moving away from the idea that the 
public has a “knowledge deficit”, the emancipatory potential of public 
engagement approaches such as reception studies, lies in the fact that it 
sees the “plurality of perspectives among the lay public as the place to 
debate and build democratic consensus” (Bravo 2009: 4).
In this vein, I propose that the traditional leader’s pronouncement 
that “You should look at what this [climate change] means for us, the 
Maasai” is the Maasai prerogative for translating climate change. I 
have argued that the overall lack of climate-change discourses can only 
partly be explained by an absent state that continues to neglect one of 
the country’s most marginalized populations. As such, global climate 
narratives that foreground crisis scenarios do not resonate with local 
concerns, as people have other pressing issues to deal with: they lack 
the most basic access to health care, education, water, land, pastures, 
infrastructure, medication, vaccination and so on (De Wit 2018). In this 
chapter, I have argued that we need to examine the complex set of prior 
commitments—including entanglements, ruptures and continuities—
that shape how this new narrative is appropriated, received and 
translated. I have sought to explore the historically produced norms of the 
Maasai villagers of Terrat within the broader historical, environmental 
and socio-cultural “interpretive context”, as well as epistemological and 
ontological dimensions that account for the possible incompatibilities 
between (the translation of) global discourses and local realities. 
Against the background of the longstanding marginalization of the 
Maasai and increasing pressure from a globalizing world, (partial) 
rejection of climate change as an incipient new doomsday scenario 
about the world should not be understood as a form of ignorance, but 
25  Literary theorist Stuart Hall, who is closely associated with reception studies, 
proposed a communication model of encoding and decoding as a form of literary 
analysis in media studies. He focused on the key role of the reader/viewer, exploring 
the possible degree of negotiation and opposition among the audience and 
distinguishing three positions: (1) dominant (hegemonic) code; (2) oppositional 
(counter-hegemonic) code; (3) negotiated code (Hall 1980). 
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rather as an emergent knowledge space that affords agentive potential 
for resistance. In line with cultural theory’s basic commitments, risk 
perceptions emerge in ways that enable people to stay true to one’s own 
set of values. Comparable to Rudiak-Gould’s findings in the Marshall 
Islands, among the Maasai in Terrat a culturalist narrative of decline, 
embedded in a gentle eschatology, speaks lamentably about the Maasai’s 
historical engagement with the forces of modernity (e.g. Hodgson 
2011), leading to in-group blame about the loss of respect (enkanyit) in 
society. Yet, contrary to the Marshall Islanders who almost unanimously 
embrace the new prophecy, the Maasai picture appears to be more 
heterogeneous and fraught with friction and incommensurability. This 
means that prior commitments alone cannot account for or predict how 
interpretation (ultimately) takes place, but more attention is needed 
for a contextual or empirical hermeneutics that explores the dynamic 
appropriation process within which reading and explaining takes place. 
I have demonstrated that the Maasai’s relationship to the climate (as 
an element of the complex entanglements between Christianity and 
Maasai cosmology) remains embedded in an inclusive ontology in 
which society, morals and nature are interwoven—a way of living that 
ceases to make sense when purged of Eng’ai. The relatively new field of 
reception studies in climate anthropology is only beginning to reveal its 
potential to understand the various contextual factors that shape how 
people interpret and give meaning to the contemporary idea of climate 
change. 
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6. Living on the Frontier: 
Laypeople’s Perceptions and 
Communication of Climate Change in 
the Coastal Region of Bangladesh
Shameem Mahmud
Despite an increased number of studies on public perceptions of climate 
change, little attention has been paid to the development of public 
understanding of climate change in developing and less-developed 
countries, which have contributed comparatively few greenhouse gas 
emissions. This chapter addresses this gap in the literature by exploring 
how people understand climate-change risks in an area at their 
forefront—the coastal region of Bangladesh. The study draws on in-depth 
interviews of local citizens and field observations. The interviews reveal 
a recurring theme of localizing climate-change risks in the context of local 
geohazards. Laypeople’s personal exposure to extreme weather events, 
and experiences of seasonal variances, influence their interpretations of 
mediated and non-mediated climate change information. The risks of 
local geohazards are readily available as prior constructs in respondents’ 
minds, and are intensified by newly acquired knowledge of climate 
change. The chapter concludes that laypeople’s perceptions of climate-
change impacts in Bangladesh are constructed on the basis of their place 
identity, on the one hand, and the frequency of regional geohazards, on 
the other.
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Introduction
Research on public perceptions of climate-change risks began in the 
late 1980s with the assumption that increased public understanding 
would help people make conscious livelihood decisions (Ockwell, 
Whitmarsh, and O’Neill 2009). Public perceptions have also been 
regarded as an important factor in making policy decisions to mitigate 
the risk of climate change (Leiserowitz 2006). The burgeoning climate 
change risk perception literature has identified paradoxical divergences 
between increased awareness and declining concern (Capstick et al. 
2015; Poortinga et al. 2011; Whitmarsh 2011); misconceptions about 
the causes, impacts, and solutions to climate change (Leiserowitz 
and Smith 2010; Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006; Kempton 1997, 1991); 
scientific complexity and uncertainty (Etkin and Ho 2007; Weber 2006); 
perceptions of climate change as a spatially distant and temporally 
future risk (Whitmarsh and Upham 2013; Ockwell, Whitmarsh, and 
O’Neill 2009); and limited public behavioral responses to mitigate 
risks (Semenza et al. 2008; Lorenzoni, Nicholson Cole, and Whitmarsh 
2007) despite different communication strategies (van der Linden 2014; 
Neverla and Taddicken 2011). 
Despite a considerable increase in the number of studies exploring 
public understanding of climate change, few have examined the 
perceptions of people living in developing countries that are more 
vulnerable to (but less responsible for) climate change (Moser 2016, 
2010). Previous studies can explain public understanding of climate 
change only in the countries largely perceived as responsible for the 
problem due to their greenhouse gas emissions (Neverla, Lüthje, and 
Mahmud 2012; Moser 2010). It is particularly interesting to explore 
public perceptions in countries where people are constantly exposed to 
regional geohazards such as storms, floods, and salinization that may 
increase and intensify as a consequence of climate change. This chapter 
addresses this research gap by investigating how the population of the 
coastal region of Bangladesh describes, explains, and understands the 
effects of climate change in the context of constant exposure to regional 
geohazards. It also investigates major information sources of climate 
change communication, which may affect laypeople’s perceptions. 
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This research posits that, although climate change has emerged as 
a recent concern, the risks of regional geohazards are not new to the 
people living in this area. The effect of human-induced climate change 
will be to increase the likelihood or strength of such hazards. It is 
also reasonable to argue that increased communication about climate 
change, through journalistic media and other communication channels, 
may cause people living in these vulnerable areas to redefine their 
relationship with regional geohazards. 
The chapter begins with a brief outline of Bangladesh’s risks of 
natural hazards and vulnerability to climate change. Based on the 
extant literature, it then analyzes the role of respondents’ geographic 
location and personal experience of natural hazards in influencing 
public perceptions of climate change. This review is followed by a 
description of the methodological design of the study. The research 
reveals a common social construct: the localization of climate-change 
risks within the context of local geohazards. Laypeople reveal that 
experiences of local hazards as well as personally observed weather 
and seasonal variances play important roles in their interpretations of 
mediated climate change information. This leads to the argument that 
laypeople’s perceptions of climate-change impacts in the coastal region 
of Bangladesh are constructed on the basis of their place identity, on 
the one hand, and their experience of regional geohazards, on the 
other.
Bangladesh’s Vulnerability to Climate Change 
Although climate change poses global risks, these risks are not equally 
distributed around the world. Even different regions of a country 
may have different levels of vulnerability. Climate scientists have 
addressed this inequality by examining possible regional variability 
in the effects of climate change (Von Storch et al. 2011; Rannow et al. 
2010; Rummukainen 2010). It has been widely documented that some 
developing countries may experience more severe impacts of global 
warming—in the forms of extreme weather, sea level rise, decreasing 
agricultural outputs, human health costs, and economic hardships—
than developed countries (IPCC 2014; Mertz et al. 2009; UNFCCC 
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2007; Mirza 2003; Rosenzweig and Parry 1994; see also Chapter 7, 
Attribution Science).
Inequalities in the distribution of climate-change risks are 
exacerbated by limited hazard management capacities in developing 
countries (Adger et al. 2013; Nagel, Dietz, and Broadbent 2008; Ali 
1999). Bangladesh holds a prominent position in the global imagination 
as being at the forefront of climate-change risks, given its geographic 
location, socio-economic characteristics, and natural hazard profile 
(Khan et al. 2011; Karim and Mimura 2008; Ali 1996). Many of its 
residents are experiencing the impacts of climate change (Coirolo et 
al. 2013); millions of people living in the country’s coastal areas have 
been dubbed “climate victims” in political and civil society discourses 
(Walsham 2010; Friedman 2009). 
Bangladesh is situated between two different, but mutually 
linked, geomorphological conditions. To the north, the Himalayan 
glaciers threaten to flood the country; more than 80% of its lands are 
floodplains (Brammer, Asaduzzaman, and Sultana 1996). To the south, 
the Bay of Bengal remains the source of notorious storms and storm 
surges that have made Bangladesh one of the most natural-hazard-
prone countries in the world. Global warming is expected to increase 
the trends and frequencies of tropical storms (Schellnhuber 2007) 
in addition to raising the sea level, thereby affecting the country’s 
densely populated coastal areas (Ahmed and Islam 2013). Residents 
of this area are frequently subjected to natural hazards in the form of 
tropical cyclones, floods, increased salinity in water and soil, storm 
surges and coastal erosion. Severe flooding that covers over 60% of the 
country occurs every four to five years, and a severe tropical cyclone 
hits, on average, every three years (MoEF 2009). Tropical cyclones in 
1970 and 1991 are estimated to have killed 300,000 and 140,000 people, 
respectively. 
Bangladesh is one of the few developing countries that has 
formulated a national climate change strategy plan (MoEF 2009). 
Discussions are ongoing to update the 2009 Bangladesh Climate 
Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) to accommodate 
changing circumstances. The BCCSAP identifies the following risks 
of climate change in Bangladesh: (i) increased frequency of tropical 
cyclones; (ii) heavier and more erratic rainfall; (iii) lower and more 
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erratic rainfall; (iv) sea level rise leading to the inundation of low-lying 
coastal areas displacing millions of people and paving the way for 
saline water intrusion; (v) warmer and more humid weather leading 
to an increased prevalence of disease; and (vi) increased intensity of 
drought in the country’s northern and western areas. Vulnerability 
to these risks is further increased by the country’s high population 
density. It is the world’s eighth most populous (and one of the most 
densely populated) countries, with an estimated 162 million people 
living in an area of 147,570 km2 (UNDP 2016). Around 70% of the 
population live in rural areas. Based on any development indicator, 
Bangladesh is a poor country. Its per capita income is US $1,080 per 
year (UNDP 2014), and more than 63 million people live below the 
poverty line (UNDP 2016). The overall adult literacy rate is only 58%. 
The economy is based on agriculture, which contributes about 22% to 
the country’s GDP and employs 46% of its labour force (Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics 2014). Ready-made garment exports account for 
about 80% of total export earnings (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 
2014). 
Climate Change Risk Perception: The Role of 
“Distances” and “Experiences of Extreme Weather” 
Public perceptions of and communication on climate change is a very 
complex research field. This complexity represents a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, climate change communication shares features 
with other communication fields, most importantly, risk communication, 
health communication, and science communication. On the other 
hand, research on public perceptions of climate change is enriched by 
the contributions of various disciplinary traditions, such as human 
geography, and social and cognitive psychology (Nerlich, Koteyko, and 
Brown 2010). A detailed literature review of the field is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. Since one of the main objectives of the current research 
is to explore perceptions of the people living near natural hazards, this 
section focuses on research related to the role of location or distance from 
the risk (also see Chapter 4, Germany) and personal experience of extreme 
weather in constructing climate change risk perception. 
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Location or Distance from the Risk
Risk perception research widely demonstrates a correlation between the 
spatial proximity of risk and individuals’ risk perceptions. For example, 
people living on the coastline or in flood-prone areas tend to express 
more concerns about the potential risks of natural hazards compared to 
those living in protected areas (Wester-Herber 2004). Similarly, people 
living close to nuclear power plants perceive the risk of nuclear hazards 
more seriously than those living further away (Venables et al. 2012), 
which clearly indicates the role of physical proximity to the origin of 
the risk. The notion of “proximity” or “distance”, however, may also 
encompass temporal, social, and hypothetical dimensions. Trope and 
Liberman (2010), in their “construal-level theory of psychological 
distance”, outline four key dimensions that might influence one’s 
understanding and evaluation of risk events and issues: spatial or 
geographic distance, hypothetical or likelihood distance, temporal 
distance, and social distance. 
The first dimension, spatial or geographic distance, is linked to the 
physical environment and location: people perceive climate-change 
risks as either (too) close to them or as something that will occur in 
more remote locations. Brody et al.  (2008) and Kumar and Geneletti’s 
(2015) studies on coastal inhabitants’ climate change risk perceptions in 
the United States and India, respectively, found that people’s physical 
location determines their level of concern about potential risk. There 
is also evidence that geographic proximity to the coast influences 
behavioral intentions to reduce carbon dioxide emissions on a personal 
level (Brody, Grover, and Vedlitz 2012). The role of spatial distance 
from the risk has been further demonstrated in studies examining 
the perception of natural hazards (Lorenzoni, Nicholson Cole, and 
Whitmatsh 2007; Weber 2006; Montz 1982), which have concluded that 
people living close to the geographic origin of hazards are more likely to 
take precautionary measures. 
The second dimension, likelihood or hypothetical distance, relates 
to the probability that an event will occur (Liberman and Förster 2011). 
This can be compared to the “uncertainty” aspect of climate change. 
Existing research finds widespread public awareness and high levels 
of perceived concern since climate change emerged as a major policy 
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issue in the late 1980s (Nisbet and Myers 2007; Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 
2006). However, this high level of perceived concern was not stable; 
public concern about climate change has been found to fluctuate over 
this time. Jasanoff (2010) reported a widening gap between the public 
and experts in assessments of climate-change risks when laypeople 
were losing faith in climate science and showing a lower level of 
concern compared to other socio-economic risks. Other studies also 
report that while public awareness of (or familiarity with) climate 
change is increasing, concern about the issue has been fluctuating since 
the late 2000s, particularly in many developed countries (Capstick et 
al. 2015; Poortinga et al. 2011; Whitmarsh 2011). Pidgeon (2012) found 
that misleading media representations and the global financial crisis of 
2008 and 2009 contributed to declining public concern about the issue. 
Some people also question whether climate change exists, and whether 
it is caused by human activity. Whitmarsh (2008b), for example, found 
that although the outright rejection of climate change among residents 
of the South of England was not widespread, a considerable number of 
people expressed some degree of uncertainty about its possible effects. 
The third dimension that might influence people’s understanding 
and evaluation of risk is “social” distances, which describe the extent to 
which people perceive the risks of climate change as applying to others 
rather than themselves. A number of studies drawing on cases from 
Europe and the United States have found that people generally perceive 
climate-change risks to be a global problem (Gifford et al. 2009; Uzzell 
2000), which has serious implications for distant locations (Spence 
et al. 2011; Spence and Pidgeon 2010), where “other people” would 
be affected (see Chapter 2, Greenland). People in vulnerable regions, 
however, express more concern about the local impact of climate change 
(Dunlap, Gallup, and Gallup 1993). 
Finally, Trope and Liberman’s (2010) fourth dimension, temporal 
distance, refers to whether an event is likely to happen now or in the 
future. Temporal distance may explain whether the public perceives 
climate change as a current or future risk. According to previous studies, 
many inhabitants of developed countries do not perceive climate change 
as a significant personal risk because they think it will affect them far in 
the future, while it is more immediate for people living in geographically 
distant countries (Spence, Poortinga, and Pidgeon 2012; Leiserowitz 
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2006; Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006; Whitmarsh 2005; Bord, O’Connor, 
and Fisher 2000).
Experience of Extreme Weather 
Climate change is a gradual and long-term phenomenon that is 
difficult to experience and observe in daily life. Yet most people 
describe concerns about climate change using evidence from personal 
experiences and observations (van der Linden 2014). Changes in 
weather patterns and extreme weather events are two possible impacts 
of climate change, which are often discussed in scientific and political 
arenas. These discourses are transferred to the public through news 
media and other communication channels. Eventually, laypeople 
recall their personal experiences of weather variances and natural 
hazard events when evaluating mediated knowledge of climate-
change risks (Kempton 1997). Several studies support the notion 
that individuals’ direct experiences and exposure to unusual weather 
events are important determinants of risk perception (see Chapter 
2, Greenland; Lawrence, Quade, and Becker 2014; Lujala, Lein, and 
Rød 2014; Reser, Bradley, and Ellul 2014; Barnett and Breakwell 2001).
Social psychologists describe this phenomenon as “the availability 
heuristic”: personal experience of a recent natural hazard and heavy 
media coverage of it are likely to influence future risk evaluations 
(Slovic 1987; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). 
Research Design 
Study Location
This study was conducted in two adjacent unions1—Gabura and 
Padmapukur in Shyamnagar Upazila sub-district of the Satkhira district. 
Satkhira is a southwestern coastal district in Bangladesh located close 
to the world’s largest mangrove forest—the Sundarbans. Both unions 
share similar characteristics in terms of the socio-economic conditions 
1  A union is the lowest tier of the local government system in Bangladesh, consisting 
of a number of villages. At present there are 4,480 unions, which are run by directly 
elected representatives.
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of their inhabitants, rural livelihood patterns, occupations, and 
vulnerability to natural hazards. Like other coastal regions, the villages 
in these unions are built on low-lying lands and are often protected 
by mud embankments. The area symbolizes human struggles against 
nature and the predators of the Sundarbans. Inhabitants of the area 
struggle with tigers and crocodiles when gathering resources from the 
mangrove forest, and are regularly exposed to natural hazards such as 
storms, storm surges, and intrusion of saltwater. The most notorious 
storms in the area were recorded in 1970, 1985, 1988, 1991, 2007, and 
2009. While some affluent community members can afford houses 
made of brick and corrugated tin, most people in the study locations 
live in houses made of mud walls, bamboo and thatch, or roofs made 
of corrugated tin and thatch. 
Fig. 6.1 A typical house structure made of local materials (photo by 
author, March 2012), CC-BY-4.0.
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Fig. 6.2 Paddy fields are turned into saltwater shrimp enclosures (photo 
by author, March 2012), CC-BY-4.0.
For livelihood, people used to depend on rice cultivation, and resources 
of the Sundarbans and adjacent rivers (e.g., fish, crab, honey, and 
wood). However, in the last two decades, most of the agricultural lands 
have been transformed into shrimp enclosures given the higher profit 
margins. Similar to other rural areas of Bangladesh, nearly half of the 
population in the study area are unable to read and write. The poverty-
struck villages are also characterized by a lack of infrastructure and 
poor health and education facilities, like many other coastal areas of 
Bangladesh. 
Data Collection
Given the limited research on climate change perceptions in non-
Western countries, data for this study were gathered using an 
inductive approach. The main data source was interviews, which were 
supplemented by prolonged field observations and notes. Interview 
participants were recruited following the strategy of theoretical 
sampling as suggested in Grounded Theory methodology (Charmaz 
2006). I approached people for interviews who had comparatively 
more experiences of the social phenomena under study. A research 
guide, a local journalist, helped me find respondents and organize the 
initial interviews. 
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The first five interviewees included a schoolteacher (male), a local 
community leader (male), a shopkeeper (male), a non-governmental 
organization (NGO) field worker (female), and an elderly person 
(male). Once the initial interviews highlighted a general trajectory 
(identifying initial theoretical categories), the sampling technique 
was changed. In the second phase, the theoretical sampling technique 
was applied to saturate the missing lines of the identified theoretical 
categories with additional data. A total of thirty-eight people (twenty-
six male and twelve female) were interviewed at their place of 
residence, which facilitated observation of the study location as well as 
the dynamic social relations of the study participants at the community 
level. The respondents included schoolteachers, a local community 
leader, NGO workers, shopkeepers, shrimp farmers, crab farmers, 
fishermen, and housewives. At least five held graduate degrees, three 
persons studied up to the twelfth grade, nine respondents studied 
between the sixth and tenth grades, four up to the fifth grade, and the 
remaining seventeen respondents were either illiterate or functionally 
literate. 
There were three defined periods of data collection, which spanned 
from early 2011 to mid-2013. All the interviews were conducted in 
person in the local language (Bangla) and recorded using a digital 
audio recorder with the prior permission of the respondents. Then, the 
initial interviews were transcribed, with coding and analysis initiated 
with the first interviews, in accordance with Grounded Theory 
methodology techniques. The interview data were analyzed following 
the basic tenets of Grounded Theory, starting with open coding to 
focused coding, and ending in theoretical abstraction (Charmaz 
2006) (see Table 6.1). The entire data analysis was conducted using 
the original Bangla transcriptions to avoid any distortion of the data 
due to translation. However, selected excerpts of the interviews were 
translated into English to present in this chapter.
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Findings
Two major patterns of public perceptions of climate-change impacts 
emerged from the interviews. First, the regional (geo)hazard pattern 
explains laypeople’s understanding of climate-change impacts within 
the context of local geohazards. This research found three distinct social 
constructs that linked the impacts of climate change to local events of 
geohazards: “climate change as increased and unprecedented storms”, 
“climate change as drowning in the sea”, and “climate change means 
increased salinity”. Second, the weather and seasonal variances pattern 
of climate-change impacts describes how the respondents attributed 
personal experiences of changes in local weather and seasons to climate 
change. These two patterns of perceptions, and examples of social 
constructs for each, are discussed in turn.
Climate Change as Regional (Geo)Hazards
Increased and Unprecedented Storms 
The most common impact of climate change reported by respondents 
was storms—a frequent geohazard in the study area during the pre- 
and post-monsoon seasons. Respondents generally believed that storms 
and tidal floods in the region were caused by climate change, and that 
similar events would continue to increase in the future. They drew a 
causal link between storms and climate change, although climate science 
still struggles to clearly establish a link between a specific storm event 
and climate change (see Chapter 7, Attribution Science). This scientific 
uncertainty, however, did not prevent laypeople from making this link: 
“Climate change means to me storms. I’ve also heard about floods, rains, 
water and other disasters. But storms are the main” (Jaheda Akhtar, 
forty, F, illiterate, housewife).
A male shrimp farmer was similarly confident in the certainty of 
climate change and its impacts on the region: “Of course climate change 
is real. The reason I am saying this, actually we can see it by ourselves. It 
is already a reality for us. We are going through more storms and more 
[tidal] surges” (Avinash Mondol, forty-two, M, third grade, shrimp 
farmer). Likewise, a female NGO official supported the link between 
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climate change and storms: “It’s the storm that comes to my mind. There 
are other disasters, but storms are most important. I think other people 
have the same idea and they know it now that storms are results of 
climate change” (Shaheena Akhter, thirty-eight, F, MA, NGO worker).
Linking climate change and storms was so obvious that a number 
of respondents used the terms “climate” and “storms” synonymously 
while describing the possible impacts of climate change. This illustrates 
how strongly the natural hazard aspect of climate change is embedded 
in respondents’ minds, likely due to respondents’ physical proximity 
to previous storm events. For example: “Climate has been increased in 
recent years because of temperature rise. You can see it here. We didn’t 
have such harsh climate in the past, but in recent times it has been 
increased. I mean the storms” (Gazi Mohhamad Ayub, thirty-two, M, 
ninth grade, unemployed).
The perceived link between climate change and storms was further 
demonstrated when some respondents explained that it was only the 
recent storm events and tidal floods that made it clear to them how 
“dreadful” the impacts of climate change would be. They described 
the effects as “immediate” and identified a temporal proximity to the 
risks of climate change. A female crab farmer said: “Honestly, it was not 
very clear to me when people talked about climate change. But, after 
the cyclone Aila now I can understand what it would like to be. Aila 
actually brought it [climate change] to us” (Maloti Mondol, forty-two, 
F, illiterate, crab farmer).
When respondents experience extreme weather events, they use 
their previous knowledge of climate change to attribute the event to 
this hitherto abstract phenomenon. When they were reminded that 
the geographic location of the area made it naturally susceptible to 
storms and tidal floods, most respondents agreed, but pointed to 
the “unprecedented” nature of recent storms and their “increased 
frequency”, which compelled them to believe that the recent storms 
were linked to climate change. One elderly male respondent noted: “Of 
course you can say that. Storms have always been part of our life. But, 
nature of storms must have been changed. I have never experienced 
this kind of storm in my lifetime” (Moksed Ali, sixty-four, M, illiterate, 
unemployed). Another elderly respondent referred to changing patterns 
of storms as evidence of climate-change impacts. “Now they [storms] 
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come without any sign. It’s very difficult to predict nowadays” (Abul 
Hossain Mollah, seventy-nine, M, eighth grade, retired government 
employee). Another indicator was the perceived increased frequency of 
storms that many respondents attributed to climate change. “We didn’t 
experience storms so frequently in the past… … now what we heard 
about impacts of climate change” (Mohasheikh Sardar, forty-four, M, 
functional literacy, shrimp and agriculture farmer).
The respondents’ descriptions clearly indicated that while storms 
had always impacted coastal people long before the debate on 
anthropogenic climate change, they believed that the rate and intensity 
of storms had recently started to increase. Persistent storms were one 
of the main motivations for drawing such perceptual constructs when 
respondents viewed the impacts of global climate change through the 
lens of local geohazards. 
Drowning in the Sea 
After increased storm events, “drowning in the sea” was the second-
most widely cited social construct of climate change. Respondents 
believed that global warming-induced sea level rise would someday 
inundate large parts of Bangladesh’s low-lying coastal areas. They 
often equated regular tidal surges with “sea level rise”, and provided a 
number of personally observed changes that they believed were impacts 
of climate change. Some respondents gave detailed accounts of how 
global warming-led melting ice at the poles and mountains was affecting 
low-lying countries like Bangladesh. A shrimp farmer, for example, 
attributed the link between global warming and ice melting as follows: 
“I heard that ice is being melted because of rising temperature. Now, all 
the water from the melted ice is flowing downstream and flooding us” 
(SM Yunus Ali, fifty-five, M, illiterate, shrimp farmer).
Respondents obtained knowledge of “increased temperature”, 
“ice melting”, and “sea level rise” from a number of communication 
sources, such as media, NGOs, and local opinion leaders. Thereafter, the 
obtained knowledge was reconstructed through personal observations 
and experiences at the local level. Throughout the process, we observed 
a pattern of “localizing climate-change impacts” as a common social 
construct. As explained by a local community leader: “Let me give 
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you an example. There are chars [river islands] near the Sundarbans. 
We have seen in the past that these chars didn’t drown even in high 
tides. But now they totally disappear even in winter when the tides 
are not very high… what does it mean? Of course, the height of water 
has increased” (GM Rafiqul Islam, forty-one, M, twelfth grade, local 
community leader).
The attribution of “heightened water as an impact of climate change”, 
however, was not prevalent in all respondents’ descriptions. Apart from 
the impacts of climate change, some respondents cited “unplanned” 
water management at the local and regional levels as a major cause of 
flooding in the area. For example, shortly after attributing tidal surges 
to global warming, an elderly male respondent added: “I think some 
unplanned dikes and dams are also contributing to the rising water” 
(Abul Hossain Mollah, seventy, M, eighth grade, retired government 
employee). 
A related prompt asked the respondent to elaborate, and he replied: 
This is my personal observation. In the last decades, a number of dikes 
and barrages have been built both in India and Bangladesh. These dikes 
have hampered the natural flow of rivers and created chars [river islands] 
with increased siltation …How can the water flow to the sea when the 
rivers are filled up? Right? You see there is not enough space in the rivers 
to accommodate additional water (Abul Hossain Mollah, seventy, M, 
eighth grade, retired government employee).
The respondent then referred to the natural fight between fresh water 
and seawater, and how the seawater has been winning lately to intrude 
further into the country: 
In the past, the strength of the current in rivers was stronger than the 
high tides from the sea. Now, the situation is opposite. The strength of 
the high tides from the sea is winning against the current of river water 
because rivers do not have strong currents. As a result, seawater is coming 
more inside the lands (Abul Hossain Mollah, 70, M, eighth grade, retired 
government employee).
This respondent’s observation gave an important insight into local 
causes of rising water in the rivers, an attribution that was shared by 
many other interviewees. A female NGO worker provided more insights 
into this “unplanned” water management issue:
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There was something like the green revolution in the 1986–87 for creating 
more croplands and irrigation. A lot of sluice gates were made at that 
time and a lot of dikes and dams to divert and manage river water for 
irrigation. They actually halted the natural flow of water. Because of 
these dikes and sluice gates, sediments cannot flow to the sea. They are 
being deposited in the riverbeds which ultimately decreases the water 
and sediment-carrying capacity of rivers Shaheena Akhter, thirty-eight, 
F, MA, NGO worker).
However, this sort of attribution did not overrule the climate change-
induced sea level rise. Rather, respondents believed that the diversion 
of river water at the local and regional levels was escalating the siltation 
and tidal flooding for which climate change was equally blamed. A 
fisherman, for example, asserted: “You can say both—climate change 
and the unplanned dikes are causing floods” (Gazi Nur Uddin, forty-
five, M, functional literacy, fishing and forestry). 
The data clearly demonstrate that two different yet mutual social 
constructs prevail among residents of this area. One was grounded in 
their newly acquired knowledge of climate-change impacts: they believed 
the water levels had risen because of ice melting at the poles and in the 
Himalayan mountains. The second set of perceptions originates from 
the respondents’ personal observations of the local water management 
system and sediment deposition in the riverbeds that they believed were 
detrimental to the natural water flow. 
Increased Salinity 
Salinity in water and soil is a common geohazard in the study area 
primarily because of its proximity to seawater. During every high 
tide, the seawater from the Bay of Bengal enters the coastal estuaries 
and flows up to one-hundred kilometers into the mainland through 
rivers and tributaries. In this process, seawater mixes with the fresh 
water of the downstream rivers of the Himalayas. The strength of tides 
from the sea and the current of downstream rivers play important 
roles in determining the level of salinity of water in the coastal region. 
Tidal surges of the sea tend to be more powerful than river currents. 
Respondents seemed to understand this natural process of salinization, 
but most seemed to be redefining their understanding of the salinity 
problem. They have been exposed to climate-change discourses recently 
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through a number of communication channels (e.g., media, NGOs, 
and social contacts) in which salinization and sea level rise are often 
discussed as local impacts of climate change. 
An NGO official involved in livelihood development programmes 
for poor people asserted: 
We have had some awareness programmes on coastal livelihood; we gave 
training to the villagers on how to survive in extreme saline conditions, 
for example, cultivating saline tolerant crops and vegetables. Climate 
change appears as a topic in these meetings as this is the main reason 
for the salinity problem in Gabura and other villages. I talked to many 
people and they now understand the real cause of salinity—it’s global 
warming that brings saline water in this region (Khairul Alam, thirty-six, 
M, BA, NGO worker).
The influence of such awareness programmes was apparent in many 
respondents’ descriptions. For example, a female respondent in her 
mid-twenties said: “Saline water is increasing because of climate change, 
that is what I heard from the organization’s [NGO’s] people” (Sonaban, 
twenty-five, F, illiterate, housewife).
A male respondent who worked as a crab farmer expressed a 
similar view when a related question reminded him about the area’s 
susceptibility to salinity:
I understand salinity is not a new problem, but the problem is being 
intensified. In the past, we could pump out fresh water from tube 
wells, but now all these wells are contaminated. Who’s to blame for 
this? Climate change might be the reason. Particularly the organisation 
people are telling us that climate change is the main reason for salinity 
(Nipendranath Mondol, forty-five, M, twelfth grade, crab farmer).
However, many interviewees were not fully convinced that climate 
change was the only cause of the salinity, and were aware of the complex, 
inherently multi-causal nature of this problem. For example, a number 
of respondents identified shrimp aquaculture in former croplands as 
one of the root causes of increased salinization: “We should not always 
blame others for the problem. From my personal experience, shrimp 
enclosures are mainly contributing to the salinity problem” (Golam 
Mustafa Gazi, fifty-three, M, illiterate, honey hunter).
The shift towards shrimp farming in the early 1980s discussed above 
involved farmers introducing saline water from nearby rivers into 
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their shrimp enclosures. This trend has had long-term consequences, 
including increased salinity in surface and groundwater as well as in the 
soil. An elderly male respondent asserted: “I think people are equally 
responsible for increased salinization. Owners of the ‘ghers’ [shrimp 
enclosures] have brought in saline water from the rivers. To me, this 
is the main reason. Everything is salty now” (Abul Hossain Mollah, 
seventy, M, eighth grade, retired government employee). 
Thus, while the interviewees initially referred to climate change 
as the main cause of the salinity problem, their detailed descriptions 
clearly identify geographic proximity and specific local economic and 
development activities such as shrimp farming as important contributors 
to the problem. 
Climate Change as Weather and Seasonal Variances 
Abrupt Seasonal Cycles 
Interviewees overwhelmingly reported that the natural seasons in 
Bangladesh had been more abrupt and unexpected in recent years 
compared to the past, and they categorically blamed climate change for 
this shift. For many, climate change and unusual seasonal behavior were 
synonymous. A male crab farmer, for instance, describes climate change 
as follows: “To me, climate change means season change. Something 
that is not normal. It says change and change of something. Right? 
Something is not like before. I can see seasons are not like they were in 
the past” (Jeher Ali Mirza, fifty-five, M, illiterate, crab farmer).
Interviewees frequently mentioned that Bangladesh used to have six 
seasons, but now has only two or three that often overlap because of 
climate change. According to a male schoolteacher: “We used to have six 
seasons. But you will find them only in the books. In reality, there are 
two or three. Others are difficult to distinguish. But, this was not always 
the case; we were known as the country of six seasons” (Abul Bashar, 
thirty-six, M, MA, schoolteacher)
Similarly, a male shrimp farmer relied on the “past” or his “childhood” 
as the point of reference to describe changing seasonal patterns that he 
believed were a consequence of global climate change. “We hardly get 
enough rain during the monsoon. Summer is extremely hot and you 
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will see changes in the winter season as well. These things are different 
than they used to be in the past” (Ashish Kumar Mondol, forty-eight, 
M, illiterate, shrimp farmer).
Erratic Rainfall and Temperature Anomalies 
Erratic rainfall was a salient feature of respondents’ descriptions of 
climate-change impacts at the local level. They often used terms such 
as “more erratic” or “more unpredictable” and “too early” or “delayed” 
to describe temporal variation in rainfall. Some respondents were so 
confident about the link between erratic rainfall and climate change that 
they recognized it as one of the most important pieces of evidence of 
climate change. Importantly, respondents frequently cited observations 
and experiences of their childhood or in the past to sustain their claims 
of erratic rainfall. In response to a question about the impacts of climate 
change, a boatman said: 
When it rains it pours endlessly for days incessantly. And when it doesn’t 
rain, everything is dry. The problem is we don’t get rain when we need, 
and we get it when actually we don’t need it. I have heard this might be 
because of climate change. I am not sure though. But it seems to me true 
(Shomsher Ali, thirty-three, M, illiterate, boatman).
While a female respondent defined climate change as follows: “Well, 
climate change means […] I think the weather is not the same as it was 
in the past. There are some visible changes in the weather pattern. To 
me, the rainy season has changed a lot” (Khadiza Banu, forty-five, F, 
functional literacy, housewife).
Other respondents take the monsoon or the rainy season as their 
point of reference in emphasizing links between erratic rainfall and 
climate change:
We all knew that it would rain during the months of Ashar and Shrabon 
[Bengali months of the rainy season] and the month of Chaitra [Bengali 
month of the dry season] should be dry. That was the normal seasonal 
cycle. But, now all has been changed. Nowadays it is very uncertain 
(Moksed Ali, sixty-four, M, illiterate, unemployed). 
Respondents also frequently attributed rising temperatures to climate 
change. A male schoolteacher, for example, explained: 
 229Living on the Frontier
We have been witnessing gradual temperature rise. It’s too hot now. For 
example, my father built this house around 15 years ago. At that time, it 
was possible to stay inside the house during summer times. But, now, in 
the month of Chaitra it is too hot to stay inside the house. It feels like a 
hell. Extremely hot! (M Abul Bashar, thirty-six, M, M.A., schoolteacher).
Communicating Climate Change
Role of Media
Analysis of the interview data reveals two major sources of climate 
change knowledge: mass media and NGO advocacy programmes. As 
for mediated climate change knowledge, respondents mainly referred 
to radio and television. “It was on the television”, “I heard it on radio”, 
“there was a programme on television” and “mainly from television 
and radio news” were the sorts of assertions that respondents made 
while describing sources of climate change knowledge. An elderly 
respondent noted: “I heard about it [climate change] from the radio. It’s 
a serious issue, very dangerous. Television also had some programmes 
on climate, but mainly radio” (Abul Hossain Mollah, seventy, M, eighth 
grade, retired government employee).
Similarly, a local community leader said: “I probably watched it on 
television news. You could find it almost every day at that time. Our 
prime minister was in a meeting [referring to COP 15 in Copenhagen] 
and it was a very big one on climate” (GM Rafiqul Islam, forty-one, M, 
twelfth grade, local community leader). 
In the interview data, only three respondents, one schoolteacher 
and two NGO field workers, cited newspaper reports that had 
enhanced their knowledge of climate change. The internet and web- or 
mobile-based social networking sites were not mentioned during the 
interviews because of their complete absence regarding climate change 
communication in the study location.
Most people referred to television and radio while describing their 
understanding of and attitudes about climate change. “Rich countries’ 
responsibility”, “frequent storms”, and “drowning in the sea” were some 
of the frames they learned about from the media which influenced their 
perceptions. Consider the following assertion: “A large part of Bangladesh 
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will be drowned in the sea, the coastal area. I saw it on television” (Gazi 
Mohammad Ayub, thirty-two, M, ninth grade, unemployed).
As the data analysis progressed regarding the media’s role in 
communicating climate change, habitual media use emerged as 
an important factor. In most cases, the media appeared to serve as a 
“passive source” for people, which indicated that climate change was 
not an interesting topic for them. Consider the following assertion: “It’s 
not that I am very much interested about climate change and seek out 
there [in TV or radio]. I mainly listen to news, whatever it is, and find 
it [climate change] there” (Mohasheikh Sardar, forty-four, M, illiterate, 
shrimp-framing and agriculture). 
Most respondents used the media primarily for entertainment. Only 
a handful of male respondents reported that they watched television or 
listened to radio news to stay up to date on contemporary national and 
global issues. A crab trader, for example, replied: “No, I didn’t watch 
TV to know more about climate change. It was out there on the news” 
(Nipendranath Mondol, forty-five, M, twelfth grade, crab trader).
Role of NGOs
NGO advocacy programmes in the form of interpersonal and group 
communication emerged as the second most important channel of 
communicating information about climate change. NGOs’ contribution 
to poverty alleviation, expanding education, women’s empowerment, 
fighting for human rights and disaster management in Bangladesh is 
well recognized in the literature (Rahman 2006; Mercer et al. 2004). 
These organizations have served as important agents of socio-economic 
development and have focused their activities on the rural poor. 
More than 250 NGOs and civil society groups were listed in the local 
government office of the study area. These organizations were involved 
in a variety of projects including micro-credit to rural livelihood 
development, emergency support to cyclone victims, climate change 
adaptation, food security, mass education, forestation, and financing 
alternative livelihoods. After the cyclones in 2007 and 2009, many NGOs 
used foreign aid either to integrate a climate change component into their 
existing projects or to launch a separate programme to raise awareness. 
For example, a field worker for a local NGO described: “Climate change 
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is now a priority focus of our existing programmes. We are working on 
mainstreaming climate change issues in providing livelihood supports 
and disaster management” (Mohsin Alam, M, thirty-one, MA, NGO 
field worker).
Thus, it is not surprising that NGOs were major sources of climate 
change knowledge for local residents. A female respondent asserted: 
“We didn’t know too much about it [climate change] before the 
organization [NGO] people started to tell us” (Momtaj Begum, thirty, F, 
illiterate, housewife and fishing).
In addition to raising awareness, NGOs also communicated 
substantive messages related to the issue. A local shrimp farmer 
explained: “In the past, we didn’t know reasons of storms and rising 
water. Now, we know; organization people told us it is because of 
climate change… Rich countries are liable for this” (Yunus Ali, M, fifty-
five, illiterate, shrimp farmer).
Respondents also noted that NGOs used a participatory approach 
to engage people on different socio-economic issues, which enabled 
NGOs to deliver services to the target beneficiaries more effectively 
than government agencies. The focus on women, group formation 
and identifying opinion leaders in the community have important 
implications for climate change communication by NGOs. An NGO 
field worker described the importance of women in communicating 
their issues to the community: 
Our target beneficiaries are women. We give them loans. As part of it, 
they have to be members of a community group formed by us. We also 
provide training on health, family planning, disaster management, and 
alternative livelihood. Climate change has been included in our training 
programmes recently because it has been badly affecting people’s lives 
(Mohsin Alam, thirty-one, M, MA, NGO field worker).
In Bangladesh, NGOs usually deliver their services to women after 
forming women’s groups. These groups meet regularly to discuss issues 
related to their livelihood challenges. Usually, field workers of the NGOs 
deliver advocacy messages to the groups, which are then handed down to 
other members of the community through informal networks. An NGO 
field worker described her approach: “Normally, we meet at one of the 
member’s uthan (courtyard) and it rotates to other members’ houses” 
(Shahida Begum, thirty-five, F, twelfth grade, NGO field worker).
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Discussion
The findings of this research clearly illustrate that the coastal people of 
Bangladesh widely believe that climate change is the underlying cause 
of their local geohazards. They also perceive climate change as both 
temporally (i.e., happening now) and spatially (i.e., happening here) 
close to them. This spatial and temporal proximity of climate-change 
risks has led people to personalize and localize the impacts. 
Local residents frequently experience regional geohazards, and the 
media and NGOs often communicate these events as possible impacts 
of climate change. Thus, social constructs of climate-change impacts in 
this region appear to be constructed on the basis of place identity on the 
one hand, and availability heuristics through communication channels, 
on the other. 
The “availability heuristics” concept infers that “a risk issue is likely 
to become powerful and capture the public’s imagination if the cause, 
effect and victim are clearly identifiable” (Whitmarsh 2005), experienced 
or can be readily imagined (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982). That 
is, recent personal experience of an extreme weather event or increased 
media coverage is likely to make people consider climate change a 
serious threat because it is readily available in their imagination. The 
risk perception literature supports this argument, as people living close 
to natural hazards tended to believe more strongly in the certainty of 
climate change (Brody et al. 2008). Leiserowitz (2006) also found that 
people who personally experienced environmental disasters tended to 
perceive climate change more emotionally compared to people who 
did not have such experiences (see also Chamila Roshani Perera and 
Rathnasiri Hewege 2013; Bulkeley 2000). By contrast, Whitmarsh (2005, 
2008a) found that personal experiences of floods in the UK had little 
impact on the level of concern about climate change. 
The findings of this research also demonstrate that, like people in 
many developed countries, the coastal people in Bangladesh fail to 
distinguish between the concepts of “climate” and “weather” when 
attributing evidence of climate change. They frequently cite personal 
observations of “abrupt weather” and “seasonal variances” to support 
the view that human-induced climate change is already taking place. 
This is in line with the studies of Read et al. (1994); Goebbert et al. 
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(2012); Capstick and Pidgeon (2014) and Taylor, Bruine de Bruin, and 
Dessai (2014), which all indicated laypeople’s confusion in conceptually 
distinguishing between weather and climate (Etkin and Ho 2007; 
Kempton 1997; Read et al. 1994) when changing weather patterns were 
attributed to climate change (Capstick and Pidgeon 2014; Hulme 2014). 
Radio and television were found to be the primary sources of 
mediated climate change knowledge for inhabitants of the study area. The 
media’s role in communicating climate change issues from the domains 
of science and politics to the public has been well established (Nisbet 
2009; Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui 2009; Cabecinhas, Lázaro, and Carvalho 
2008; Weingart, Engels, and Pansegrau 2000a). In particular, Sampei and 
Aoyagi-Usui (2009) find that television and daily newspapers are the 
main sources of information about environmental and climate change for 
laypeople in Japan. However, the current research did not find that the 
print media played an important role in communicating climate change 
information in the study area. Low literacy rates, economic hardship, 
and geographic location have reduced public access to newspapers 
considerably. This implies that climate change communication strategies 
should take into account the local media environment and levels of 
access to different types of media. 
We find that the study respondents believe climate change has been 
affecting them badly, but display little interest in seeking information on 
climate change from the media. Most interviewees reported consuming 
television and radio content for entertainment; climate change issues 
were generally perceived as either “too boring” or “too complicated”. In 
rural Bangladesh, watching television or listening to the radio are largely 
regarded as leisure time activities. Rural people struggle with a number 
of hardships, and there are very limited options for entertainment. Media 
use thus serves as an escape from their daily troubles, as described in 
media use and gratifications theory (Blumler and Katz 1974; Katz, 
Blumler and Gurevitch 1974). These viewing patterns highlight the 
need for “infotainment” programmes on climate change issues. 
Identifying the important role of interest groups, most notably NGOs, 
in communicating climate change information is one of the significant 
contributions of this research. Respondents’ framing of climate change 
as linked to local geohazards and the politicization of the issue was 
informed by the NGOs. NGOs’ role in politicizing the global climate 
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change debate has received scholarly attention in recent years; they are 
important actors in mediating the issues to the public, policy makers and 
other stakeholders (e.g., Doyle 2009; Corell and Betsill 2001). However, 
the scientific literature has thus far overlooked NGOs’ contribution in 
facilitating grassroots climate-change awareness. This study finds that 
NGOs are particularly successful at employing a participatory approach 
to communicate the issue to the public, and at creating community 
opinion leaders. In particular, they were able to create awareness of 
climate-change risks among women, who had comparatively limited 
access to the media. 
Conclusion
This research explored public perceptions and the communication 
of climate-change risks in the coastal regions of Bangladesh, an area 
besieged by a number of regional geohazards that are worsening due 
to human-induced climate change. Previous research in this area has 
mainly been limited to examining cases in developed countries; the 
perceptions of people living on the “frontline” of climate change effects 
have been largely unexplored until now. Two main research questions 
guided this study. First, how do people in this area perceive risks of 
climate change? Second, how do they communicate these risks?
The study’s findings reveal two important factors in constructing 
public perceptions: “local hazard culture” and “local communication 
environment”. Regarding the former, public perceptions of climate-
change risks are situated and constructed within the contexts of specific 
characteristics of local geohazards. Laypeople in the study area cited 
personal experiences of natural hazards and changes in local weather 
patterns as evidence of climate change. Accordingly, local events and 
their characteristics serve as important filters through which to interpret 
the risks of climate change. 
The second factor, the local communication environment, highlighted 
the important role of respondents’ sources of knowledge, notably the 
media (e.g., television) and formal (e.g., NGOs) and informal social 
contacts. The mutual relationship between these two factors means that 
people obtain climate change information from a number of sources, 
 235Living on the Frontier
and this information is understood within a specific cultural framework 
of natural hazards. 
Future research should address two additional areas. First, the 
study’s methodological approach could be applied to other coastal 
regions of Bangladesh as well as hazard-prone regions in other countries. 
Such a cross-cultural comparison could explore the role of a specific 
hazard culture in the social construction of the concept of climate 
change. Second, future research should analyze NGOs’ communication 
strategies, tools and content, as well as their role (and effectiveness) in 
creating awareness and motivating behavioral changes of laypeople. 
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7. Extreme Weather Events 
and Local Impacts of Climate 
Change:  
The Scientific Perspective
Friederike E. L. Otto
While global and regional temperature increases are the most certain 
indicators of anthropogenic climate change, due to the emissions from 
burning fossil fuels, the damage caused by climate change is most clearly 
manifest in changes in seasons and extreme weather events. Recent 
advances in the attribution of extreme weather events, combined with 
newly available observations of past weather and climate, have made it 
possible to causally link high-impact extreme events to human-induced 
climate change. The level of confidence in these findings, however, 
varies according to the type of event and region of the world. While the 
increase in heatwaves can be quantified with confidence in most parts 
of the world, attribution assessments for droughts and hurricanes are 
much more uncertain. 
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From Global Climate Change to Local Impacts
Scientific reports, political debates, and to a large extent the media, use 
global mean temperature rise as the metric to determine how humans 
are changing the climate by burning fossil fuels. Most prominently, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations 
used this metric to measure and discuss the changing climate. More 
recently, the December 2015 Paris Agreement defines the central goal 
of international climate policy and politics as limiting global mean 
temperature increases to well below 2°C. 
It is, however, not the abstract measure of global mean temperature 
that will cause loss and damage from climate change. Instead, the 
impacts of climate change primarily manifest themselves through 
rising sea levels and the changing risks of extreme weather events. This 
chapter provides a scientific account of the kinds of changes that are 
already being experienced locally, and the changes that we might see 
in the future. It then assesses what climate scientists know about the 
attribution of weather events (such as those discussed elsewhere in this 
volume) to global warming.
From Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Weather
The levels of scientific evidence and our ability to quantify each link in 
the chain of causality from greenhouse gas emissions via global mean 
temperature increases to local effects on weather and hydrology, to 
impacts affecting society, and loss and damage vary considerably (see 
Fig. 7.1). The evidence of the first element, from individual countries’ 
(Skeie et al. 2017) and companies’ (Heede 2014) greenhouse gas 
emissions to concentrations in the atmosphere, is unambiguous. The 
next link in the chain—from atmospheric CO2 concentrations to global 
mean temperature—is also certain and has been known for a long time 
(IPCC 2014). Recent quantitative assessments estimate the global mean 
temperature increase resulting from anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions from the beginning of the industrial revolution to the present 
at about 1°C (Haustein et al. 2017). The evidence is also strong for the 
increase in large-scale average temperatures; the absolute changes are 
very different, but temperatures are increasing in all inhabited regions 
of the world. For instance in Europe, annual mean temperatures have 
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changed twice as fast as the global average (Hegerl et al. 2018; IPCC 
2014). In recent years an increase in global precipitation that is expected 
in a warming climate has also been observed and attributed to human-
induced greenhouse gas emissions (Marvel et al. 2017; IPCC 2014; Allen 
and Ingram 2002). 
Fig. 7.1 Chain of causality from greenhouse gas emissions to loss and 
damage. The width of the arrow signifies the relative level of confidence 
in the quantitative assessments for different parts of the chain. For the 
last four boxes, confidence levels are very different depending on the 
region and type of event (e.g., heatwaves have high confidence, 
windstorms have low confidence) or impact (source: author, 2020).
The next—and arguably most crucial for the day-to-day lives of the 
majority of the world’s population—link from anthropogenic climate 
change and global warming to local or regional individual weather and 
climate-related events has long been impossible to make with confidence. 
Yet, this has changed in recent years. One of the most noticeable local 
effects is the change in seasons: the mid-latitudes are experiencing 
an earlier spring and shorter winters, which is clearly caused by 
anthropogenic climate change (Santer et al. 2018; Christidis, Jones, and 
Stott 2014). Quantifying and establishing the link between individual 
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weather events, which often cause significant damage, has been the focus 
of the emerging science of extreme event attribution (Otto 2017; Stott et 
al. 2016). This strand of research is ambitious because whether and to 
what extent an extreme weather event leads to impacts on natural and 
human systems depends not only on the meteorological hazard (i.e., the 
weather event) but also on the vulnerability and exposure to that hazard 
(i.e., who or what is in harm’s way). Attributing damage and losses from 
extreme weather to climate change is thus possible with quantitative 
information on vulnerability and exposure and an understanding of 
local decision-making and governance structures, but very few studies 
have assessed this final link in the chain of causality (Mitchell et al. 2016; 
Schaller et al. 2016). However, enormous progress has been made in 
being able to robustly and routinely determine whether and to what 
extent anthropogenic climate change has altered the likelihood of 
extreme weather events to occur. Compared to only five years ago, we 
are now able to much more fully understand what anthropogenic global 
greenhouse gas emissions translate to for a particular location, because 
we can quantify the link between global warming and extreme weather. 
This is a crucial step that facilitates a true assessment of the changing 
risks on the level at which both individual and political decisions are 
made. 
In 2003, a landmark publication (Allen 2003) suggested approaching 
the attribution question regarding the role of anthropogenic climate 
change in extreme weather events (Otto et al. 2016) in a probabilistic 
way. This approach entails assessing the likelihood of the extreme 
event in question to occur in the current climate, all man-made drivers 
included, and comparing it with the probability of its occurrence in a 
world without human-induced climate change in order to isolate and 
quantify the effect of climate change. The first paper to apply this 
approach was published in 2004; it found an increase of at least 100% 
in the likelihood that the 2003 European heatwave was attributable to 
human-induced climate change (Stott, Stone, and Allen 2004).
For today’s climate, it is possible to use observations of weather 
and climate to estimate the likelihood that an event will occur. Yet 
we lack observations of a hypothetical, counterfactual world without 
anthropogenic climate change. Furthermore, we can only observe 
weather that has occurred; it is not possible to observe all weather events 
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that are possible in a given climate. The method of event attribution 
thus relies on climate models to simulate possible weather, including 
the extreme event in question, in a given region and season accurately 
enough to draw robust conclusions on the role of climate change. Early 
studies applying the probabilistic event attribution approach employed 
a single climate model; thus, the results are heavily dependent on that 
model’s reliability. A methodology has recently been developed that 
includes multiple models and several lines of evidence; a whole new 
field of climate science has emerged, and the methods are constantly 
improving. Two aspects of the methodology are important to stress here. 
First, the definition of an extreme event is a crucial part of the analysis 
and determines the outcome. In the most widely applied approach 
discussed here, the event is always defined as a type of weather that 
leads to an impact (e.g., extreme rainfall above a certain threshold in a 
particular area or season that causes flooding). Other approaches favor 
much more narrow definitions of an event by, e.g., conditioning on the 
exact atmospheric circulation state without assessing the likelihood of 
such a situation (Otto et al. 2016). The latter is useful for understanding 
the impact of climate change on weather but less useful for local 
decision-making. Second, attribution of extreme events is only reliable 
for the types of events for which climate models are available that 
realistically simulate the type of event; thus, the evidence of a causal link 
between anthropogenic climate change and localized weather events is 
not comprehensive.
Because the role of climate change is always mentioned by the media, 
by members of the public, and by people affected by the impacts of an 
extreme event, a significant amount of public attention has been focused 
on the development of the science. This exposure has also generated 
close scrutiny of scientific studies by peers; critical publications from 
both sides claim that scientists are too confident in their attribution 
statements (Bellprat and Doblas-Reyes 2016) or that they are too 
cautious (Lloyd and Oreskes 2018). While this might have produced 
temporary confusion in public understanding, overall, the public 
scientific discussions led to the comparably fast development of better 
and more robust methods of estimating changing hazards and reducing 
the uncertainty in the results. 
250 Global Warming in Local Discourses
In 2016, the US National Academy of Sciences asked climate scientists 
who were not involved in the science itself to write a report on the state of 
event attribution science and the robustness of the results of such studies. 
The resulting report (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine 2016) concluded that the results were robust overall, but not 
for all types of extreme events. For example, current climate models 
cannot reliably simulate very small-scale events, like flash floods, 
hail, or tornados, in order to assess the role of climate change in their 
occurrence. Nor do we have comprehensive observations on hailstorms 
with which to evaluate climate models. By contrast, since heatwaves and 
large-scale rainfall events are well observed and simulated, confidence 
in the attribution results is high. For droughts and other more complex 
events resulting from a combination of meteorological drivers (such as 
a lack of rainfall and high evaporation), confidence very much depends 
on which aspects of the droughts are studied. Despite these limitations, 
this independent report written by first-class climate scientists noted the 
thoroughness of the new approach to answering one of the most pressing 
questions when natural disasters strike. The report concluded that it is 
now possible to attribute individual weather events to anthropogenic 
climate change. It is thus only in the last few years that the role of climate 
change in extreme weather events around the world has been assessed; 
before, only a few studies examined specific events.
The advancement of event attribution science, and the availability of 
much improved simulations of future changes in extreme events, allow 
us to look at specific events and regions and thus enable a growing 
understanding of how climate change is impacting natural and human 
systems at the local level. This is necessary, as a warming climate has a 
twofold impact on local weather. First, given the increase in greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere and rising global mean temperatures, we expect 
the number of heatwaves to increase and the coldwaves to decrease. 
Similarly, because a warmer atmosphere can hold more water vapor, 
extreme precipitation will increase globally, on average. Indeed, both of 
these impacts have already been observed (IPCC 2012). 
Second, locally, however, this can look very different. The extent of 
extreme precipitation and temperature increases varies, because the 
thermodynamic (warming) effect is not the only way in which climate 
change affects weather and extreme events. Higher levels of greenhouse 
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gases in the atmosphere, combined with more water vapor and a 
changing land surface, alter the atmospheric circulation, which affects 
where and when weather systems develop and how they progress. This 
so-called dynamic effect can be the same size as the thermodynamic 
effect or larger, and it can act in the same direction, thus increasing 
the risk of extreme precipitation, for example, more than would be 
expected from high temperatures alone (Risser and Wehner 2017; van 
Oldenborgh et al. 2017). The effects could also counteract each other, 
and thus prevent changes in extremes (Schaller et al. 2014). Thus, 
there are a priori three possible ways in which climate change affects 
weather and extreme weather; it can: (1) increase the likelihood of an 
event occurring, (2) decrease the likelihood of an event occurring, or 
(3) not affect the likelihood of events and extremes (Otto et al. 2016). 
Event attribution studies thus allow us to assess which of these three 
cases applies to a given type of weather event in a particular region and 
season and quantify the change.
While all three of these impacts can be the result of anthropogenic 
climate change alone, anthropogenic greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere are not the only external driver affecting the likelihood of 
extreme events. For example, an increase in heat events can be offset by 
a cooling trend induced by implementing large-scale irrigation systems 
that keep the soil wet and thus reduce the land-atmosphere feedback 
(van Oldenborgh et al. 2018). 
Aerosols of anthropogenic and natural origin also have a large 
influence on extreme weather events. Depending on the type of aerosol, 
they either reflect sunlight (and thus lead to a cooling) or absorb long-
wave radiation (and thus exacerbate the effect of greenhouse gases). 
However, these are only the direct effects. Aerosols also interact with 
clouds in various ways, making it extremely hard to estimate their exact 
influence on the climate system. On a global scale they do lead to a 
cooling, however (IPCC 2014). In contrast to greenhouse gases, aerosols 
have a very short lifetime, on the order of days or weeks depending on 
how high in the atmosphere they are emitted. If the effect of greenhouse 
gases in an extreme event is masked by local aerosol pollution, irrigation 
or other land use changes, the observed data will reveal no trend in 
extremes. 
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Thus, if observations are the basis of decision-making, these can 
be fatally wrong. Increasing global attempts to combat air pollution 
will soon cancel the masking effect. This of course also means that 
attribution studies that focus only on the attribution of current extreme 
events without putting them in the context of future climate change 
miss an important part of the story. Very few studies have examined 
changing hazards across timescales from the past to the present and 
future. For instance, in the IPCC’s fifth assessment report, detection 
and attribution (IPCC 2014) were discussed in a different chapter than 
projections of future climate change (IPCC 2014), and they used very 
different scales and methods of assessment. Future studies will address 
changing hazards, due to requests from city planners, disaster risk 
reduction experts, and other people involved in climate-change impacts 
and adaptation planning (van Aalst et al. 2018). 
Thus, extreme event attribution allows us to assess the current 
impacts of climate change, in terms of weather as well as costs and 
ecological and societal implications; a comprehensive picture is slowly 
emerging, but there are huge gaps in the developing world. We also 
have the methodologies to combine this understanding with assessment 
of future climate change on geographical scales that matter for decision-
making (e.g., Otto et al. 2018). However, while in theory it is possible 
to conduct an inventory of a large proportion of the changing hazards 
and extreme events taking place in a warming world, few studies have 
examined specific events in individual countries. 
Regional Understanding
Bangladesh is in many ways the poster child of climate-change impacts 
(see Chapter 6, Bangladesh). On the one hand, its population is extremely 
vulnerable to flooding and saltwater intrusion (e.g. Warner and van der 
Geest 2013). Therefore, even small changes in the likelihood of extreme 
precipitation have a huge impact on the country’s exposure to flooding. 
On the other hand, Bangladesh’s scientists and government are acutely 
aware of this situation, and are exploring ways to deal with the impacts 
of climate change, including understanding and quantifying its impacts. 
For example, it was the first country to establish a national mechanism 
to address loss and damage from climate change—the costs (economic 
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and otherwise) that mitigation and adaptation efforts have not avoided. 
While no articles have been published thus far that attribute individual 
extreme events in Bangladesh to anthropogenic climate change, a 
growing body of literature has confirmed that climate change increases 
the risk of damage from extreme events in a changing climate (Caesar 
et al. 2015; Ahmed, Diffenbaugh, and Hertel 2009; Karim and Mimura 
2008). 
Extreme weather events also occur elsewhere on the Indian 
subcontinent; each year it experiences droughts, floods, and heatwaves 
(Dash et al. 2007). In recent years many events have received high levels 
of international media attention because of heat records being broken 
(e.g., in Rajasthan in 2016, a large-scale heatwave in Andhra Pradesh in 
2015) and large losses of assets (e.g., after massive flooding in Chennai in 
2015), and of life (e.g., after exceptionally high monsoon rains in 2018). 
While there is little doubt that climate change plays a role in extreme 
weather events in India (Goswami et al. 2006), attribution studies 
of these recent events have shown that factors other than increased 
greenhouse gases continue to play a crucial role in driving extreme 
weather events over India (van Oldenborgh et al. 2018, 2016; Wehner 
at al. 2016). Natural variability as well as other man-made drivers like 
aerosol pollution play a particularly large role on small scales. At the 
same time, drivers outside the climate system, like river management, 
sewage water systems, and the sheer number of people in harm’s way 
determine to a large degree the impacts of changing weather and 
climate. Understanding how these risks are changing throughout the 
world requires disentangling these factors and assessing their future 
trajectories. 
In India and elsewhere, information on these changing risks is lacking 
at a scale where it is needed most—in the most vulnerable regions, where 
events cause the greatest impacts, where climate change is increasing 
risk, and where the media and the general public are asking questions 
about the root causes of disasters and their own vulnerability. India has a 
strong climate science community and widespread awareness of the fact 
that changes in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events 
and rising sea levels caused by human-induced climate change threaten 
decades of development gains, and pose a clear and present danger to 
the social and economic welfare of communities. The city of Ahmedabad 
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in Gujarat is a good example of how awareness of the changing risk of 
extreme heat has led to the development of a heatwave plan. The plan, 
consisting mostly of awareness rising and simple behavioral advice 
when heat wave warnings are being issued, dramatically reduced 
hospital admissions for heat-related conditions during the most recent 
heat wave compared with the 2005 heatwave (Knowlton et al. 2014). 
With heat-related diseases on the rise in a warming climate (Glaser et 
al. 2016), this example indicates that access to information on the extent 
to which extreme weather events are influenced by climate change and 
other factors can save lives. 
The science base in Northern Europe for localized extreme events 
is broader: a large number of studies have assessed the changing risk 
of extreme events and heatwaves in particular. But the awareness and 
preparedness of individual cities is similar to those of India, although 
vulnerability and exposure are of course very different (cf. Chapter 
4, Germany). The region’s 2003 heatwave, which caused a reported 
70,000 deaths (Donner, Muller, and Koppel 2015), demonstrated that 
preparedness is not a given in this part of the world (Aguiar et al. 
2018). The event led the United Kingdom to develop a heatwave plan 
the following year, before the first attribution study (Stott, Stone, and 
Allen 2004) on this event was published. Subsequent heatwaves had less 
severe impacts, but all showed a clear attributable signal in likelihood 
and intensity to anthropogenic climate change (Christidis, Jones, and 
Stott 2014; Otto et al. 2012). Apart from heatwaves, an increase in 
extreme precipitation events is the most likely impact of anthropogenic 
climate change in Northern Germany. While there are no attribution 
studies on this specific area, given the similarity of the UK’s climate, the 
attributable increase in the intensity and frequency of winter rainstorms 
there gives a good indication of what can be expected in Hamburg (Otto 
et al. 2018b; Schaller et al. 2016). In the summer, the risk of extreme 
precipitation is not currently changing (Otto et al. 2015a; Schaller et al. 
2014). These results are in line with projections of future precipitation 
extremes, which show a significant increase in the winter but no clear 
sign of an attributable change in likelihood or intensity in the summer 
(IPCC 2012). Much less studied are the impacts of anthropogenic 
climate change on windstorms, which often cause casualties. The latest 
generation of regional climate models is good enough to enable realistic 
 255Extreme Weather Events and Local Impacts of Climate Change
simulations, but the lack of comprehensive and reliable observational 
data on these events prevents assessments of this potential impact of 
climate change.
Our knowledge and understanding of extreme weather and their 
changes in a changing climate is again different in East Africa. Droughts 
and floods are the extreme events that have the largest impacts in the 
region; droughts have been studied intensely in recent years. Over 
the last few decades, an observed drying trend in much of the region 
has provided a puzzle for the climate science community, as the 
observations are at odds with model simulations that generally predict 
a wetting trend. Rowell, Booth, Nicholson, and Good (2015) have 
recently made progress in understanding this apparent paradox from a 
modelling perspective. In addition, a large number of event attribution 
studies (Liebmann et al. 2017; Philip et al. 2017; Uhe et al. 2017; Funk et 
al. 2016; Marthews et al. 2015; Otto et al. 2015a; Otto et al. 2015b) have 
helped to disentangle some of the drivers behind the observed trend 
and to identify the relative importance of different drivers in individual 
droughts in recent years. 
The main finding of these event attribution studies is that 
anthropogenic climate change is not a key driver of the lack of rain in 
East Africa in recent years. Drought is a complex phenomenon; the 
higher global temperatures have exacerbated the drought by increasing 
the risk of dry soil moisture (Philip et al. 2017) through increased 
evaporation (Marthews et al. 2015), or via teleconnection through 
higher ocean temperatures (Funk et al. 2016). Teleconnections are 
patterns of variability in ocean temperatures; where they are analyzed 
for East Africa, the predominant mode of variability is the El Niño 
Southern Oscillation (Indeje, Semazzi, and Ogallo 2000). Variability in 
Indian Ocean temperatures is also important. Different modes in these 
patterns have always been crucial to determining seasonal rainfall and 
the likelihood of drought or flood in East Africa. A key question is 
whether (and to what extent) climate change will affect these patterns. 
There is currently insufficient evidence to draw definite conclusions, but 
some studies show that a warming trend, in combination with strong El 
Niño events, may increase the number of droughts (Funk et al. 2018) 
and flood disasters (Li et al. 2016) in the future. 
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In East Africa, huge advances in our understanding of rainfall 
variability and climate model reliability have been made possible by the 
better access to observed data (Funk et al. 2015), and close collaboration 
with scientists from East African Met Services and universities and 
international scientists. Yet many questions remain, particularly 
regarding the role of temperature. 
An increase in temperature can contribute to drier soils and thus 
exacerbate the risk of drought, an effect often referred to when aiming to 
establish a climate change link (Funk et al. 2016). However, particularly 
in already arid regions, temperature often only exacerbates evaporation 
when moisture is present. Compounding the meteorological effects, it 
has been shown that hotter than normal temperatures have accelerated 
forage and water depletion across most of the region’s pastoral and 
marginal agricultural areas (FEWS NET 2017), and thus identifying 
increasing temperatures as an additional stressor, which will have 
implications during future extreme heat and drought events, as well 
as for livelihood activities such as crop production (Republic of Kenya 
2013). 
East Africa has always experienced extreme weather events (see 
Chapter 5, Tanzania). But the fact that not all of the recent droughts 
were very extreme from a meteorological perspective highlights that it 
is high vulnerability that led to the severe societal impacts (Magnan et 
al. 2016). 
In sum, the results generated by the nascent field of event attribution 
indicate that attribution studies around the world largely confirm our 
expectations—that a warming climate increases heatwaves and extreme 
rainfall events. The magnitude of this increase, however, varies widely 
by region and season, and local factors unrelated to climate change can 
prevent or decrease the risk of these extremes. 
The examples above thus highlight that a heightened understanding 
of regional changes in individual types of extreme weather events 
facilitates preparation for all types of extreme weather. But if these 
advancements in natural science are not made relevant to those 
experiencing such weather and deciding how best to adapt, even 
perfect models and complete inventories of climate-change impacts will 
not prevent future loss and damage from extreme weather caused by 
climate change.
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